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**THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
PERSONALITY**



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TORONTO

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PERSONALITY

BY
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NEWTON THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTION

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TO MY SONS

COMRADES IN THE QUEST AND SERVICE OF TRUTH

WAYLAND FARRIES VAUGHAN

RICHARD FARRIES VAUGHAN



PREFACE

No aspect of modern life is more significant than the increasing recognition of the idea of personality. In the confusion which marks the intellectual and social changes of the present day, personality is the clew which gives the most promise of leading us out of the labyrinth of problems into light and freedom.

In this book we seek to understand personality in its historical relationships and inward meaning and to employ it as a principle of interpretation in the wide range of our intellectual and practical interests. Our effort is not to discuss individual problems exhaustively, but to present a comprehensive and self-consistent world view, whose constructive idea is personality. The result of our studies is the conviction that such a world view best meets the demand of philosophy for a complete synthesis of the facts of life, of religion for a universe friendly to its values, and of ethics for power and guidance in the presence of the tasks of the modern world.

We know that many able pens are engaged in a similar task of interpretation. To enumerate the volumes dealing with a personalistic view of life, and particularly to itemize the author's indebtedness to them, would constitute a volume in itself. I wish to express my deep obligations to fellow members of the Faculty of the Newton Theological Institution. To my friend, Professor Woodman Bradbury, in particular, who read the manuscript, I owe many valuable

suggestions. A similar service was rendered by Professor John W. Buckham of the Pacific School of Religion, my honored teacher of California days. For bibliographical references, I am much indebted to Librarian William J. Cloues. My wife, Eleanor Farries Vaughan, has given assistance which can be acknowledged but not measured. My apologia for adding one more book to the theological literature of our time is the hope that I may so hold personality to the light of modern knowledge that some distinctive ray may flash from even a single facet and illumine the pathway of our human life.

Newton Centre, Massachusetts.

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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
PERSONALITY

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CHAPTER I

THE STRIFE OF OPINIONS

1. *Our need of a world view.* The greatest need of our time is a workable philosophy of life. Man cannot live by facts alone, he must have meanings also. We dwell in an age of science, but its vast and noble discoveries throw no light on the ultimate mysteries of existence. Science has no reply to the query as to why there should be any world.

It is the task of philosophy, supplementing science and using all its findings, to appraise the world in the terms of purpose, or the lack of it. Purpose alone gives meanings, and apart from it our existence is a troubled dream. We cannot dispense with a world view, a way of looking at life as a whole. A man may not use technical terms to state his general ideas about the world, but he is sure to acquire a philosophy of some kind.

The rising demand for an interpretation of the avalanche of scientific facts which threaten to smother us has recently found striking expression at Harvard University. The Student Council has petitioned the authorities for the appointment of a committee to make a thorough study of the educational system of the university to attempt to fill the void occasioned by the decay of religion, by organizing new courses in

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each of the major departments of science, "which in addition to giving the laws of Nature should seek to explain them in terms of philosophy." The philosophical tradition at Harvard is a brilliant one, but there, as elsewhere, the mind of the new generation asks for the spiritual significance of the vast mass of facts presented by the modern sciences.

Every world view is a social product. It is a stream which has gathered into itself the interpretation of nature and human life, the fears and hopes of many generations. The rude guesses of primitive peoples, in which fancy and truth were closely interwoven, were the beginnings of philosophy. The enlarging experiences of men, the compulsions of new environments, necessarily produced many changes in the funded ideas of every human group. Strong and original personalities impressed themselves on the social mind. Separated by barriers of language and mountains and seas, peoples have shaped their views of the world.

The startling fact which confronts us to-day throughout the world is the breakdown of many long-cherished ways of thinking. This is particularly true of the non-Christian systems of thought as they come into contact with scientific Western civilization. In Japan, everything has changed except the landscape in a single lifetime. The old religions of the land are losing their power or are undergoing transformation. China is breaking the fetters of its age-long conservatism and is adjusting itself to the modern world. India finds that the caste system, which is at the basis of its social life, cannot be maintained in an age of science and democracy. The whole Mohammedan world is astir under the influence of Western ideas. Africa is throwing away its fetishes and moving into the stream of

history. The tragic situation in which many non-Christian peoples find themselves is the crumbling of the old religions and the old ethical bases of social stability, without the attainment of new foundations upon which to build a higher order of life.

Nor are the Western Christian nations exempt from vast intellectual changes. Many writers speak in radical terms of the transformations which are taking place. We are told by James T. Shotwell that "the brand of superstition" is being placed upon many of the most cherished beliefs of the fathers.¹ He agrees with Dr. Osler in saying of religion, that as far as the control of society is concerned, "The battle of Armageddon has been fought—and lost!" He declares that the tremulous note of reverence in the presence of the mysteries of life and matter will continue to sound across the still, clear spaces of the mind, but the intellectual forms in which religion formerly expressed itself are falling into silence. Our divinities are being overtaken by the fate of the once powerful Unkulunkulu, whom the Zulu, disillusioned by contact with the white man's ideas and ways, likened to a very old crone, sitting helplessly in the sun, unable even to catch and flog the children who made sport of her.²

It is plain that powerful forces assail the Christian view of the world. The attack is directed not merely against the outposts of the faith, but against the citadel of the reality of God himself. For the most part, men have hitherto differed in the forms of religion to which they have adhered, but we have now the relatively new phenomenon of numerous groups and individuals who reject religion in any recognizable historical sense of the word. In the Latin countries the intellectual classes as a whole are hostile or indif-

ferent to institutional religion. Certain labor groups in capitalistic countries accuse the church of complicity with their exploiters and denounce religion as the opiate of the people. The Communists of Russia are endeavoring to crush out religion altogether. On every hand, there are individual voices which challenge generally accepted religious beliefs. To Eugenio Rignano, religion is "a great human illusion that has vanished."³ We are assured by Roy W. Sellars that "Romantic spiritualism must give way to humanistic naturalism."⁴ And Count Hermann Keyserling reports concerning God, "He has gone out of business altogether."⁵

The forces which have brought about the present crisis in religion are many and are deeply seated in our complex civilization. They are by no means inherently hostile to religious faith but they have radically disturbed traditional religion in all lands. Among the major influences, which are compelling us to recast our inherited world views, are the rise of modern science, the increase in our knowledge of history and of contemporary peoples, the development of literary and historical criticism, and the growth of democracy.

The most potent single force in the creation of the modern mind is science. The word, of course, is used with reference to natural science and the methods which are appropriate to it. The study of the phenomena of the physical universe, according to a certain procedure and eventuating in certain discoveries, has virtually revolutionized human life. As a method, science is a way of attaining knowledge through induction from objective facts and special safeguards against error. It employs direct observation, orderly experiment, hypothesis in arriving at general laws, and veri-

fication in the light of all the ascertainable facts. The task of science is to describe and classify phenomena and to discover the laws of their relations. It is interested solely in efficient causation, how things happen; but it is not at all interested in final causation, why or for what purpose they happen.

Students of nature find things bound together by cause and effect. There is no lost Pleiad, no unrelated fact. Science, therefore, makes the assumption that the reign of law is universal. It believes in orderly relations and unbroken continuities. The theory of evolution has been particularly influential, for it declares that development is the creative procedure everywhere. The wide acceptance of the idea of evolution in some form has profoundly affected all our intellectual activities in every sphere of human interest.

The employment of the inductive method of science has resulted in a vast extension of knowledge. The microscope has resolved the atom into a dynamic system of electrons; the telescope has widened the sidereal realm into island universes a hundred million light years away. We have gained command over steam and electricity and are reaching after atomic energies. The inventions which have marked the progress of science are remaking our customs and institutions. The noblest gift of science, however, is not its utilities but the scientific spirit. This is the spirit which seeks with humility the truth only and fears nothing but the horror of a lie.

The new intellectual attitude, diffused by science, has far-reaching consequences for religion. It makes impossible subjection to authority purely arbitrary and external. The facetious advice of Thomas Hobbes to swallow our religious pills whole, without any ques-

tioning, is increasingly disregarded. We are disposed to inquire about the ingredients, even though we may not chew them. Science has given men a new sense of mastery over the world and has thus produced a larger self-reliance and social hopefulness. We are quickly forgetting the lesson taught by the World War that science in itself may merely supply us with the instruments of mutual destruction. Furthermore, science by its wise self-restriction to the causal system in nature, has, nevertheless, promoted the materialistic temper which interprets all things in terms of matter and its laws.

In order to understand the present religious situation, account must be taken, also, of our increased knowledge of other peoples, both those who have lived in the past and those who are living to-day. History enlarges our outlook and emancipates us from prejudices and one-sided opinions. The decline of Græco-Roman civilization left the peoples of western Europe with little knowledge or appreciation of the intellectual riches of the past. The Renaissance was an awakening of the minds of these peoples, through acquaintance with the literary memorials of the ancient world, as well as through geographical discoveries. Not until a century ago, was the tri-lingual inscription of the Rosetta Stone deciphered and the civilization of ancient Egypt disclosed to us. The Behistun inscription in the Zagros Mountains at a still later time proved the key to the life of the peoples of Babylonia and Assyria. Historical research has brought us a flood of light upon the times when the Bible was written and has necessarily modified traditional views concerning it, while bringing into clearer relief its essential religious message.

We possess, also, a better acquaintance with fellow peoples upon our planet. This has been made possible by the means of communication which scientific invention has put in our hands. The battle of New Orleans in 1815 was fought a fortnight after America and Britain had made peace at Ghent, for news in those days traveled by sailboats. To-day the nations are a neighborhood and all happenings are matters of common knowledge. The mutual acquaintance of religions has been particularly momentous. No doubt, in religions, as in automobiles, there is worse and better, but claims of exclusive excellence are inadmissible in the light of the study of comparative religion. "There is not a piece of dress," said Father Bury in Buddhistic China, "not a sacerdotal function, not a ceremony of the court of Rome which the Devil has not copied in this country." * Christianity has distinctive values but the study of religions in general compels us to find them in the essentials and not in the incidentals of faith.

The rise of literary and historical criticism is another fact which has a profound bearing upon authoritarian religion of every kind. There is authority in religion, as there is in science, but it is the authority of knowledge of things-as-they-are, rather than the authority of Ptolemy's account of the solar system or of Calvin's interpretation of the spiritual order. "Criticism," through the shifting emphasis of language, has become a misunderstood term, particularly when "higher" is attached to it. The first word, of course, means discriminative study and its positive result is appreciation, while the latter word, with no savor of arrogance, differentiates the study of a document in its inner message and historical relationships from mere effort

to arrive at the correct original text. The canons of literary and historical criticism were first employed in modern times in an effort to winnow the factual wheat from the legendary chaff in classical writings.

It was inevitable that Biblical literature should be subjected to the tests of the critical method. We have learned that every book in our Scriptures came out of a definite historical situation and is vital with the power of the providential movement which gave it birth. As the record of a progressive divine revelation, the Bible has both historical relativity and permanent religious value. Nevertheless, there has been serious disturbance of faith, even as Loyola found that the reading of Erasmus' Greek Testament, with its variations from the Vulgate, marred his devotional mood and he resolved to read no more.

The growth of democracy, also, is a momentous factor in the theological situation. The last two centuries have seen the rise to self-consciousness and power of class after class in human society. In part, this has been possible through the new command of the resources of nature which science has given us; in part it has been due to a new appreciation of the worth of man as man everywhere.

In recent years there has been a reaction against political democracy, as an accompaniment and aftermath of war. The counter movements, nevertheless, seek popular approval and are, doubtless, temporary reactions against the rule of the people. Monarchy, particularly absolute monarchy, has largely disappeared and is apparently doomed to extinction. Democracy must find ways to assure itself of more competent leadership but it has proved itself, on the whole, quite as efficient as the despotisms of the past and its ideals

are those most accordant with an intelligent, self-reliant, and progressive humanity.

Democracy is a fact closely related to the fortunes of religion in modern life. It is itself deeply in debt to historic Christianity with its basic doctrines of the universal fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of men. Christianity, however, in its formative period did not escape the law that theology always draws its pattern ideas from contemporary social life. And Christianity had its beginning in a world familiar with Oriental monarchies, and in which Roman emperors held despotic sway over many peoples. Inevitably, its organization and its doctrines were poured into monarchical molds. The papal system of Roman Catholicism is Roman imperialism in the sphere of religion. To the Calvinist, God was absolute monarch after the manner of contemporary kings. The whole dogma of salvation in centuries past was successively phrased in terms which reflected slavery, feudalism, monarchism absolute or constitutional.

And now upon these ecclesiastical institutions and doctrinal schematisms, there falls the influence of democracy. The present upheavals in religion are incidents in its progressive democratization. The entire structure of our religion is involved in this process—our conception of God, our forms of organization and worship, our idea of salvation, our view of what lies beyond death. This democratization of Christianity is imperative if it is to function effectively in a democratic age. But the process of remodeling our inherited religious domicile, while we still live in it, is necessarily attended by confusion and distress. And as every great movement has its indefensible extremes, we find to-day a militant humanism which, in the

name of democracy, cancels theism itself and reduces religion to reverence for human values and devotion to social service.

It is obvious to all observers that the significant movements of our age have acted as a solvent upon our inherited world view. The valuable elements of our faith have not thereby perished. The essential truths of religion lie within the chemical solution awaiting some philosophical precipitant which will crystallize them into new forms of beauty and utility.

In the meantime, the quest after a satisfactory philosophy of life occupies the thoughtful modern man. It is altogether probable that he will go into many blind alleys before he finds the open road. In science, even the unsuccessful experimenter receives a degree of honor as contributor to the final discovery. He has shown us how not to do it. Our various philosophies, inadequate and erroneous as many of them may appear to us, add something to human wisdom. And the curious fact remains that in science and in philosophy the cumbersome, untenable hypothesis comes first, especially to a type of the learned mind; the simple and adequate hypothesis appears last. The intricate, revolving spheres of Ptolemy precede the heliocentric planetary system of Copernicus; the complicated legalisms of the Pharisees precede Jesus' statement of human duty as love to God and man. The clew to the riddle of the universe, once we know it, will seem as simple as it is wonderful. The little child can understand it and the wisest philosopher cannot fathom its depths.

2. *Competitive interpretations of life.* Even a cursory survey of the present state of popular thought and of the forces which have produced it reveals the

need of a workable philosophy of life. Where is the architectonic idea which will enable us to construct a home for our spirits? The world views presented for our acceptance are bewildering in number and complexity. There is scarcely a theory of knowledge or of objective reality which some aspirant after truth—or originality—has not sponsored. For the purpose of this discussion, it will suffice to refer briefly to agnosticism, materialism, pantheism, humanism, and personalism. Many of the other theories readily find a place as aspects or equivalents of these interpretations of the world.

Agnosticism can scarcely be called a world view for it is in itself a negative term. It constitutes, however, a theory of knowledge and an attitude toward religious realities. Thomas Huxley invented the word “agnostic,” for, as a member of the Metaphysical Society, he felt like a fox without a tail unless he had a philosophical appellative of some kind. The word in itself is merely a disclaimer of knowledge, but the ignorance it assumes is not ordinary ignorance but a learned ignorance. The name may be new but the reality is certainly as old as Greek skepticism. Indeed, Confucius and Buddha interested themselves solely in morality and ignored supernatural beings.

It was Immanuel Kant, himself believer in God, freedom and immortality, who laid the foundation for modern agnosticism by his distinction between “phenomena,” or appearances to the senses, and “noumena,” or the invisible spiritual realities behind phenomena which can never be known in themselves. At a later day, Herbert Spencer pronounced the reality back of all things “utterly inscrutable.” This attitude toward the realities which religion affirms is very widespread

in our day. Sometimes it is a wistful yearning after spiritual verities, sometimes it is sheer naturalism in convenient disguise.

There is value in agnosticism as a protest against the theological omniscience which explored the innermost recesses of the nature of God and gave us detailed eschatological programs. Religion, as the spirit of awe and reverence, cannot dispense with mystery, but mystery is not the utterly unknown but the partially known, and it is itself a challenge to larger knowledge. We know "in part," but we know. Agnosticism can only be relative, for an absolute agnosticism would be self-refuting. To know that we do not know is itself knowledge. Practically, the nescience of agnosticism is extended only to religious realities. The agnostic accepts the findings of the naturalist and the sociologist. If he believes anything at all, however, he is under compulsion, by virtue of the unity of the universe, to keep on endlessly. There is only one universe and knowledge of any one thing, even the flower in the crannied wall, involves relationships which ultimately tell us all concerning God and man. The spiritual experiences of life are facts which demand explanation, as truly as boulders and beetles demand it. A reality behind phenomena, which cannot be known, is pure myth. Reality is known in and through its manifestations. The whole universe, therefore, is divine self-revelation, every shrub and star is vocal with God. Agnosticism has a noble aspect of humility, but after all, in so far as it is a refusal to try to ground the supreme values of life in ultimate reality, it is an unworthy evasion of the highest obligations of human thinking.

Materialism, unlike agnosticism, has the virtue of

positive affirmations concerning the universe. There is a tendency to-day to use the term "naturalism," instead of "materialism," as designation of the anti-theistic world view under consideration. Naturalism emphasizes the mechanical nature of the cosmic process and its indifference to ideals, whereas materialism directs our thought to matter and force as the basic data of existence and is traditionally militant in its attitude toward religion. The terms are practically interchangeable. To both of them, our idealisms are temporary incidents in the ongoing of the world. Any system of thought which gives the last word to a physical universe which goes triumphantly on its impersonal way when all spiritual intelligence has vanished is properly designated as materialism.

In general, there are only two philosophies in the world, those which interpret existence in terms of matter, and those which interpret existence in terms of mind. Man finds the clew to ultimate reality in nature or in himself. These two philosophies we denominate materialism or idealism. Of these philosophies there are, of course, innumerable modifications, phases, and even interminglings. Nor does any idealist deny the reality of matter upon its own plane. He does deny that all existence is at last reducible to matter and its energy. The great battlefield of metaphysics, as the long history of philosophy proves, is the relation of mind and matter to each other. The first philosophers in our Western world were really physicists. Thales affirmed that all things were constituted of water, whereas Heraclitus believed that fire was the primal fact. To Democritus we owe the theory that atoms are the building blocks of both things and thoughts.

The rise of modern science gave impetus to the

materialistic type of thought. It is not difficult to find many parallels to Cabanis' remark that the brain produces thought as the liver produces bile. Ernst Haeckel reduced everything to the Law of Substance, whose discovery and establishment he regarded as the greatest intellectual achievement of the nineteenth century.⁷ He wrapped up in this law both the conservation of matter and the conservation of energy. It follows that belief in a personal God and life after death is "mere superstition." Haeckel managed, however, to endow matter with a wealth of psychic qualities which almost lifted it into mind. Materialism, as a modern philosophy, soon foundered upon the rocks and there is scarcely a professional philosopher willing to wear its label. With the coming of behavioristic psychology, there is a marked recrudescence of materialistic thought. As a mode of life, materialism has greater vogue than it has as a philosophy.

The obstacles to the acceptance of materialism as a working view of life are insurmountable. The whole question of the nature of matter is in debate. The new theories of matter make it very difficult for us to be materialists. Some physicists resolve matter into pure energy. The "atom" has become a system of protons and electrons whose constituent fact seems to be electricity. And "energy" brings us to the borderland of will and a spiritual interpretation of reality. Scientific information is yet insufficient for dogmatic statement, but the radio-activity of matter appears to have dealt a fatal blow to the old materialism. The physiological psychology which attempts to make ideas a mere product of cerebral activity, scintillations of the nervous system, contradicts the universal experience of the efficiency of consciousness.

The pragmatic condemnation of materialism is its benumbing and devastating effect upon life. It takes from us all the inspirations which proceed from belief in freedom, God and immortality. In the evolutionary ethic of the survival of the fittest through ruthless struggle, it even gives intellectual sanction to the horrors of war. This interpretation of evolution is invalidated, however, by the recognition of mutual aid, or love, as the decisive factor in the upward march of life. Thorough-going naturalism sees no abiding spiritual significance to our human life. It must confess with Bertrand Russell, in one of his older essays, that all our fairest intellectual achievements are destined to be destroyed at last by "the trampling march of unconscious power." A heroic but unavailing defiance of the oncoming cosmos, as we rear our temporary idealistic structures, was the noblest counsel which he was then able to give us. The idea of "creativity" in nature, now widely accepted, is playing havoc with the old deterministic world of naturalism. Russell himself is now willing to endow even the atom with a kind of limited freewill. And he assures us that we need not think of ourselves as powerless and small in the grip of vast cosmic forces.⁸ We shall not have reached the clear, open spaces, however, until we recognize that the material universe is wholly instrumental and that spiritual values are final and eternal.

In pantheism, we have a world view which has fascinated many minds throughout the centuries. There are two kinds of pantheism—materialistic and idealistic. The former type of pantheism is scarcely distinguishable from materialism which finds the unity of all things in the concepts of matter and motion. Many materialists are willing to use the name of

"God," as the infinite sum of all natural forces. Like Schopenhauer, however, they know that pantheism is only a polite form of atheism, a convenient way of "giving the Lord God his congé." ° On the other hand, idealistic pantheism regards mind as the monistic principle. The universe in its totality is the expression of impersonal mind which comprehends all things.

The two chief historic exponents of pantheism are Sankara and Spinoza. The great Vedantic philosopher taught that Brahman is the only reality and Brahman is simple undifferentiated intelligence, wholly without attributes or relations. To be sure, he speaks of a lower Brahman whom he calls Isvara, who fulfills a theistic function for mankind, but Isvara ultimately merges into the higher, impersonal Brahman. The visible world, including ourselves, is "maya," or illusion. Our true destiny is to pass beyond all individuality and to realize our identity with the Absolute. The system of Spinoza seems to be more friendly to the real existence of the world. He endowed the one self-subsisting reality which he denominated "substance" with the two attributes of extension and thought. The world exists eternally by necessity. We find salvation by knowing all things as they are in God and by losing ourselves in him.

One of the attractions of pantheism is its emphasis upon unity. All thought is a quest after a unified world. The scientific temper, in particular, finds satisfaction in a monistic interpretation of things. The highest unity, however, is a unity of complexities, and it may well prove that a pluralistic personalism is nearer the truth than is a pantheistic monism. It is true, also, that pantheism brings the divine very close to us, a fact which appeals strongly to the mystical

temper. The permanent truth in pantheism is the fact of the immanence of God in his world.

Pantheism is attractive, also, because it seems to bring deliverance from our anthropomorphisms, it makes God too great for our human concepts. Many deeply religious men feel that the sense of awe in us requires as object of worship a divine immensity lying beyond the reach of our personal pronouns. There are various philosophical problems to which pantheism gives a distinctive angle of approach. It does away with the puzzle of creation by giving us a self-existent universe and it engulfs in a realm of necessity or illusion the questions pertaining to the reality of evil in its various forms.

Despite its elements of appeal the difficulties in pantheism are so great that it can be the philosophy of only an esoteric company. Even in India, preëminently the home of pantheism, the masses of the people practically ignore Vedantism and bow down to personal polytheistic deities. The idea of impersonal mind lies outside all human experience. The only mind of which we can gain any conception is mind as a phase of personality. Pantheism is unable to account for the phenomenal world, including human personalities, for its world ground is causally inadequate. If we call the phenomenal world an illusion, we are honor bound to include ourselves and our pantheistic opinions in that category. Personality in man, as well as in God, perishes in the pantheistic gulf. Man becomes an evanescent wave on the ocean of being. Moral distinctions fade in the realm of illusion or of necessity. By its own inward logic, pantheism everywhere lowers our estimate of man and destroys the incentives to progress.

The most aggressive philosophical applicant for the position of practical guide to our age is humanism. It bids us make humanity, in its ideal and collective aspects, the only object of religious reverence and service. It does not concern itself with the reality of God as objective to humanity. As a rule, it uses the old religious terms with their emotional power, but it redefines them beyond recognition. To humanism, God is the Ideal Socius; he is "personal," for a community possesses personality; he is even "transcendent," because society is beyond and above individual life. The new social religion can even affirm its belief in "eternal life," but it uses the phrase in a qualitative sense, for the only immortality in which it believes is the persistence of our influence in the human group.

The real founder of this type of thought was Auguste Comte, author of *Positive Philosophy*. According to him, there have been three stages in man's interpretation of the world. In the theological stage, we had explanation by personal divine agencies; in the metaphysical stage, by impersonal essences and powers; in the positive stage, we arrive at a truly scientific attitude and concern ourselves with natural and social phenomena and their laws. As a substitute for the historical religions, Comte in his later years proposed a Religion of Humanity, whose Grand Etre, or object of worship, in brief, was the sum total of the civilized and progressive part of our race. The highly elaborate cultus which Comte drew up for the new religion has found very slight acceptance, but his central idea of devotion to humanity as the only religion possible in our scientific age exerts to-day a tremendous influence.¹⁰ Members of widely divergent philosophical groups can be classed as humanists, for no better term

expresses their religious attitude. Emile Durkheim of France, Hans Vaihinger of Germany, Edward S. Ames of our country, emphasize humanity as the object of reverential devotion.

A movement of thought, so influential, obviously embodies much that is true. Society does furnish many analogies to deity in the functions which it performs for the individual life. It may be said to be creative, for personality is a social product. It nourishes, disciplines, forgives, redeems. It is frequently the object of a loyalty religious in its quality and degree. To Mazzini, Italy was a religion, although he was a true theist. We make invocations and sing praises to "Alma Mater" and to "America the Beautiful." Harry A. Overstreet shrinks from too planetary a divine society and insists on the inclusion of all cosmic intelligences in the God "who is Ourselves."¹¹ In so far as God is immanent in society, he is surely discoverable there. The effort to limit God to the Spirit of the Group, nevertheless, would be fatal to religion.

Historically, religion has thought of Deity as Something There, as a Cosmic Power upon which our humanity as a whole is dependent. Humanism cannot explain Nature as a reality antecedent to our presence upon earth. We found trees and stars and did not call them into existence; a power extra-human must account for them. And somehow, there is an Order-of-Things, in which we are enabled to realize our social values. As an object of worship, the God who is Ourselves is sadly lacking. This God is both sinful and transitory. He supplies no assurance that we live in a world where our loftiest ideals can find realization and where our hearts can find rest in the conscious-

ness of adequate power. Prayer, with all its inspirations, cannot sustain itself in an atmosphere so lacking in truly personal elements.¹² The Religion of Humanity is not really religion at all, it is ethics. The religious problem begins where the positivists leave off. And if religion could ever be dwarfed into humanistic molds, it would lose the socializing power which, as supernatural faith, it has always exerted.

There is one more philosophy of life which offers itself to the modern mind and that is personalism. It does not question the elements of truth in systems which bear other names but it believes that it takes account of a larger number of facts and gives them better coherence and unity. Difficulties there are in every world view; more than one philosophic ship has been wrecked on the presence of evil in the universe. Personalism is not without its special problems but on the whole it is the most satisfactory explanation of the world in which we live.

The word "personalism" is relatively new but the ideas which it expresses are deeply embedded in the history of thought.¹³ Whether he knew it or not, man has always interpreted the universe in terms of his own powers. It was Friedrich Schleiermacher who first spoke of "Personalismus" in 1799 in his epochal *Discourses on Religion to Its Cultured Despisers*. An essentially equivalent term was "Personal Idealism" which George H. Howison made current at the beginning of the twentieth century by his use of it in *The Limits of Evolution*. In France, Charles Renouvier, in 1903, wrote *Le Personalisme* and in Germany, in 1906, William Stern called his own philosophy "Critical Personalism." The first use of the word in English on the title page of a book, was by Borden P. Bowne,

who published *Personalism* in 1908. In a letter written later, he declares, "I am a Personalist, the first of the clan in any thorough-going sense."

The term "personalism" is practically self-defining. It is the world view which finds in personality or man's selfhood, a key to the nature of the ultimate reality which religion calls God, and to the significance of the cosmic process and of human history as the scenes in which personal values are realized. Personalism demands a careful definition of the nature of personality as we know it in ourselves. As personality is a growth and is now conditioned by factors which are not necessarily always essential to it, we must free the idea of its anthropomorphisms in order to apply it intelligently to the Supreme Being. Possibly, we shall have reason to believe that the complete idea of personality is not in ourselves but that we are only sparks thrown out by the lapidary's wheel from the parental diamond—sparks but diamond.

The interpretation of the world from the point of view of personality is the age-long and catholic human philosophy. Idealism of some kind remains the philosophy of the great majority of men. It has thus upon its side the empirical response of the human mind to the order of things. Pragmatism rightly tells us that our deepest beliefs arose out of the necessities of life and that our metaphysics, whether unusually stubborn or otherwise, are our efforts to justify them. It is true that one wise man's verdict outweighs all the fools but it may fairly be said that idealism, in its most inclusive sense, is the faith of primitive men and the main stream of philosophic tradition.

The inability of the anti-theistic world views to escape personalism is apparent with respect to mate-

rialism, pantheism and humanism. In the case of materialism, it is necessary to endow the original world-stuff with qualities more or less psychic in order to get our present orderly universe out of them. Even to Democritus, the fiery atoms, stimulated by the effluxes of things, had power of perception, that is, a quality of mind. And when John Tyndall in our time, declared that matter had in it the promise and potency of every form of life, he ascribed to matter abilities which properly belong to spirit. As for idealistic pantheism, it can proceed only on the theory of immanent, impersonal mind, a something which lies wholly outside all experience on land or sea, for mind, certainly in its higher ranges, is only an aspect of personality. Even the Hindu philosophies are compelled to recognize the transcendence of the Divine, as well as its immanence, in the world. Metaphysics may speak of an impersonal Absolute but religion requires the fellowship of God and man, and Hinduism in its chief expressions as Vishnuism and Sivaism cannot refrain from thinking of God as a person.

An instructive instance of a humanism which is implicitly personalistic occurs in the writings of James H. Leuba, despite his hostility to the idea of a personal God. He tells us that our need is "a religion in agreement with the accepted body of scientific knowledge and centered about Humanity, conceived as the manifestation of a Force tending to the creation of an ideal society."¹⁴ Plainly, the Force of which this able psychologist speaks, semi-personalized with an initial capital letter, possesses attributes which we commonly associate with personality. This force is purposive, it tends to or aims at the creation of an

ideal society; it is beneficent or loving, for an ideal society is a good in itself; and it is intelligent, for it is adapting means for the realization of ends. Purpose, love, and intelligence are expressions of personality, and we have here a humanism which is logically theistic, as Molière's Sganarelle was a physician, in spite of itself.

To trace the growth of personalism as a philosophy would involve much of the long, long story of human thought on ultimate problems. We usually begin, and rightly, with the Greeks, as the pioneers of philosophy in our Western world. Anaxagoras opened a door on far vistas when he spoke of "nous" or mind, as the explanatory principle in the world. To Plato goes the credit of conceiving mind in immaterial terms, and Aristotle is in agreement with him. Our debt to Augustine is vast for in his autobiography he opened, as no one else previously had done, the door to the inner life of man. In modern times, Descartes, in building his philosophy on self-certainty, magnified personality. Leibnitz, with his theory of persons as windowless monads and God as the supreme monad, stressed the pluralistic aspect of reality. Berkeley made matter solely an activity of divine mind. Kant put man back on the center of the stage from which a Copernican cosmology had driven him, by making mind the very seat of the categories of time and space. Lotze saw in man the microcosm who reflects the macrocosm, the dewdrop which mirrors the sky. Bowne formulated the various personalistic elements into a consistent system of thought. The roll of recent exponents of a view which can properly be called personalistic is a long one. It includes Pringle-

Pattison, Sorley, Rashdall, Turner in England; Eucken, Troeltsch in Germany; Renouvier, Boutroux in France; Aliotta, Croce in Italy. As for America, emphasis is placed on personal idealism by Ladd, Bowne, Brightman, Knudson, Buckham, Calkins, Alexander, Leighton, Pratt, Wright, Flewelling. And a study of the present trend of thought shows a reaction from mechanistic and realistic views toward more spiritual interpretations of the universe.

Within personalism itself there are, of course, diversities of opinion. The common element is the faith that mind, spirit, personality is ultimate and that all else is adjectival. There is the non-theistic personalism of J. M. E. McTaggart who taught that reality is a society of persons who are immortal. They themselves are the Absolute. The "Critical Personalism" of William Stern is pantheistic. God has no independent existence. In the personal idealism of George Howison, creation has no place; we simply are, God the infinite Person and men as finite and dependent persons.

The absolute idealists regard mind as the one, basic, unifying fact but with them mind does not always imply personality even in God. Bosanquet finds that the spirit of totality is the ultimate reality, and in this reality our human personalities are incidental and transient facts. Bradley is willing to apply the concept of personality to God but only on the condition that God is super-personal. But idealists, like Royce and Hocking, give to personality a larger emphasis. With respect to immortality, the attitude of absolute idealists varies; Bosanquet denied it, Royce affirmed it. The trend of this type of idealism, however, is to engulf human personalities in the life of God. It is

a monistic system of thought and God himself is the one reality.

On the other hand, we have a pluralistic idealism and this is what we generally mean by "Personalism." It sees in God, as Supreme Mind, the source of our being and acknowledges our dependence upon him but it insists that we have a relative independence of God. It declares that things also have a certain objective reality, distinct from persons; they are not simply idea, they are externalized idea, a deed of God. The reality which we find in the material order, nevertheless, is dependent, subordinate, instrumental. But persons, once existent, are ends in themselves. Reality, then, does not consist of God alone; it consists of God, the neighbors, and ourselves. Personalism guards our moral freedom, finds an explanation of error and sin which relieves God of specific responsibility, and opens the door to a life of adventure, achievement and hope.

World views, like all organisms in the evolutionary process, are subject to the law of the survival of the fittest. They are, doubtless, adjusted in some measure to stages of culture but there is an eternal order of reality which judges them and declares which are worthy to live. If it is correct to say that it is the truth within a system which carries it and wins adherents, then in all systems there are valuable elements and each of them has some contribution to make to the philosophy of to-morrow. Our faith in personalism rests upon the conviction that it organizes the facts of life into the most harmonious and self-consistent system of thought. It is preëminently the Christian philosophy of the world but its validity lies in its intrinsic excellence. The assumption that per-

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sonality is the master light of all our seeing imposes upon us the task of understanding personality as we find it in ourselves. We can then proceed to consider what illumination it casts upon our metaphysical problems, our moral responsibilities, and our ideal values.

CHAPTER II

THE WONDER OF SELF-DISCOVERY

THE familiar picture of "Psyche at Nature's Mirror" by Friedrich Thumann is a parable of the discovery of the self, for Psyche is but another word for soul. She bends over the clear and quiet waters and is absorbed in the contemplation of her own lovely features. Personality possesses the marvelous power of making itself an object of knowledge; and if it is, indeed, the key to the meaning of all things, our first philosophic duty is to obey the ancient command, "Know Thyself."

The paradox of personality is that it is the reality about which we know most and least. We know most about it because it is really the only thing which we do know, for all our knowledge, even of the objective world, is content of our own minds and the interpretations we put upon it; we know least about it, for it is the one reality which must be defined in terms of itself. Augustine marveled that men went abroad to gaze at mountains and seas, and passed themselves, the crowning wonder, by.¹ On every side, personality reaches out toward the infinite. We cannot fathom its abysmal deeps or climb its inaccessible heights.

The human race, in its early stages, like the child, centers its attention on objective realities. Knowledge of the human self is conditioned upon knowledge of its environment. Only after months of experience can a child say "I" and "me." The day it does so is the

real birthday of the soul and Fichte with good right thus celebrated the birthday of his son. Philosophers in Greece began with speculations about the constituent elements of the universe; it was in later centuries that their gaze turned upon themselves. The greatest revolution in our Western world occurred in the days of Socrates when the thoughts of men moved from the outer world to the inner. The first of the sciences seems to have been astronomy; the last, by way of emphasis, if our times may testify, are sociology and psychology. Man began with the stars and ends with himself.

At the present time, a defensible conception of our own personality is especially urgent. In fact, the most important task before us is an understanding of the real nature of the self, for upon it all our ideal interests are dependent. Without the self, we have no base line from which to measure either the physical or the moral universe. Our conclusions with respect to personality will determine our whole world view. If it is only a secondary product of cerebral activities then we have no permanent basis for our ethical obligations and values. But if it is the goal and repository of the gains of the creative process, then we can proceed with a sense of security to build personal characters and a divine society.

Our task is the definition of a reality whose existence all must assume. Denials of the self are at the most denials of conceptions of the self. Even if we say that the self is a by-product of physical forces, an illusion in the flux of things, it is at least a by-product and an illusion. The self, some kind of a self, everyone must take for granted. The best we can say is that our assurance of the self rises from a certain

immediacy of feeling. There is an inward awareness which carries its own credentials. We may say "*Cogito ergo sum*," or "*Ago ergo sum*," but whether emphasis lies on thought or act, we accept the existence of the self as the primary datum of all knowledge.

1. *Historic theories of personality.* In the long course of human thought, many ideas have been held concerning personality and many descriptive terms have been employed. The question of terminology is a difficult one in this field for even current usage varies widely. What is meant by "soul," "spirit," "mind," "consciousness," "self," "personality"? There are at least four theories of personality which stand out in human thought—animism, associationism, behaviorism, and self-psychology.

In animism, we meet with the age-long theory of the "soul" as some kind of substantive reality. The word "animism," although it comes from *anima*, which is Latin for soul, scarcely does justice to this theory for the word is now too heavily freighted with primitive anthropology. It should be said in this connection that what awakens the marvel of men to-day is not that primitive men knew so little but that they knew so much. Perhaps, the instinctive, universal insight of men into the order of things, in which they found themselves, contains basic truths which no sophistications of later times can displace. At least, primitive men believed in power more-than-human, in distinctions of right and wrong, in the reality of selfhood and in its persistence in some form beyond the experience of death. We have refined these doctrines but we can scarcely get beyond them.

The soul, to primitive peoples, was a substance distinct from the body, yet dwelling within the body and

capable of existing in a shade-like state apart from the body. The idea of the soul arose largely through dreams. While his body remained in the same place, man somehow journeyed to distant places in his dreams and engaged in various activities, though often with very ineffectual powers. He likened this ethereal double of himself to the most tenuous thing which he knew, namely, to wind or breath. The soul was not metaphorically breath, it was literally so. It was a rarified kind of matter, even to early Biblical writers and, possibly, to later ones also.

The soul psychology thinks of personality as a substance, whether physical or metaphysical, in which faculties or qualities inhere as pins in a pincushion, or candles in a birthday cake. Some of the greatest philosophers have held to this substantialistic nature of the soul. People generally have been accustomed to think of the soul as a static something which a man possesses, rather than to identify it with the vital, dynamic man himself. A Japanese in America was led to express the wish that Christian people would pay less attention to his soul and more to himself. Because of its traditional connotations, the word "soul" has fallen into disfavor with psychologists generally. It is, however, too valuable a word to lose, for like its kindred word "spirit," it is a term which expresses values. After the present storm has passed, the psychologists will haul it back on the ship as part of the cargo which they needlessly threw overboard.

The conception of personality called "associationism" is especially connected with David Hume, the keen Scotch metaphysician. Hume believed, like Berkeley, that realities are mental but, unlike Berkeley, he was not sure of the self as their possessor. He

could discover no self in which ideas inhered. All we have are sensations or impressions made upon our senses, and the ideas or pale copies of them in memory and imagination, together with the relations of these impressions and ideas. "I can never catch *myself* at any time without a perception," he wrote, "and never can observe anything but the perception." ² He virtually resolved the self into changing and evanescent sensations and did away with its abiding spiritual significance.

The speculations of Hume awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumbers and the German philosopher proceeded to show that knowledge is possible because the mind itself, through its inherent powers, its categories of various kinds, organizes sensations into knowledge. Indeed, Hume himself had implicitly acknowledged in various ways the unifying activity of personality. He speaks of the mind as a "bundle" of perceptions. Manifestly something ties things into a bundle and that something is personality. The self is, indeed, never without a content but it is possessor of its perceptions and processes. It takes the disconnected threads furnished by the senses and weaves them into a garment of use and beauty. Like the man unable to find his spectacles because they were already on his nose, Hume failed to find his self because all his conscious activities were its expression. It bound his experiences into an indivisible whole and constituted his personal life.

Akin to associationist conceptions of personality, is the theory of mind states as propounded by William James. It is significant that he wrote, two years before his death, to the arch-personalist, Borden P. Bowne, "Our *emphatic* footsteps fall on the same

spot.”³ His account of the self, however, has not been fully satisfactory to believers in personalism. He taught that our consciousness is composed of mind states and the task of psychology is merely to describe them and to discover the laws of their succession. Each state appropriates its predecessor and thus continuity is attained. Possibly, by way of compensation for the poverty of his idea of the self at this point, James stressed the realm of the “subconscious” where our lives merge into the divine mother sea.⁴ Despite the emphasis which has been placed by many writers upon the subconscious, we must believe that the real self is identical with reflective consciousness, as captain on the bridge of the ship, and not with the miscellaneous freightage in the hold. The important fact is that there is consciousness of states, as well as states of consciousness. There could be no “stream” of consciousness without a containing river bed and no awareness of the stream apart from a spectator on the banks.

Behaviorism is a conception of the self which is influential in circles dominated by mechanistic materialism. It is properly a method for the study of the self, valuable within its limits. In its extreme forms, behaviorism leads to conclusions which fail to do justice to personality. We learn from its chief proponent, John B. Watson, that the behavior of a self tells us all we can know about it, for introspection has no necessary place in our studies. Psychology is really a branch of natural science. We know man as we know an animal, for no impassable gulf divides them, by the response which he makes to the stimuli of external objects. He is “an assembled organic machine.”⁵ Emotion is a bodily resonance, and thought, as a talk-

ing to ourselves, is manual, visceral, laryngeal movements. On the basis of these statements, consciousness appears to be a relationship of physical objects. It naturally follows that extreme behaviorists regard our actions as rigidly determined, any real moral freedom on our part is a myth.

We have supposed hitherto that psychology was the study of consciousness, its laws and conditions. Behaviorism solves the problems of consciousness after the manner of the medical practitioner who promised both to cure the disease and to eradicate the system. There is no consciousness left, in the sense of an efficient self, which requires correlation with the brain. The behaviorist need not deny the existence of mental states, he merely prefers to ignore them. He learned his technique in the study of animal psychology, and manifestly no one can see things from the inside of the canine or bovine mind, he can only observe behavior. But each man can employ introspection in the study of himself, and he can make large inferences with respect to other human things, evidently constituted like himself. The unity of the sciences, which behaviorism seeks to attain by the use of a single quantitative method throughout, is achieved by it through inadequate attention to phenomena of consciousness and to spiritual values, such as self-judgments upon our behavior, and the ideals and hopes which cannot report themselves to the physical senses as they do at the tribunal of conscience.

There are various schools of behaviorists, ranging from the strictly mechanistic to the purposive. The neo-realists, as represented by Ralph B. Perry, for instance, find that mind is primarily interested behavior. He insists that these interests defined, adopted,

rejected, or reaffirmed in every moral crisis are evident alike to myself and to others, by the way I act with reference to them. The parts of the environment to which a man responds are mental content, the whole world of things being neutral entities. And it is to be remembered that neo-realism makes relations, as well as other universals, independently real. To Perry the person is an organization among its "acts" of cognition and of interest.⁶ The manner in which he uses the word "acts" plainly leaves us in the world of behaviorism. The logical conclusion which must be drawn from a self which is a function of objects and a universe which consists of neutral entities would seem to be that personality in man possesses no lasting significance and that personality in God is an overbelief having no basis in reality.

What is known as the self-psychology is the conception of personality which personal idealists generally hold. Strictly speaking the word "self" is applicable to every being, including animals, possessing any degree of consciousness, whereas "person" or "personality" is the kind of self which is capable of conceptual reason, which can construct and achieve ideals, which is self-reflective. A self possesses consciousness; a person, self-consciousness. A human life begins as a self in the lower sense, and out of the raw materials of its individuality, it builds personality.

In general, believers in personality are in two camps—the structuralists and the functionalists. The former seek to define the self in terms of substance; it is a thing-like reality of some kind. William McDougall has defined the soul as "a sum of enduring capacities for consciousness."⁷ Here the word "capacities" is made to do duty as a basis for con-

scious activities. McDougall, however, disclaims the "substance" idea of the soul. We seem to stand greatly in need of a metaphysical ego. Psychology, as a descriptive science, may dispense with it, but philosophy cannot do so. Leighton regards this ego as "the principle of rational integration," given by the Universe to the biological complex of psycho-physical elements and forces which constitute the new-born child.⁸

At the present time, the functionalists have things all their own way. A thing is what it does. Essence is purposive. We live in a dynamic universe, where even matter seems reducible to energy. Personality is the vital unity of our conscious experiences. It is both unity, as the animist affirmed; and it is multiplicity, as the associationist declared. It is aware of itself as continuous reality and it is ever changing in its thoughts, feelings and hopes. We find in it the one solvent of the philosophic riddle of the permanent and the changing. Personality is not simply conscious states, it is their owner, expressed in them, and yet greater than all of them. It transcends time, making memory conservator of the past, and imagination architect of the future. The ascendant levels of existence are matter, life, mind; in man all meet and find their unity. The metaphysical ego distinguishes itself from the body, because it knows itself capable of intellectual and spiritual activities which are not properly functions of matter. It is a spiritual reality; it is reason, will and love in self-conscious unity.

If personality is identified with conscious experience and is capable of self-reflection, a real problem rises when consciousness is interrupted by a blow or by sleep. Even then, certain bodily activities continue,

but personal life does not consist in them. Our ability to transcend time is revealed by the way in which we take up the threads of existence when we awake from sleep, brain shock, or amnesia. The continuity of our life, as a matter of fact, is in God, in whom we live and move and have our being. We must confess that our personal life now is incomplete, interrupted, fragmentary. It is, however, conceivable that we shall not only waken from the sleep which men call death, but that in and through death, we shall enter upon a kind of personal life which is unbroken day.

2. *The emergence of personality.* We shall, doubtless, find light on the nature of personality if we can learn, however, inadequately, the way in which man came into his present estate. No one can penetrate the morning mists which lie upon the beginnings of human life. Sir William Bateson, while professing faith in evolution, recently startled his fellow scientists by declaring that we simply do not know how man originated. Science, at the most, can only speak of method and not of ultimate causality. Evolution, granting its truth, is a method, not an agent; to the religious man, it is God's way of doing things.

There are two views of the cosmic background of man which confront us to-day—the mechanical and the creative. We may believe, if we will, in a universe which is a fixed sum of mass and force. Changes may take place within this universe, but they are only quantitative shiftings, mere cosmic weather. The universe, including our so-called spiritual values, is a fixed reality in its totality. If man appears, for a moment, as a wave rising from the sea, it is only to fall back into its waters. Our civilizations were already latent, given, in the original fire mist, or planetesimals, or

"God." When they have run their course, they vanish into the original forces of which they were a passing expression. The process of the world, as an explanation of the "given," is the conception which has largely dominated Western science.

The other view regards the evolutionary process as "creative." New values, inexplicable by mere mechanical changes, appear along the way. We live in a growing universe, where the really new can and does emerge. Reality is not a constant sum, it is capable of increase. The idea of "creative evolution" is plainly one of the most significant ideas in the whole course of human history. We owe much to Henri Bergson for the development and popularization of the conception of life as "a continuous creation of unforeseeable form." *

The outward sign and condition for the appearance of a new form of life is increasing complexity of organization. There is larger interdependence of those two structural units of the whole creation, the atom and the cell. And then, lo, a higher form of life emerges. Does that life arise within the organism, or does it enter the organism from without? Who can tell? The best we can do is to speak of the Beyond which is within. As it is the order-of-things which enfolds the organism and vitalizes its development, we may truly say that it is a power transcendent and not merely immanent. In the conception of a dynamic and creative universe, we have a perfect setting for the appearance of man as a unique personal being. He is debtor to the lower orders of life, as the cornerstone rests upon the lower strata of the pyramid. The basic instincts of our natures we share with the animals, but we are more than animals. There has been

opposition to the theory of evolution because it seemed to degrade man to the level of the ape. But if evolution is "creative," if the radically new can appear in the process, then man can be genetically related to lower creatures and yet stand forth as man in all his distinctive greatness. The idea of "leaps," as factors in evolution, is one of the notable contributions to evolutionary theory made since the days of Darwin. There is, occasionally, a sudden jump from one stage to another, without a toilsome passage through intermediate stages. J. Arthur Thomson tells us that when man appeared, it was probably through "a discontinuous variation of considerable magnitude."¹⁰ Such an account of the emergence of man confers upon him all the distinction which any doctrine of special creation can give.

The brain of man, as the central fact in the nervous system, represents a degree of organization which makes it the proper instrument of a new type of creature. Its nearly ten billion cells present a marvelous complexity and thus offer a possible range of associations which is practically limitless. The relation of consciousness to the brain is one of the most challenging problems which psychologists confront.¹¹ In general four theories have been proposed—materialism, mentalism, parallelism, interaction. It can be said that consciousness is a refined form of matter. As a scoffing Hindu declared centuries ago, the soul is "a sort of bodily effervescence like the foam of beer."¹² On the other hand, mentalism asserts that brain is the product of mind. Parallelism sees an inexplicable concomitance of thought and brain changes, or it sees two ways of looking at the same fact.

To interactionism, soul and body are coördinate realities which mutually affect one another. This theory best explains the indubitable fact of our daily experience, that the mind initiates action and yet is influenced by bodily states. It gives to the soul a comparative and a possible independence of the body. It may even justify us in saying, under certain conditions, what Emerson is reported to have said to the perturbed person who hastened into his presence to declare that the world was immediately coming to an end, "Never mind, we can get along very well without it."

The individual life, with its long racial and cosmic heritage, achieves personality through years of experience. The babe has its instincts, which are inborn modes of reaction to given situations. These are its quarry out of which it builds selfhood, under the organizing power of the ideals which it defines through the aid of its social environment. The instincts thus centered about ideals are our sentiments. To the movement of the self toward an ideal, we give the name of "will." The religiousness of the self is not a special faculty but is its sentiments grouped about God as our supreme ideal. Only through effort, pain, struggle is character attained.

For its emergence, personality requires a social order. Its potentialities are realized only in social relations. It gains consciousness of itself in the presence of other selves. The ego and the alter come into existence together. Thus altruism is as primordial as self-assertion. We live essentially in a world of persons and only incidentally and instrumentally in a world of things. Baby proceeds at once to appropriate its social heritage by imitation, even though it is true,

as asserted, that during the first months the parents imitate baby more than baby imitates them. It defines its ideals, at first, in terms of what people expect and demand. The very language, which is the instrument of its higher intellectual activities, is a social gift. And to the end of the story, individual and society are necessary to each other.

3. *Aspects of personality.* Personality is a diamond with many facets. And from each facet, the whole jewel shines out, relative to the light in which it is placed. The self is no assemblage of unrelated faculties, no series of water-tight compartments. In each of its activities, the whole self is involved. The simplest analysis of personality gives us self-consciousness and self-determination. Kant's threefold divisions were: conative, cognitive and affective. There is a tendency to-day to group together the emotional and volitional. We shall follow the Kantian classification, giving to an aspect of the cognitive our self-consciousness, special mention.

Our conative tendencies are summed up in the word "will." The primary fact with every organism is an inward drive toward its own self-realization. Life everywhere is the great pioneer, insurgent and adventurer. It climbs the mountainside, descends into oceanic depths, and penetrates the Arctic circle. If it can get a start, even on stars vastly different from our own, who can doubt its power of adaptation and multiplication? Like all creatures, man has the impulse to fulfill his nature according to its inherent capacities. He has his share of the "élan vital" which is at the heart of the world. This thrust after fullness of life bases itself in our biological interest but reaches out after all the ideal interests of personality. The

word "interest," so central in our striving, carries with it the idea of purpose. There is pull as well as push, aspiration as well as momentum. The instincts themselves are coördinated and sublimated in the pursuit of chosen ends. It is the whole self which we are under compulsion to realize. And the "will" is the movement of the self in pursuit of its ideal, whether low or high.

The "freedom" of the will inheres in the conception of "creative" evolution. This new philosophy of the cosmic process spells the death of mechanistic determinism. It cannot accept the statement that no man has an iota of real freedom, that our so-called sins are as rigidly determined as our philanthropies and heroisms. Creativity in the world order has its highest expression in the freedom of man. This freedom lies in the power to create an ideal and to move toward it. If it be said that the elements of the ideal lie in our heredity and environment, the reply is that these elements, and more besides, are a heterogeneous and contradictory mass. Many lines of sequence meet at the switch of the human will. We do not improvise trains out of nothing; we give the right of way to sequences already existent, through our power of attention and organization. Our freedom is not outside of law but within it. And the will is free when the self is free. But the self is free, all its powers finding due and harmonious expression, only as we do right. In the service of God, there is perfect freedom. |

Another aspect of personality is our intellectual tendencies and these we call "mind." The beginnings of mind are far down in the organic world. Mind has various levels of expression as it shows itself in adaptive behavior. The simple reflex actions and

instinctive adjustments of lower organisms parallel the human mind, as far as they go. Among the higher animals, we seem to find the beginnings of the distinctively human intellectual characteristics. Our minds possess the power of perception, apperception, memory, imagination, reason. An influential school of opinion regards mind as simply "instrumental" to our biological and other interests. Thought is functional. This is a true account of thought in the earlier stages of experience. But thought, like scientific investigation, yields its most practical results when it is least utilitarian. It is a profanation of mind to make it merely instrumental. In its higher ranges, it is disinterested quest after truth, even as Aristotle pictured the ultimate bliss as the intellectual contemplation of God.

There is one phase of mind in which man transcends other earthly creatures and that is the possession of conceptual reason. The animal has a percept of an object; but does it have a concept, that is, the idea of a universal or abstract reality? It can see things but can it conceive the invisible realities which we call "relations"? We find here the unique greatness of the human mind which makes man a citizen in an unseen and eternal world. Language, without which human progress is impossible, is an achievement of conceptual reason. Animals communicate with each other, chiefly by the emotional tone in their voices. Man has an elaborate system of symbols by which arbitrary sounds and characters stand for objects and ideas. The idea of the "self," as a spiritual entity, is possible only to man. In like manner, we can arrive at the thought of God as the supreme and invisible spirit. Prayer, worship, religion are the prerogatives

of man alone because he alone possesses reason in the higher sense of the term.

Mind includes, furthermore, affective tendencies. We have emotion, feeling. Man was built for action and all self-expression always has its aspect of satisfaction. There is a pleasure-tone which accompanies the activity of the instincts. The sense of feeling has its physical basis in the nervous system, particularly the brain. It cannot be completely explained, however, in physico-chemical terms or as bodily resonances. When that subtle, invisible reality, which is life, leaves the organism, though all else remains the same, there is no feeling. Not even the secretions of the ductless glands, poured into the blood, tell the entire story. Bertrand Russell testifies that "adrenin" produced in him the physical symptoms of fear but that he actually felt no fear.¹³ It is in mind itself that we must find the seat of the emotions.

In its higher ranges, emotions have to do with ideal interests. We have the sense of value, awakening in us reverence and love. These values are of many kinds, for whatever is precious to us is a value. They base themselves in our appreciations and cannot be further argued. The highest of all values is personal value and here appreciation takes the name of "love," which is the noblest expression of personality. Love, at its best, moves in the sphere of the ideal, it esteems its object in terms of potentialities and not merely of actualities. "Love is not love which alters when it alteration finds."¹⁴ The dynamic of life lies in our feelings. There can be no motion without emotion.

The last aspect of personality which we consider is probably first in the order of importance, and that is self-consciousness. It is often called the fundamental

characteristic of personality. The mind has the power of self-reflection. It can project itself, as it were, upon a screen and look upon itself. Of course, such knowledge, in man, involves consciousness of an objective world, the self knows itself in relation to an environment. But the human mind can turn in upon itself and contemplate and judge itself in its content and relationships. This power does not belong to us in the first months of infancy, it comes as nature's last and crowning gift as the babe rises into a separate personal life. Self-consciousness is an achievement of conceptual reason, for the self is a concept, an immaterial reality, and as such belongs to man alone. Animals, let it be said again, have consciousness; man has self-consciousness. He is great enough to emancipate himself from the tyranny of the senses and to own himself.

The possession of self-consciousness lifts man into the distinctively personal realm. It makes a moral life possible, for it compels definition of ideals and the formation of self-judgments of praise or blame. "Conscience" is only another form of the word "consciousness," but it implies an awareness of the self in relation to ideals. The discovery of God as a spiritual being must be made, if at all, in the categories disclosed in man's inner life. There is truth in the saying of the mystics that the descent into the soul is the ascent to God. The unity of personality, its togetherness, its sense of identity and continuity, have their basis in self-consciousness.

4. *The worth of personality.* From the facts thus far adduced, personality plainly possesses unique and transcendent worth. The value of man as man has been an axiom of the Christian faith through the cen-

turies. A different attitude, on the part of a school of writers, is manifest to-day, as an aspect of the neopaganism of our time. Man is presented as merely one of the higher animals, an ephemeral incident in the order of nature. Personality has been likened to a scum which has appeared on the surface of the universe. The nemesis of all depreciation of personality is the invalidation of the adverse opinions which are themselves expressions of personality—scum upon scum, so to speak. In the face of the belittlement of man, two considerations justify the estimate which personalism puts upon him—the place of personality in the cosmic process, and the intrinsic values of personality.

The central place of man in the divine plan was not difficult to believe in the days of the Ptolemaic astronomy. The earth, with man as its chief tenant, held the center of the stellar stage, the sun and all attendant luminaries circled about it. Modern astrophysics, on the other hand, tells us that our planet is relatively but a grain of dust in the vastness of the stellar universe. Of course, there is a sense in which all the world exists for each life in it. Alexander Pope's pampered goose insisted that man existed for its sake. With good logic it could have reasoned that the cosmic order in all its illimitable extent toiled to provide the light and air and food which his goose-ship enjoyed.

One fact, however, declares the unique eminence of man: he is the culmination of the whole cosmic process, as we know that process. Genesis and geology are agreed, man is the final term in creation. He is not merely one fact, coördinate with a multitude of other facts in a static world, he is the end of a process.

It began with the amœba, passed through stages of increasing complexity and reached its climax when man appeared. And in the case of a process, the Aristotelian doctrine holds: the end reveals the meaning of the process as a whole. Through untold ages, the universe toiled to produce man as its masterpiece.

The question pertinently rises—how do we know that human personality is the end and aim of the cosmic process? Perhaps there is a nobler creature yet to come. There was a time in evolution when the dinosaur was its highest product, but the dinosaur has been superseded. A study of the evolutionary process, however, shows that the power within it and above it is seeking to produce a higher type of man but not to displace him. Why should nature improve the human hand or the human eyes when man, by using his mind, can make a printing press and a trip hammer, or spectacles and microscope and telescope? In other words, the Cosmic Energy is pouring itself into the development of man's intellectual and spiritual powers, itself an endless task, and we may boldly claim that there will never appear upon earth a higher value than personality.¹⁵

Nor can we substitute the human race for the individual man, as the unit in the cosmic process. Is nature so careful of the type, when scarpéd stone bears its witness to the species that have perished? It can be strongly maintained that society is an abstract term for individuals acting socially. Society is not a permanent reality on our planet. It is possible that the individuals who compose society may constitute another society elsewhere, but an ethno-centric interpretation of life wrecks itself upon the eventual dis-

appearance of human society from our planet. Personality appears in the cosmic process as an end in itself. It is not an adjective, it is a noun.

The other consideration which validates the worth of personality is the intrinsic values in man. He is possessor of reason, will and love in self-conscious unity. These are spiritual realities and in themselves have inexpressible value. We know well that when we speak of "value," we are outside of the sphere where argument avails. *De gustibus, non disputandum*. Like tastes, concerning values there is no dispute. If a man is pleased to deny that thought which ranges through the universe, love which is stronger than death, that these are no more than clods and thunderbolts, there is no logic to convince him otherwise.

The physical vastness of the universe does not belittle personality, for personality moves in the realm of the spiritual. It is measured by other standards than are planets and suns. Betelgeuse may be twenty-seven million times larger than our sun, it still remains true that it is nothing but "a gas bag," ignorant of its fellow suns and not even conscious of itself. Whereas man, measuring the bulk of Betelgeuse, analyzing it into its component elements, taking its temperature, tucks it away in a corner of his mind as one of his mental possessions.

In affirming the ultimate value of personality, we make no exclusive claim for man, merely as man. It would be a vast presumption to declare that all things existed for him alone. The claim we make is for spiritual intelligences everywhere, if they exist outside our planet, which indeed is likely. Under whatever forms they exist, higher values than freedom, reason,

and good will are inconceivable to us. Personality is the loftiest reality of which we have any knowledge.

The chief point at issue, in the formulation of a world view, is the status of man in the universe. It is possible that we must seek elsewhere for the key which unlocks the mysteries of existence. Christianity, however, has dared to believe in the kinship of man to the power which is the source and goal of all things. It finds in personality the clew to the meaning of God and of his world.

CHAPTER III

THE HUMANITY OF GOD

THE idea of God is a storm center of discussion in our time, not alone in schools of philosophy but even in popular circles. Every thoughtful person knows that there is some reality objective to his individual self, to which he owes his being, upon which he is dependent, and which has the last word to say with regard to what is to become of him. And the name which English-speaking people ordinarily give to this reality is "God." The character of God, manifestly, is quite as important as his existence. It may be just as well not to have a God as to have the wrong kind of a God. In intrinsic importance, this question stands alone: "What do you mean by God?"

A representative symposium on "My Idea of God" reveals the fact that the word "God" covers a multitude of meanings.¹ Everyone is willing to employ it, if he can give it content, even though he defines it beyond recognition by the general mind. It signifies to each man who uses it the Ultimate Reality, whatever its nature. The word God, therefore, may refer to the impersonal order of the world, to the neutral entities of the neo-realists, or to humanity itself in its ideal aspects.

The historic Christian view defines God in terms of personality. It would, doubtless, conduce to clarity of discussion, if the familiar word "God" were restricted

to its theistic significance, unless otherwise specifically stated. In every conception of the supreme reality, there is much positive truth which is parallel to the personalistic view. Even the Karma of original Buddhism is in many respects a pragmatic substitute for God in his moral order. In applying the concept of personality to God, our first task must relate to its meaning as thus employed; then we must consider the evidence which can be adduced in its favor, resolve the difficulties, confront the alternatives, and appraise the power of the resultant interpretation of God.

1. *The conception of personality as applied to God.* Personality is a word with a long and varied history, in which it has had successively dramatic, legal, theological, and psychological meanings. It comes from *persona*, which is the Latin word for "mask." To this day, we have the phrase "*dramatis personae*." Then person came to signify, in Roman law, an individual who had full legal rights. The juristic mind of Tertullian, the Roman lawyer, utilized the word for theological purposes, particularly to describe certain three-fold distinctions in the divine nature, which are the bases of the divine self-manifestation as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. As a technical theological term in relation to the Trinitarian God, "person" does not mean and never did mean just what we mean by "personality." It was employed as the Latin equivalent for the Greek "*hypostasis*" (*ὑπόστασις*, that which stands under). God was defined in the creeds as one substance or essence, but as three hypostases or persons. Tertullian himself, in writing against Praxeas, said that Christians never permitted themselves to speak of "two Gods"; they were monotheists. God is one personality; but he is three "persons," in the technical

sense of the word. In present-day usage, "person" as a psychological and philosophical term is used interchangeably with personality, and we have already seen that personality signifies our whole spiritual selfhood.

The symbolic nature of language is nowhere a more important consideration than it is in relation to God.² Some of our words are strictly descriptive, like the onomatopoetic word "whir." Practically all our words for things are arbitrary sounds or signs which are purely symbolic; "rose" to us is rose, but by its name in other languages, it smells as sweet. Our names for spiritual realities are metaphors drawn from the physical order. We can designate the unseen only by saying that it is like something in the realm of the visible.

Due to their symbolic character, words for spiritual realities can convey only approximate meanings. All that we can ask words to do is to make right impressions, not to express exact and infallible truth. Augustine fully understood the limitations of language when he wrote concerning the Trinity. He declared that human language labors under great poverty of speech. Then he added the famous words: "*Dictum est, Tres Personae, non ut diceretur, sed ne taceretur*"; which may be freely translated: "We say Three Persons, not that it may be so said, but that we may not be silent."

The fact that words are but symbols of spiritual realities elicits various attitudes among men. It is possible to say that words as symbols are valueless, or at the least not usable in scholarly discussion. As a substitute for terms patently symbolic, thinkers are prone to employ "abstract" terms which were, nevertheless, themselves originally metaphors but whose origin has been clouded by time. To refuse to use

words of symbolic character is to be reduced to silence, and, like Augustine, silent we cannot be. On the other hand, we may go to the opposite extreme and insist upon taking our metaphorical terms literally. We shall then declare that God has veritable physical "hands" and sits upon a "throne," because the Scriptures thus speak. Such literalism soon involves us in hopeless contradictions with other legitimate metaphors and in all kinds of theological impossibilities. Penal fire and outer darkness cannot both be literal, for fire dispels darkness. Our proper attitude toward the symbolic character of words is to choose the most truly descriptive and helpful ones and to use them with proper discrimination. When we speak of God, we shall avail ourselves of the loftiest human symbols, without insisting that they are exact theological definitions.

The designation of God as "personality" is obviously an effort to understand the Supreme Reality in terms of our own selfhood. The word gets its content, first of all, in our self-knowledge, and then is applied to God, and is verified in our observation of the activities of God in his world. Through man to God—this is the well-trodden path to the great discovery. It is possible to stigmatize the method as "anthropomorphism," a making of God in our own likeness, a reduction of the Infinite to our little human stature. But our disparagement is tempered when we reflect that science is just as anthropomorphic as religion. All our progress in knowledge in every sphere is only a commentary on the Protagorean truth that man is the measure of all things.

Our knowledge of the physical order is conditioned by our five senses and is expressed in the categories

of the human mind. A man must see through his own eyes or not at all. His measurements are all relative to himself; a "foot" is the distance from heel to toe. He then proceeds to say that so many feet make a mile and the sun is so many miles away. God himself can be real to us only as he bows down and passes beneath the archway of our human powers. The highest reality which we know is our spiritual selfhood, and it is as inevitable, as it is justifiable, that we should understand God in its light.

In ascribing personality to God, it is plainly necessary for us to free the word from distinctively human limitations. My personality is subject to growth from the humblest beginnings, whereas God is the fontal life, the ground of all things, including their becoming. Man's personality is conditioned in its activities by brain, nerves, glands, stomach, hands. There is no reason to believe that the Divine Mind is limited by a physical organism like our own. The universe itself is God's body. To believe, as certain sects teach, that God has a physical form similar to man, is "anthropomorphism" in its indefensible sense. Nor can we think that "wrath" in God is a transcript of our passion. Our personalities at the best are only partially realized; our purpose is often faltering, our knowledge limited, our feelings unworthy, our self-consciousness incomplete. The norm of personality cannot lie in us; if anywhere, it lies in God. "Perfect personality," said Rudolf Lotze, in memorable words, "is in God only; to all finite minds is allotted but a pale copy thereof." *

The debate concerning the "personality" of God turns, like so many of our human discussions, upon definition. If personality is conceived in its lower terms, we can understand the hesitancy of many

thinkers regarding its use. Perhaps that is all that the denial of the personality of God usually signifies. The same men who refuse to ascribe personality to God are as a rule willing to speak of God as super-personal; He is not less than personality, as we know it in ourselves, but far more. Even personalists of the most pronounced Christian type recognize the limitations of the term. According to B. H. Streeter, the personification of God is "a dangerous necessity. . . . It is the smoked glass through which alone we can behold the sun." " And Arthur J. Balfour wrote, "The attribution of personality to God, though much truer, I think, than the denial of it, is manifestly inadequate to the full reality we are seeking to express."⁶ Inadequacy, however, is not falsity. All our knowledge in every sphere is partial. But knowledge is knowledge, whatever its degree, and as such it can grow from more to more. Personality may be a symbolic term but it is our noblest term, and we can bring nothing better to the understanding of God.

2. *The evidence of divine personality.* A tenable belief in the personality of God must rest, not upon wishful thinking, but upon evidence. The character of the evidence will not be in the nature of mathematical demonstration, which obtains only in the realm of the purely abstract, but it will consist of the moral certainties upon which rests all our faith in the concrete realities of experience. The scientist begins with a preliminary examination of facts; then by a stroke of imaginative insight, he makes an hypothesis to account for the facts. And finally, he tests his hypothesis in the light of all the ascertainable facts, whether friendly or hostile.

In so far as belief in a personal God does not rest

upon the necessary presuppositions of the human mind, it is based upon the divine self-expression in the total world order. We know the nature of God, as we know the natures of people about us, by the way he behaves. We interpret his actions in the light of our experience as personal beings. A man's assurance of the existence of other human selves is no easy epistemological problem. Perhaps they are only subjective disturbances in his brain. He regards them as persons, however, because he sees them doing things similar to the things which he himself does, and which he judges, therefore, to be the appropriate expressions of persons. By a similar logic, if we see that the Power which is at work in the cosmos is acting in ways which are characteristic of ourselves as personalities and of our neighbors as personalities, then we properly recognize the Power as personal. In short, if the universe reveals purpose, mind, love, self-consciousness, then it is indwelt and dominated by Divine Personality. And by the "universe," we must signify both the physical order and the realm of human life.

As we view the world of nature, we discover an intelligible "drive" within it which we may properly call purpose. Many different names have been given to the power which pushes or pulls in this dynamic universe. Aristotle spoke of an "entelechy" which was an internal perfecting principle, whereby Form molded matter in ever higher levels of life, God being the goal, the final cause, the attractive power in it all. The modern theory of evolution bristles with such phrases as "struggle for existence," "conative principle," "creative agency." It would seem that evolution with its affirmation of development from lower

forms of life to higher culminating in man was itself a declaration of purposive intelligence at work in the world. The idea of "chance" cannot adequately explain the delicate adjustment of the environmental factors in which life can subsist, and the appearance and conservation of the structural modifications which fit an organism for survival. Evolution has modified the argument from design, turning our minds from itemized adaptations to the grand sweep of the cosmic process from amoeba to man.

Various theories seek to make this force at work in nature as something other or less than the activity of purposive personality. "Unconscious Will," von Hartmann called it. To Bergson, the "*élan vital*," vital impetus, has no defined ends, it is "creative" as it goes along. A new teleology in our day discards conscious design due to preformed divine purpose. In its stead, Professor Beckwith gives us "an inherent principle or tendency to organization and harmony of the elements of the world." ⁶ There is here due recognition of the immanent character of the power at work in the universe, as distinguished from a power simply external, but it is a power apparently blind which is compelled to feel its way.

The concept of "purpose" is clearly presented to us by the activities of our own personalities. We, at least, are purposive beings at our best, whether we build printing presses or republics. The glory of man is his power to create an ideal and to strive for its achievement. The animals are moved by their impulses, without having clearly defined spiritual objectives. There are aimless human lives, so to speak, but the noblest lives have definite aims and try to realize them. It is wholly probable that the best

analogy for God's activities is found, not on the lower levels of our life, but on the highest. What seems to be the "trial and error" method in evolution is incidental to the progressive movement of things as a whole. The very fact that the forms of life chosen for survival are those best adjusted to the environment points to a power not only purposive but intelligent and kind. The creative process is not an aimless and improvised cow path. It is the realization of the divine intention to build a society of personalities. The confession of faith made by C. Lloyd Morgan is in full accord with the ascertained facts of science, "For better or worse," he writes, "I acknowledge God as the Nisus through whose activity emergents emerge and the whole course of emergent evolution is directed." 7

When we turn to the intellectual side of personality, we find that the world order bears cogent testimony to the divine mind. The fact of "order" itself signifies coherent relationships which are the revelation of the reason built into the world. As we observe the physical universe, we find meanings everywhere. Nature is the embodiment of ideas. Our very ability to understand the world points to the kinship of our minds with the mind within it and behind it. And all the vast complex of nature constitutes a realm so unified that we can speak of the universality of law. We cannot find in nature an unrelated entity. We live in a "universe," a *unus versus*, a rolling into one. Therefore, we believe in both the reality and the oneness of the mind of which the universe is the expression.

There can be no question then concerning the revelation of intelligible relations in nature; but do they

necessarily point to personality? Perhaps there is impersonal mind-stuff which constitutes the world. The functional conception of mind, in opposition to the substantialistic, rules out such an hypothesis. Mind, as we know it, is an aspect of the self; in its highest ranges, an aspect of a personal self. And a world so wonderful as our world would seem to require for its explanation mind on supreme levels. A realm in which things cohere in intelligible relations is scarcely the product of chance. New values appear in the emergent evolutionary process but they are the result of organization and organization is the activity of mind, which is indeed the driving force in the ongoing of the world.

The witness of the physical order to the affective aspect of divine personality is less clear than to the volitional and intellectual. Things in themselves cannot exhibit love; they can, however, be the instrumentalities of personality and thus reveal divine goodness. It would not be difficult to show that the structural principle of rational harmony in the universe is itself but another name for love, for it provides a wholly dependable and responsive world as a sphere in which personalities can achieve their purposes and realize themselves. Nature, however, presents such an aspect of indifference and even of cruelty, that it seems at times a refutation of the belief that God is love.

It is highly significant that more and more, as the cosmic process unfolds, the element of mutual aid becomes the decisive factor in evolution. There has been a wide change in the opinions of scientists since the early days of the evolutionary theory when emphasis upon the struggle for survival seemed to necessitate

a pitiless philosophy of force.⁸ The animals who care for their young have a greater proportionate strength than have their more individualistic rivals and have largely displaced them. The pack and the herd have brought both defense and victory to their members. When we reach human levels, we see that peoples in whom the principle of coöperation is most highly developed are the most powerful. It is a law of social evolution that the meek shall inherit the earth. The higher levels of civilization are possible only in societies where citizens trust one another and mutually serve one another. Love is alike the goal and the inward power of evolution.

The existence of self-consciousness in God is something which we can know only inferentially. This fact does not disturb us when we remember that all our knowledge of an objective world rests upon faith in the trustworthiness of our faculties and in the honesty of the universe. In the case of our fellow men, we have no way of getting inside their personalities and sensing directly the self-awareness which they feel. But when we see them exhibiting the usual purposive, rational, emotional characteristics of personality, we justly infer the presence of personality in its full range of powers. Our assurance that God is self-conscious Being has its basis in the conviction that the revealer of purpose, mind, and love possesses necessarily the self-consciousness which is requisite to the completeness of personality and which alone makes other personal qualities intelligible.

In our interrogation of the world order with reference to the personality of God, we must not omit the facts presented in man's moral nature and experience. Science, as such, deals solely with phenomena, the

things that can be measured quantitatively. It does not concern itself with the qualitative values which constitute our essential life as moral beings. To construct a theory of the nature of the Ultimate Reality based on the facts presented by the physical sciences alone, is like a commentary on the drama of Hamlet with all reference to Hamlet carefully expunged. Man is "organic to the world," in Pringle-Pattison's highly significant phrase.⁹ He arose out of its processes, he is built into its structure. As the consummate product of the world, he reveals as nothing else does, the nature of the Creative Energy which is at work.

The experience of the famous scientist, George John Romanes, has its message for us, as it had for his contemporaries a generation ago. Although reared in a religious home and warmly espousing its teachings, he was led by his scientific studies to abandon faith in God. In the volume in which he announced his negative conclusions, he frankly acknowledged that the universe had lost for him its soul of loveliness and that he felt the keenest pain when he contrasted the lonely mystery of existence without God with the hallowed glory of the creed which he once avowed. Years passed and Romanes found at last that he had made a fatal oversight—he had omitted man from his data.

My theory of natural causation [said he] obeyed the law of parsimony, resolving all into Being as such, but, on the other hand, it erred in not considering whether higher causes are not necessary to account for spiritual facts—i.e. whether the ultimate Being must not be at least as high as the intellectual and spiritual nature of man.¹⁰

With the clew of man's moral personality, Romanes found his way to the inspirations and consolations of faith in God.

The principle of adequate causation requires God as explanation of man as a moral being. If it be said that in creative evolution something can appear in the effect not found in the cause, then we must go back of the law of cause and effect as it operates in our phenomenal world to the Order-of-Things which has decreed that when certain elements combine in a new organizational complex, then new values appear. And the Order-of-Things is only one of God's other names. Man cannot be higher than the Reality which calls him forth and in whom he has his being. In the spiritual world, also, streams do not rise higher than their fountain. If man is personal, God is at least personal, whatever more. Robert Browning, with poetic genius, in a single line in "An Epistle," stated the argument for divine personality, "O heart I made, a heart beats here." We discover God in our moral nature rather than in astral universes. But if we say, with Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things, we must add Aristotle's qualification and say the "good" man. We have gained our belief in God as moral person, not solely by the inward revelations of our own conscience, but by acquaintance with noble men and women. And our supreme conviction that God is Personality, whose character is Holy Love, arises as we stand in the presence of Christ.

If God is to be understood in the light of the universe, physical and moral, in which he has expressed himself, then it must be acknowledged that he "behaves" like a person. He does things characteristic of personality, as I dimly know personality in myself.

Can it not be said, therefore, that the term personality as applied to God is truly descriptive and not arbitrarily symbolic? When I call my fellow man a "personality," I do not regard the word as symbol but as description. No doubt personality, just as it exists in man, is far from being an adequate representation of God, and there are areas of divine being which lie beyond our ken; but in so far as God in his activities reveals himself as purposive, rational, benevolent, whether in nature or in man, then personality is genuine description and not mere symbol.

3. *Difficulties in the idea of God as personal.* There are obstacles in the way of belief in the personality of God, despite the cogent evidence which can be adduced in its behalf. Mysteries we find everywhere, even in connection with the indisputable reality of our own beings. David Hume was not the only man troubled with odd thoughts about his own existence when he gave rein to his speculative impulses. We are honor bound, however, when confronted with two mysteries, to choose the lesser. And it rightly seems less of a mystery to believe that our intelligible and resplendent world is an expression of self-conscious mind than to believe that insensate matter somehow arrogated to itself forms of order, law and beauty. The difficulties in the idea of divine personality must be frankly confronted. They are both philosophical and religious.

Among the objections to personality in God raised by philosophy is one which merits but little attention. It rests upon the assertion that God is infinite, which means literally without limitation, and that we cannot, therefore, affirm personality of God, for personality is limitation. At its worst, the objection is a verbal

quibble; at its best, it rests upon the false presupposition that reality is found in the abstract and indefinable rather than in the concrete and the kindred to ourselves. "Infinite" is a qualitative as well as an existential term. It can signify that the power, excellence, goodness of God are beyond our capacity of adequate comprehension. And is it not true that denial of personality would also place limitation upon God, the limitation of non-being? We give no honor to God by reducing him to a rimless cipher, concerning whom nothing can be affirmed.

The chief metaphysical difficulty, in relation to the personality of God, concerns itself with him as the Absolute. Here is a word to arouse awe or resentment, according as we define it. Personalists certainly do not mean by it the all-inclusive reality, of which our individual personalities are passing modes. They are pluralists, believing in a certain otherness from God himself of both things and persons. Personalists interpret reality as "a society of persons," says Professor Brightman.¹¹ They are monists in the sense that they believe that all finite personalities derive their beings from God and in God find their continuance and fulfillment.

This antinomy of oneness and manyness has a dim parallel in the manner in which each human consciousness includes other persons within itself and yet is an independent and unitary reality. The world can have no ground and no unity unless all things, animate and inanimate, somehow subsist in God. We cannot live without the Absolute. But here is the problem—how can the conditions of personality exist in God, if we think of him as existing alone, the source and ground of all else? In us self-consciousness requires the exist-

ence of other selves, of an objective world; and if the Absolute does not have them, how can he be personal?

One answer to the problem is found in the historic doctrine of the Trinity, which declares that God exists as Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Trinitarianism aims to show how God can be eternally self-sufficient and at the same time benevolent. It insists that the social conditions necessary to personality exist within the divine nature. By the same token, our priceless social values are not a perishable exotic in the universe. They have their sanction in the very being of God. No one has argued more earnestly for the Trinity, as pledge of the social nature of divine personality than George A. Gordon.¹² He tells us that a solitary God is to be pitied, and in comparison with him the group on Olympus were happy indeed. He sees the tri-theism to which such a view tends and seeks to guard against it. The query inevitably arises, if we make God a society constituted of individual personalities, are we not polytheists? Is God a committee? Can we say that there are "three egos" in God and still be monotheists? We are not able to resolve the mysteries involved in the being of God but the doctrine of the Tri-unity of God stands, at least, as a noble symbol of the richness and complexity of the life of God, whereby he is the independent ground of the world and the guarantee that human love has permanent sanction in the heart of Reality.

Another reply to those who deny the personality of the Absolute is the theory of creation from eternity. God has expressed himself in a universe from the beginning of a self-existence which has no beginning. Just as the sunlight is coeval with the sun, though proceeding from it and dependent upon it, so there

has always been a world as the divine self-expression; and in the objective actuality of that world we have the condition of self-consciousness in God. The theory of creation from eternity may well be true, but there is still a logical, if not a chronological, priority of God. How could a God not in himself social ever be the source of a social world? Possibly the objectivity of personalities, as an ideal of creative love, gave God the otherness requisite to self-consciousness.

We have proceeded on the assumption that the conditions under which our finite, dependent, growing personalities realize themselves are true for God. A moment's consideration should instruct us that the self-existent, fontal life must be vastly different from our own, despite the elements of kinship. There is justice in the divine protest, expressed in a Psalm of Israel, "Thou thoughtest that I was altogether such an one as thyself." The necessity for the non-self as a condition of self-consciousness may be a limitation of our finite personalities which does not exist for God. The distinction between the Divine Self and its changing states may suffice for God. Our type of personality may not be the only possible one. In fact, we are personalities in embryo, in contrast with personality as it exists in God. Of this truth we are sure and the doctrine of the Trinity is its great historic symbol, God has the glorious fullness of life in himself.

The other difficulty with respect to personality in God is religious. We do not refer to the fact of evil in the world, apparently so contradictory to the existence of a being who can be called purposive, intelligent or good. Here we take cognizance of the belittlement to which we seem to subject God and the consequent diminution of his value to us as object of rev-

erent worship. Xenophanes, centuries ago, noted that the Ethiopians depicted the gods with flat noses and the Thracians depicted them with red hair; and he concluded that the oxen would depict their God as an ox; the lions, as a lion. Thus God is but the giant shadow of ourselves. As Browning's Caliban, lying in the slime, muses about Setebos, god of the island, he twists off a pincer from one crab and gives another worms, and says, "As it likes me each time, I do: so He." This is the long story of anthropomorphism in theology—"so He." There is, however, a lower and a higher anthropomorphism and the higher lifts us into an ideal order whose symbols are not unworthy of God.

No writer has set forth more impressively than has Rudolf Otto the essence of the religious attitude as awe in the presence of the *Mysterium Tremendum*, who is too vast to be expressed in any of our concepts, even the concept of personality. This indefinable divine he calls the "numinous." According to Otto, the rationalization of God by our concepts tends to extrude the authentic and sensitive element of feeling from the religious experience. He believes that God, in a true sense, may be called personality but the category of personality is applicable only to the manward side of God. It is significant, however, that Otto applies the word "numinous" to the vast profound in the life of man himself.¹³ And yet by definition, we give the name of personality to man's whole spiritual selfhood. And it is not clear why the selfhood of God cannot be included in the same term. Personality is not only, as Otto seems to imply, the rational principle in us, but it includes the volitional and the affective. By analogy, therefore, we may say that the numinous in God is none other than the inaccessible

heights and depths of his personal being. Otherwise, we build an altar to the Unknown God and worship nescience. The undiscovered in God must be continuous with what we already know of him and consistent with it. We have, indeed, but a whisper of God, yet it is not contradicted by the thunder of his power. He is light and in him is no darkness at all.

4. *Alternatives to the acceptance of personality in God.* The reasonableness of regarding God as personal is apparent also when we consider the alternatives. It is impossible for us to assume a wholly negative attitude toward the idea of divine personality. If we do not say that God is personal, then, if we think at all, we must say something else. There is something there which we define, however unconsciously, in some way. Two alternatives only confront the non-personalist; he must think of God in subpersonal terms or in superpersonal.

The favorite subpersonal term is "energy" or "force." It is plain to every one that a vast and ceaseless power is at work in the world. This is not a universe of static, immobile matter. No one to-day would define the ultimate reality as dead, unmoving matter; it is, at least, the energy which is expressed in matter. Assuredly, this is the case with the physicists who regard matter itself as a form of energy.

An outstanding example of the designation of the ultimate source of things as energy is presented in the writings of Herbert Spencer. "But one truth," said he, "must grow ever clearer—the truth that there is an Inscrutable Existence everywhere manifest, to which he (the man of science) can neither find nor conceive beginning nor end. Amid the mysteries which become the more mysterious the more they are thought

about, there will remain the one absolute certainty, that he is ever in the presence of an Infinite and Eternal Energy, from which all things proceed." The use of capital letters seems an approach toward the personalization of this source of the world. And it is reasonable to say, also, that all things proceeding from this Energy are surcharged with revelations of its nature, even as a book discloses the character of its writer. Spencer knew more about the Inscrutable existence than he sometimes averred. He tells us that the power which manifests itself in consciousness is but a different conditioned form of the power which manifests itself beyond consciousness.¹⁴ Energy therefore, as expounded by Spencer, has inescapable theistic implications, which he himself at times expressed as psychic and hyper-personal.

When we examine the concept of energy closely, we find that it cannot stand apart from personality. The only force of which we have direct knowledge is the urge of our wills. We have causal power, we initiate activities. If we were inert clods, the idea of force could never rise within our minds. Here too man is the measure of all things. If force can exist as an independent reality, we cannot know it, for the only force conceivable by us, constituted as we are, is the driving power of personality. It was natural and inevitable for primitive man to interpret the power visible in nature as expressions of personal agency. On higher levels, we must do so still. The force at work in the universe, however, is not capricious spirits, it is the personal God. And if this power decrees that in the long run it is ill with the wicked and well with the righteous, then the moral objectives, which it manifestly seeks proclaim its personal character.

The idea of impersonal mind also lies in the sub-personal realm. Not infrequently, men acknowledge that "mind" is apparent in the operations of the world, but they deny to that mind the attribute of self-consciousness. Absolute idealists magnify idea as constitutive of reality but often it is idea bereft of personal qualities, as we know them in ourselves. Voluntarism exalts will, but according to many of its exponents, it stops short of personality. Schopenhauer's "Absolute Will," Nietzsche's "will to power," von Hartmann's "Unconscious Will"—in none of these cases is will regarded as an aspect of self-conscious Being. Do we not have in all these conceptions of mind or will something less than what we see in humanity? The lower animal possesses mind. It is so absorbed in consciousness that it cannot free itself and attain self-consciousness. It has will in the sense of instinctive action not directed to the realization of an ideal. It is not in subhuman creatures, therefore, that we look for the type of Divine Mind. The power who constitutes us and our world deserves to be viewed from our highest hilltop and that is the self-conscious personality of man.

The other alternative open to non-personalists is the interpretation of God as super-personal. As we have seen, there is a characterization of God as super-personal, which is inevitable in the light of the finite limitations of human personality. The most pronounced personalists thus use the term. James H. Snowden speaks of "super-personality in God."¹⁸ Rufus M. Jones characterizes God as personal and "vastly more."¹⁹ F. H. Bradley would not be classified as a personalist but he wrote of the Absolute, "It is not personal because it is personal and more. It is, in

a word, super-personal." In a later volume, he says that he can accept personality in God as religiously valuable but only if it is supplemented by other beliefs which really contradict it.¹⁷

One of the supposedly super-personal terms, which serves not only as an approach to God but also as a substitute for him, is "values." The idea of value carries us into the realm of the moral, the practical, the helpful. A "value" is the adjective of some reality which we desire for the attainment of ends and for the furtherance of life. Harald Höffding defines religion as belief in the conservation of value. He acknowledges that personality is the highest reality known to us in experience, nevertheless it is inadequate to describe the inmost reality of a universe which calls forth and cherishes values.¹⁸

An examination of values shows that they are not dissociable from personality. They are the conscious experiences of a person to whom some things are estimable. The statement is irrefutable that our ultimate measure of value is our conception of personal excellence, and that all other values are relative to it. When we enumerate, however casually, the spiritual values in particular, we see that they are phases of personal life. Can we say that such values as truth, goodness, beauty, completeness are over-personal? Truth is not separable from integrity of mind; goodness is a quality of personal will; beauty does not exist apart from the perceiving mind which appreciates harmony; completeness is a category furnished by the mind with its sense of self-identity and wholeness. All values, proposed as substitutes for personality, prove to be but phases of personality itself. And God deserves to be understood not in terms of some

aspect of human personality but in terms of its total self-conscious, spiritual greatness.

We find, further, that the idea of "totality" is regarded as possessing super-personal excellence. "Logic or the spirit of totality," said Bosanquet, "is the clew to reality, value and freedom."¹⁹ Persons are an element in totality but are transcended by the whole of which they are only a part. Jan Smuts asserts that the key to the universe is the power within it which tends to the creation of ever higher wholes. Compared with its parts, the whole is ever something different and transcendent, as water is more than oxygen plus hydrogen. Only by an abuse of language can we term that higher whole in which personalities inhere "personality." And yet in a passage of great moral elevation, Smuts calls that Field in which we live "vital, friendly, educative, creative."²⁰ To be friendly and educative, particularly, sound much like the attitude and activity of personality. And whence comes the concept of the "whole"? Here too, as we have already noted, is a category based in our sense of unity and self-identity; it is a phase of personality.

The phrase "super-personal" has its truth but it is easily perverted. In one sense it is meaningless, for we are not constituted so that we can know what lies outside our range of personal powers, any more than we can know material realities beyond the cognizance of our five senses. The phrase sounds well but in fact it is merely a respectable road into agnosticism. However, it has something of the mysterious quality of the blessed word "Mesopotamia" and induces a religious feeling. And it must not be overlooked that there is a strange gravitational power in "super-personal" which tends to carry it down to "sub-personal." It is

useful as designating personality higher than human. It is best understood as describing ideal and infinite personality. In any event, super-personality in God cannot negate personality in God. He is personal, whatever more may constitute the fullness of his life.

5. *Practical importance of belief in divine personality.* The idea of God, as supreme personality, is not an irrelevant speculation unrelated to our practical interests; it is surcharged with moral power. Our discussions in the various fields of human activity will prove to be but elucidations and applications of the significance of personality in both God and man. The fact that God is personal has far-reaching importance for the individual and for society.

There is practical value in possessing a mind which has attained a reasonably satisfying view of the world. The metaphysical interest in each of us is not something apart from the concerns of our daily life. Modern industrial concerns have learned that the mental peace of their workmen is vitally connected with the efficiency with which they toil. No doubt, there are refinements of speculation which seem very remote from the everyday world. The classic illustration in this field, frequently cited, was the medieval dispute concerning the number of angels who can stand on the point of a needle. Even so, yet here the ultimate question at issue was the reality of spiritual intelligences, as distinguished from space-occupying material objects. It may be freely admitted, of course, that the problem could have been stated in much more immediate and vital terms.

The idea of divine personality gives to the human mind an adequate explanation of the origin and purpose of the world. We cannot with any mental satis-

faction to ourselves attribute to blind fate, or to mere chance, the order of things in which we live. To regard this contingent, ever changing world, as simply self-existent and self-operative apart from a supreme mind, does violence to the causal nature of our own understanding. In our daily experience, personality is constantly the creative and directive force in all undertakings. And when we contemplate the universe—and contemplate we must as thinking beings—the one idea which gathers the scattered leaves of the Sibyl and binds them into an intelligible volume of love and hope is the idea of infinite personality who has given reality to the phenomenal order, and who is seeking to create, through that order, moral personalities in his own likeness.

The consciousness of kinship with God enables men to feel “at home” in the universe and thus his emotional needs are met. Who does not sense the pulsing joy and confidence in the lines of Maltbie D. Babcock, intense and enthusiastic believer in God?

This is my Father's world;
And, to my listening ears,
All nature sings and 'round me rings
The music of the spheres.
This is my Father's world;
I rest me in the thought
Of rocks and trees, of skies and seas,—
His hand the wonders wrought.²¹

The attitude toward the universe revealed in these words is far different from that of the man who endures with bloody but unbowed head what he regards as the bludgeonings of fate. There are potent inspirations and consolations which we forego when we consider ourselves temporary exotics in an indifferent or hostile

world where matter and force are the final facts. The moment, however, that one begins to soften the hard features of naturalism by finding friendliness in the cosmic order, he verges toward personalism: for friendliness is the prerogative and expression of personality.

The idea of divine personality brings increased strength of will to man. This strength comes in part through the direct inspirations of companionship with God. The consciousness that we are fellow workers with him gives us loyalty to our moral idealisms. We have reasonable assurance of victory when we believe ourselves to be in accord with the loving purposes of the Lord of the universe. Then, too, our sense of the worth of personality, in ourselves and in others, is immeasurably enhanced when we regard the ultimate cosmic reality as personal. It would be impossible for us to believe in the supremacy and permanence of spiritual values unless we believed in a divine power personal enough to explain, appreciate and conserve them. And out of our belief in the supremacy of the personal, as over against life upon materialistic levels, comes moral dynamic alike for self-realization and for social service.

Society has a tremendous stake in the truth of divine personality. It is a fact, universally recognized, that the concept of God becomes the repository and the bearer of the ideals of a people. This concept presents itself as a standard which shapes the lives of oncoming generations. It is possible, of course, to say that men thus merely project their own ideals and call them God, but it is equally possible to say, and far more truly, that noble views of God are our progressive apprehension of a reality objective to us. The character of God, as an embodiment of ideals, has forma-

tive power. Men try to conform their lives to God's will, they wish to be like him. The types of civilization which we have in the world are only deductions and commentaries upon the ideas of God which they enshrine.

A people who regard God as personal, the possessor of the loftiest moral qualities, are thereby pledged to judge and shape their institutions in the light of his character. If God is the perfect wisdom, righteousness and love, then, to be like God, men are constrained to lift their personal powers to their highest expression. Here are the springs of social progress, here in forceful personalities who are striving to realize the personal ideals which they find in God. On the other hand, impersonalism in God falls like a paralysis upon moral endeavor. The pantheistic Hindu regards the ultimate and highest reality as impersonal. It is wholly logical for him, therefore, to make self-obliteration the goal of effort. Instead of seeking to heighten his personal powers, he attempts to merge himself in an unconscious Absolute. Do we not find in these facts the explanation alike of the social stagnation in pantheistic lands and the spirit of progress which pervades Christian lands? If attention is directed to backward conditions in Mohammedan countries, it can be said that Mohammedanism, despite its monotheistic excellences and its historic achievements, tends to so overstress the sovereignty of God as to make him an inescapable fate. It exalts dependence upon God at the expense of fellowship with him. The hope of social progress, in Orient and in Occident, lies in a more perfect personalization of religion.

CHAPTER IV

THE SPIRITUALITY OF NATURE

THE circle about the fireplace of George Fox has been much crowded in our time. Not a few share the later phases of his experience but many thoughtful persons remain under the cloud which settled for a time upon the mind of the great Quaker mystic.

And one morning, runs the familiar account in the Journal, as I was sitting by the fire, a great cloud came over me, and a temptation beset me; and I sat still and it was said, "All things come by nature"; and the elements and the stars came over me, so that I was in a manner quite clouded with it; but in as much as I sat still and said nothing the people of the house perceived nothing. And as I sat still under it and let it alone, a living hope arose in me and a true voice arose in me which said: "There is a living God who made all things." And immediately the cloud and temptation vanished away, and life arose over it all, and my heart was glad and I praised the living God.¹

No formal definition of "nature" is given in the words of Fox but he indicates its general character and the manner in which it presents itself as a substitute for the personal God. The "elements," doubtless, refer to the component factors of the physical order upon

earth, and the "stars" to the stellar universe. His words remind us of the "elements," or "rudiments of the world," the *stoicheia*, which once held the Galatians in bondage and which signified, according to many scholars, the cosmic powers, who dominated even the gods and rested, like modern materialism, as a blind and heavy fate upon the souls of men.'

To us, "nature" has a wide range of meaning, from the essential character of any reality to a collective name of the whole of things. In this chapter, nature signifies the world of which science, both physical and biological, takes account. We mean by nature the order of the world in which man is placed and in which he realizes personal values. He is himself a part of nature and yet he transcends nature.

Know, man hath all that Nature hath, but more,
And in that more lie all his hopes of good.^a

We think of nature as objective to man, even as, in a true sense, it is objective to God. The relation of personality to nature, therefore, requires a discussion of nature as the expression of the divine personality and as the sphere for the realization of human personalities.

1. *Nature as revelation of God.* Nature in all its vastness and complexity is a revelation of the power which constitutes and sustains it. This power may be completely within nature, in brief nature itself; or it may be a power antecedent to nature and superior to it, but expressing itself in and through nature. The character of this power must be learned from its activities. A mechanism tells us much concerning the purpose and intelligence of its artificer. The processes of the growing plant reveal wonderful adjustments to

soil and rain and sunshine. We seem to be compelled by the facts to assign to nature psychic and purposive and rational qualities which properly appertain not to matter but to personality. The world has within itself the witness that the power which originates and sustains it is personal. Nature is best understood by us as an objectification of the will of the ever creative God.

The idea of creation is basic to a theistic view of the world. A "carpenter" theory of the universe is not thereby implied, nor the emergence of the earth into being *instantly* in a form fitted for habitation by man. Our planet, and assuredly the sidereal universe, are the products of a development through measureless time. It can scarcely be said that creation began in time, for time, as a relation of succession among phenomena, itself began with the existence of phenomena. The power thus to relate things is a function of intelligence, a category of personality. Time is objective to us but certainly not, in a similar way, to the creator of all things. It is better to say that creation is from eternity than to say that it began in time. We cannot answer the question as to what God was doing prior to a creation six thousand years ago by saying, with the exasperated theologian, that he was cutting birch rods with which to punish askers of impertinent questions.

God is forever self-expressive, the universe is derived from him and is dependent for its existence upon the continuous forth-putting of his power. God is eternally creative. Are not new personalities with all their achievements ever appearing even in our own little world? And there is reason to believe that new suns are born when clouds of star dust, emitted by the radio-activity of the heavenly bodies, begin to recon-

stitute various forms of matter and to glow with heat as gravitational forces condense them. At length these suns, as beautiful *débutantes*, are received into solar society. The universe evidently is not running down; it has facilities for winding itself up.

The method whereby God objectified his will in a visible universe, like all origins, is enveloped in mystery, although the newer theories of the dynamic nature of matter give rise to interesting speculations. The atom and the cell are the building units of the inanimate and the animate creation. The magic word for the appearance of higher forms of existence is "organization." When physical and chemical forces assume certain complex forms, life appears; but as far as all our experience goes, it is life from antecedent life. And there is no better hypothesis than that of a Creative Will imparting itself in the ongoings of the cosmic process.

The creation of the world by God has profound corollaries. It is pledge of the fact that the world in its inmost constitution is plastic to the purposes of God, that it is usable for the achievement of personal values. If the world had been constituted by some principle of evil, then pessimism would be grounded in the very nature of things. It cannot, of course, be said, that a material universe in itself possesses moral qualities; at best it is neutral, receiving its moral significance from its relation to personality. But the world, as the self-expression of a good God, deserves the Biblical encomium, which is the charter of all optimism, "And God saw everything that he had made, and, behold, it was very good." It is a world which is friendly to personalities, in its constitutive principle. Nature and man, as products of the

same hand, can coöperate. Man by virtue of the constitution of his being is made for God and he cannot utterly deny his heritage. The fact of the creation of the world by God itself declares the supremacy of the spiritual.

The meaning of "matter" is fundamentally important in the understanding of "nature," for nature we have defined as the world of which science takes account. The physical and chemical sciences deal with the phenomena and laws of inanimate matter, and the biological sciences introduce life as an added factor. Doubtless, primitive man, with his surface judgments, regarded matter as "stuff," ordinarily very substantial, but occasionally ethereal, as in ghosts. Democritus profoundly influenced later centuries by his supposition that all material objects consisted of atoms which he regarded as "uncuttable" particles. Physical things differed only in the kind of atoms which constituted them and the manner of their arrangement and motion. The atom in itself was solid and lifeless. Lucretius thought that life could originate among the atoms. The discovery of bacteria has made doubly foolish his statement that life can arise spontaneously in a clod subjected to dampness and warmth. Since the days of the ancient physicists, there was practically no progress in the knowledge of the nature of matter until our own day.

Nothing in the twentieth century is more significant than the discoveries and speculations concerning matter. Hitherto, we had operated with the three dimensions—length, breadth and height—but Minkowski has added time as a fourth dimension and we speak of a space-time continuum. And gravitation, thanks to

Einstein, has ceased to be a mysterious push or pull of particles of matter toward each other and has become a result of motion, like the pressure of our bodies against the side of the automobile when we swiftly turn a corner of the road. The "indivisible" atom has been resolved into a complex dynamic system. According to generally accepted theories, charges of negative electricity called "electrons," move around a nucleus of positive electricity called the "proton," in orbits, relative to their size, as vast as those of planets around the sun. Other theories regard the electrons as in violent agitation and think of the atom simply as a locality whence there is radiation of energy.

What, then, is the ultimate nature of matter? At the most, it is reducible to three realities—ether, electricity, energy. Sir Oliver Lodge insists that electrons are knots or twists or vortices in the ether of space. Other scientists of distinction deny the existence of ether. As for electricity, it is sometimes said that positive electricity and negative electricity are two different entities. There seems general agreement that matter is in some sense electrical in its nature. But when we ask how electricity is to be regarded, as stuff or as force, the apparently inevitable answer is force. In that event, the one constituent reality in matter is energy. And the different forms of matter are the result of the various combinations of the electrons. To some extent, we already know how to combine electrons to produce substances. We may yet discover the philosopher's stone and manufacture gold. The physicists, as a whole, are not ready to declare that matter consists solely of energy but there are influential voices who make the affirmation.

The effect of these theories upon materialism as a philosophy is radical and far-reaching. Certainly in its older forms, materialism is discredited. No sensible person denies the reality of matter upon its own plane, whatever its constituent elements. It is plain, however, that we draw near to a spiritual interpretation of the universe when we resolve all material objects, whether pebbles, oceans, or suns into energy. Constituted as we are, energy is interpretable by us only as expression of will. Nature in all its aspects must be regarded as a continuous forth-putting of divine thought and purpose. We do not look out over a dead universe, a vast cemetery of impersonal matter. We see a world vibrant, alive, spiritual. To this conclusion tend all theories which emphasize the dynamic nature of the material world.

A striking instance of the philosophical effect of scientific interpretations of matter is seen in the reversal of position made by Robert Blatchford, editor for many years of *The Clarion*, a radical anti-theistic paper published in England.

Ever since I began to read and think about life [says he] I have been what is called a materialist. But of late the distant drum has been beating out new and strange measures, and it has never been a fault of mine to shut my ears. The fact is that I have had to abandon my positions. Materialism seemed to be an impregnable fortress so long as there remained a material foundation to stand on. But how can one hold to materialism if there is no material? It seems to me that the division of the atom shook the materialistic fabric dangerously. If the infinitesimal atom is divisible into

millions of electrons, all of them in motion, there is no such thing as material substance. I have been driven out of my materialist philosophy. Let us, then, give a little thought to the soul.⁴

The contingent character of nature, also, points to a reality greater than itself. It is a dependent, ever-changing thing which finds its orderly continuity in the purposeful God. Through vast eons, the solar bodies pass through their phases, the white light of suns still in their youth, the yellowish light of suns whose fires are dying down, and then possibly some new beginning through redistribution of component parts. Perhaps A. N. Whitehead has given us a true picture of the transition of the universe when he tells us that it is passing with a slowness, inconceivable in our measures of time, to new creative conditions, amid which the physical world, as we know it, will be represented by "a ripple barely to be distinguished from non-entity."⁵ Of more immediate interest are the changes which take place in the order of nature here upon earth. Evolution seeks to describe these changes from the first primordial cell to the teeming life which we find here to-day. New factors have appeared but always with due preparation and in forms which are intelligible to the human mind. It seemed to Huxley, as he watched the development of a water newt, that a more subtle vision would have shown "the hidden artist with his plan before him, striving with skillful manipulation to perfect his work."⁶ Even the weather has been taken from the realm of caprice and is being subjected more and more to meteorological prediction. And in all its vast complexity and constant

changes, the realm of nature is so unified that we properly call it a system.

There are only two ways of explaining the orderly changes visible in nature. Either they are effected by some principle wholly in nature itself which coördinates the workings of its several parts, or they are brought about by some reality which works within nature but is itself a larger reality than nature, upon which nature is dependent. The latter alternative clearly recognizes a power which is superior to nature and which may properly be called personal. If we choose the first alternative, we are compelled to endow the power within nature, or nature itself, with purpose, intelligence, and even goodness, qualities which appertain to personality. A reality within nature, or identical with it, possessing personal characteristics, rises above the functions of matter and is really transcendent. The name which we give to God has no importance but only the meaning which we attach to it. We may call him Nature but his features, as revealed in the beneficent orderliness of the world, strangely resemble the Christian God.

In our time, the relation of God to nature usually finds definition in the terms "immanence" and "transcendence." Both are plainly spatial metaphors. One declares that God dwells "in" his world; the other that he is "beyond" or "above" his world. Such words may make right impressions but they cannot convey precise meanings. Spiritual realities cannot be located by the finger of the compass. It is impossible to weigh love on copper scales, or to indicate the locality of God by signposts. Nevertheless, immanence and transcendence are useful terms and we must employ them, for no better ones are available.

Immanence means that God is the inner and present ground of all existence and activity. Nature does not subsist and operate by virtue of its own legality, some power within itself independent of God. He did not constitute the world, as a self-operative machine, and withdraw from it as an engineer might leap from the cab of a locomotive which he has put under motion, leaving it to run through impersonal forces immanent in itself. Matter is the continuous forth-putting of divine energy; and as for man, God is the soul of his soul. If God were to withdraw from his universe, every form of existence animate and inanimate, would vanish. The immanence of God in man is no abolition of human freedom. The energy to which man gives direction and development is the gift and power of God, however used. The indwelling of God is everywhere conditioned by nature and man. Only in some limited sense is God in a tree, even as the life of man is only partially in some obscure member of his body. In a far higher sense God dwells in human personality, but here his presence is ethically conditioned. He is not equally present and revealed in Judas and in Jesus. And everywhere, the fact of divine immanence invests nature with a new sacredness and beauty, whether at Tintern Abbey or at Akhetaton, in the valley of the Nile, where Ikhnaton sang his hymn to the sun.

The companion truth to immanence is transcendence. God is not submerged in nature, his personality lost in pantheism. The fact of personality in God is itself a transcendence of the material universe. If God possesses mind, love, and will in self-conscious unity, then he is superior to, apart from, the sphere of physical phenomena. Creation implies an otherness of the world even to God. It stands over against

him, as the externalization of his will. Even so—the fullness of truth can only be expressed in antinomies—all created things subsist in God, even as an inventor's machine is objective to him and yet is included in his larger self. The truth of divine transcendence is necessary to religion. A God infinitely greater than the world of nature shatters our human complacency and moves the soul to the lowly and aspiring reverence which is the heart of religious feeling. The present reaction against mere immanentism, with the renewed emphasis upon transcendence, is inevitable in the conservation of the religious spirit. The God who is above nature and dominates it is a God able to hear and answer prayer, to transform human personalities with his unbought grace and power, and to inspire the adoration and love which are the soul of all consecration to noble tasks.

The intelligibleness of nature, as the expression of mind, is a fact which confronts us everywhere. In the act of knowledge, in any sphere, we bring much in ourselves to the scene. We interpret nature in the light of our powers and experience, even as a traveler in Europe sees what he is qualified to see by his knowledge of history or his appreciation of art. Assuredly, we could not find purpose, mind, goodness in nature unless they existed in ourselves. The principle of cause and effect, by which the world is unified, lies first of all in the structure of our minds. But whatever the subjective aspects of knowledge, we believe in the reality of an objective world whose orderly relations are not imposed by our minds but are discovered by them. It is an hypothesis which works successfully, brings coherence into the facts of experience, and enables us to control our physical environment.

The observed sequences of phenomena we call "law." And our experience leads to the conviction that where causal conditions are the same, the same results eventuate. Our confidence finds expression in such phrases as "the uniformity of law," and "the conservation of energy." They may be only pious assertions but they underlie all science and all our mastery over the external world.

The favorite metaphor of our time, with which to characterize the intelligible physical world, is the "machine." Where there is life, "organism," of course, is a more adequate term; but certainly if living phenomena are ultimately explicable by chemical reactions and mathematical physics, then the mechanistic analogy suffices. The universe appears to work with the undeviating precision of a machine. If we understand its operation, we know what it is going to do when the wheels begin to go round. And it has seemed to many minds that a mechanistic philosophy is necessitated by the facts of science. It is a profound mistake, however, to think that mechanism and teleology are opposed to each other. A machine is an instrument. It implies both a maker and a product. It is the very incarnation of purpose. A machine whose use we cannot discover, which can serve no intelligible purpose, is not a machine—it is simply junk. Nor have we any experience of machines which are self-operative. Sir Arthur Keith denies God and immortality on the ground that the world is a "machine" which "runs itself."⁷ We have no experience of such machines, whatever may be true of organisms, and the would-be inventor of a perpetual motion mechanism we regard as the victim of a harmless delusion.

The intelligibleness of the world implies a similarity

of the mind of man to the mind of God. It can be said that man is able to know nature because he was nurtured by nature but there is no reason to suppose that animals, in like manner the product of nature, have any appreciation of the general laws which govern the operation of the universe. We can know only those things which are the expressions of minds like our own. We are able to find meanings in the hieroglyphs of the Egyptians because minds similar to our minds put meanings in them. The lions that creep out of the Libyan desert find no significance in the symbolic characters which reveal to us the thoughts and deeds of the wonderful people who dwelt beside the Nile. We literally think God's thoughts after him when we delight in the discoveries of science. And across the pages of every treatise on science is written the truth of the kinship of God and man.

One of the most significant aspects of nature is the beauty which we find everywhere, if we have discerning eyes. Not infrequently, earnest souls have been oblivious to beauty in nature because of their absorption in economic gain, superficial pleasure, or one-sided religion. Calvin, living within sight of Mont Blanc, makes no reference to it in his writings; and even Erasmus, the humanist, spends his hours while crossing the Alps in writing a treatise on "Old Age." A complete religion takes full account, not alone of the good and the true, but also of the beautiful. Wherever we look upon the visible universe, there is beauty, whether in the stars that inlay the floor of heaven, in the surf breaking on the shore, or in the flowers which adorn the fields. Even the desert is beautiful. The colors that rest upon it at dawn and

twilight are wonderful, and every grain of sand in its expanse is a crystal of marvelous workmanship. This beauty does not exist merely for its utility, as certain scientists have said concerning the flowers which attract the insects on whose wings the fructifying pollen is borne to other flowers. What utility is there in a splendid sunset? Beauty is structural in the universe, inseparable from the touch of God's hand.

Beauty is indisputably a spiritual reality, even though it can be discerned only in and through the material. The essential nature of beauty is found in harmony, coherence, completeness. It lies in the relationship of things; and relationship is a spiritual fact, and is spiritually apprehended. The power to see relationship belongs, in the fullest sense, only to possessors of conceptual reason, that is, to personal beings. Beauty, then, is not primarily in things, it is in the self-revealing soul and in the perceiving soul. It is a language by which personalities communicate with one another. We do not commune with nature but through nature, as a system of symbols, we commune with God.

The sense of the "numinous," the consciousness of the divine which is greater than all our ability to define, rises nowhere with more authentic power than in the presence of the sublime and the beautiful. Horace Bridges, as a sorrowful boy in a squalid backyard in London, lifted his eyes to the sky and received the innermost message of beauty.

One of those miraculous sunsets [he writes] that are occasionally to be seen through the smoky haze of London was in all its glory. Instantly my trouble fell from me. The universe spoke to me.

It said, "Don't worry. Underneath are the everlasting arms." And I believed it, and have never doubted it since, and never can doubt it.⁸

The beauty which is in nature is the divine self-expression. It is personality in one of its avenues of communication with personalities.

2. *Nature as a sphere for the realization of personalities.* Nature presents itself not only as a medium in which God discloses himself to us but also as a scene in which we achieve personal values. As purposive beings, inalienably and incurably purposive, we are bound to ask what the physical universe is for. Such a question is not the foolish query of juvenile curiosity which a mature intelligence may be expected to outgrow. The highest standard by which we measure men is the character of their central purpose and the steadfastness of their loyalty to it. An aimless God, playing with planets as a baby plays with marbles, falls far below our best human standards. God has a purpose worthy of himself, worthy of the wonderful material universe which constitutes his field of effort.

The divine purpose was never more happily expressed than by the great poet who wrote the interpretation of creation found in the book of Genesis. On the morning of the sixth and final creative day, God is represented as saying, "Let us make man in our image." It is a valid principle of philosophy that the culmination of a process reveals the meaning of a process as a whole. The end illumines the stages by which it is realized, the lower must be understood in the light of the higher which fulfills and crowns it. The cosmic process has for its purpose the creation of Godlike personalities. If we call the physical universe a machine,

a legitimate figure but not the only permissible one, then we can say that its product is spiritual intelligences. The world is a character-factory. We are often told that it is immeasurable conceit for man to declare that the universe exists for his sake. True, if the claim is made simply for ourselves as members of the *genus homo*, but if we speak in behalf of all personal beings, Martian and otherwise, in whatever stellar system their lot may be cast, then we merely show a proper appraisal of values when we make the material instrumental to the achievement of the spiritual.

The mildest indictment of nature made by its critics declares its indifference to distinctively human values. Nature goes on its heedless way, treating all alike. The Alpine avalanche pays no attention to the fact that there is a village in its path. The lightning smites a church as readily as it does a bacchanalian resort, accepting the challenge of the spire even on the house of God. The Black Death made no discrimination between saint and sinner, as it swept away half the population of some medieval European communities. According to naturalism, our whole human experiment in personal and social idealism is only a passing episode in cosmic history.

At the end of all our strivings and efforts [says E. D. Martin] science sees our world a frozen clod whirling through emptiness about a cheerless and exhausted sun, bearing on its sides the marks of man's once hopeful activity, fragments of his works of art mixed with glacial débris, all waiting in the dark for millenniums until the final crash comes, when even the burned out sun shall be

shattered in collision with another like it, and the story shall all be over while there is no one to remember and none to care. All will be as if it had never been.*

This dismal picture fails to take account of all the facts, spiritual as well as astronomic. As a description of the eventual destiny of our solar system, it is probably correct, but the destruction of a particular house does not necessarily involve the destruction of the builder and of the tenants. There may be excellent reasons for believing, in the light of a rational interpretation of the universe in terms of its manifest purpose, that the story of spiritual intelligences will be far from ended because there has been a change in cosmic weather and a destruction of a temporary habitation.

A deeper view of nature does not justify the verdict of indifference brought against it. No doubt, all physical realities have a certain moral neutrality; they gain moral meaning only in relation to moral beings. The locomotive greatly facilitates human communications but it has no hesitation in running over the pedestrian who gets in its way. All our machines mangle or serve us, according as we relate ourselves to them. What appears to be the indifference of nature is purely incidental to the trustworthy character of nature. If gravitation did not work with undeviating regularity, we could not venture to build dams or to lay one brick upon another. Surely, it is divine kindness to give us a world wholly dependable.

And when we rise out of the realm of mechanics into life, we find the whole theory of evolution protesting against the idea that nature is indifferent to

higher forms of life. Does not evolution teach that those creatures are chosen for survival who are best adapted to environment? And everywhere nature puts upon an organism, which functions well in relation to environment, the seal of pleasure. No judgment upon nature, defined in the largest sense, is adequate which does not take into account the fact that man is an integral part of the world order. And in human life we find moral selection at work. There is a premium placed upon the coöperative spirit, upon obedience to those laws which underlie the welfare of individual and society. In the long run, it is ill with the wicked and it is well with the righteous, and all by virtue of the inexorable decree of nature.

A more severe indictment of nature declares that it is guilty, not of indifference merely, but of hostility. Plato believed that God worked with intractable materials, that evil has its basis in the negative substratum of existence. And Bergson finds that life is a movement, while matter is the inverse movement, life, as it were, falling back on itself. This conception of materiality does not necessarily give us a pessimistic view of nature, although it does suggest a thwarting of the vital impulse, at least for a time. Theologians in various religions have ascribed the hostile aspects of nature to satanic agencies. In the religion of Zoroaster, Angra-Mainyu was held responsible for all the plagues, whether blighting cold and withering heat, or vermin, vice and disbelief. The ninety-nine thousand, nine hundred and ninety-nine diseases, also, are his inflictions. The same bitter cosmic foe of man, only under another name, was blamed by Christian theologians for crop failures and death, as well as for moral obliquities.

No more serious charge of hostility to moral values has been made against nature than by some exponents of evolution. It is not forgotten that Thomas Huxley declared that nature was the headquarters of the enemy. "Let it be understood once for all," are his challenging words, "that the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it."¹⁰ If these words are true, the stars in their courses do not fight for us, they fight against us. This conclusion is based on the supposition that ruthless struggle, by which the strong survive and the weak are destroyed, is basic in evolution. Cosmic sanction has thus been claimed for pitiless militarism; war was justified as a biological necessity. Christianity was pilloried by some writers of this school of thought as counter to nature, because it taught pity for the weak, love for enemies, gentleness toward all men.

A more just and adequate interpretation of evolution has done much to exonerate nature from being the scene of unrelieved cruelty. Henry Drummond pointed out that there was in nature not only a struggle for life but a struggle for the life of others.¹¹ Even the cell, at the very beginnings of life, divides to become two cells; it dies to live in larger life. And increasingly as evolution proceeds, mutual aid becomes the secret of survival, and mutual aid is only another name for love. The elimination of weaker strains in any group, certainly in the human group, is best accomplished in ways devoid of cruelty and wholly consistent with individual happiness. In point of fact, struggle is so good, that our duty is to qualify every one possible to participate in it on proper levels. It can now be boldly said that evolution vindicates altruism quite as truly

as it does self-assertion. And Robert Millikan, speaking of the part which man plays in evolution, assures us that "the idea that nature is at bottom benevolent has now become well-nigh universal."¹²

The problem of evil confronts us when we turn our eyes upon the darker aspects of nature. Evil assumes two general forms—cosmic and moral. Under the first term, we understand those ills which come to us through the constitution of the world order in which we live; under the second, we designate the loss and pain which are the result of our own wrongdoing. It is cosmic evil which pertains particularly to nature, yet it is convenient at this point, to speak in a general way of evil as a whole. Probably, when we have spoken, and all other human voices have been heard, evil will remain an unfathomable mystery.

There is a strong insistence to-day that we must take a serious view of evil. A saccharine optimism does not suit the realistic temper of our times. Absolute idealism has been discredited with many minds because it seems to make evil necessary to the completeness of things, a discord which heightens the universal music, possibly an illusion incidental to our present stage of development. Such a comfortable philosophy is charged with cutting the nerve of strenuous morality and with promoting the taking of illegal moral holidays. The problem which confronts the moralist is to construct a view of life which challenges man with a sense of terrific risk in living, and yet gives him reasonable assurance of victory, if he tries to do his part.

The pain which afflicts the world is plainly incidental to the possession of sentiency. To be able to feel—this is the condition of both joy and sorrow. And perhaps the sorrow is none too great a price to

pay for heartstrings that can thrill with the highest ecstasy. The sufferings of the lower animals in some ways are more of a problem than are the sufferings which we endure. In the case of creatures who are heirs of immortality, it is possible to find eternal utility in the temporary ministry of pain. But unless we open the doors of a future world to the animals—which many are willing to do—the pain which they suffer seems aimless and gratuitous. It can be said that their sufferings are far less than we often suppose. They have no fear of death as an abstract idea of the mind; the violence which they experience is often an anesthetic; they have no pangs of conscience for they cannot sin. There is among animals far more of happiness than of pain, so that the balance is overwhelmingly on the right side.

In the case of man, there is pain which seems to be inevitably involved in the order of the universe, in the structure of human experience. We refer not merely to physical ills but to the disparity which ever lies between man's ideals and his achievements. He is never satisfied. "Consciousness," said Auguste Sabatier, "like every other child is born in tears. The child of pain, it can only be developed by pain."¹⁸ We experience frustration, disappointment, bereavement, which we can transcend only as we learn a higher wisdom. Over against these facts, there is the inherent joy of a life of striving. The premise of Schopenhauer's philosophy of pessimism is utterly wrong, striving is not in itself pain, striving brings us the joy of self-expression and creative effort.

The believer in God, as a being personal and beneficent, must relate his faith to the presence of evil in the universe. If God is omnipotent, why does he per-

mit evil? And the dilemma confronts us—an omnipotent God who is not good, or a good God who is limited in power. Men cannot surrender faith in divine goodness, for that is the postulate of all successful living, therefore they believe that God is under the self-limitations of his own wisdom and self-consistency. His power is adequate but it is not unconditioned. The word “finite” does not do justice to the plenitude of the divine resources. He is not a godlet but God, whose greatness we cannot measure. It may well be true that he also toils and strives, but his purposes cannot fail.

The idea of development has affected the problem of evil, as it has all else. The presence of evil was a more acute fact when men thought of a world created perfect, complete, and all in a moment. How could trouble and sorrow enter such a world? But if the universe is in process, much light falls upon the cloud. The confusion and imperfection which pain us may be incidents, necessary incidents, like scattered piles of lumber, in the building of the temple of human life. We may find little to admire in the tangled ends of the threads woven into the rug as we face the weaver and view the process, but when we see from the right side the finished pattern in its beauty, we know that divine goodness and power have woven upon the loom of time the life of humanity.

Nor can we deny the fact of everyday experience that there is an alchemy which transmutes suffering, whether due to cosmic or moral evil, into the gold of character. We readily see the educational values in cosmic disasters. The deadly lightnings taught us the meaning of electricity. But it is more difficult to assert that even moral evil can be taken up into vicarious

love and transcended, for such hopefulness lends itself to the resolution, Let us do evil that good may come. It were better for us never to do wrong; but having done wrong, it is within the power of penitence to give new significance even to the past. It is the belief of Christianity that God discloses himself most fully as Eternal Redeemer and that the transmutative power of the Cross is the central fact in the gospel.

Death has been regarded as the ultimate cosmic evil. It removes us from loved fellowships and scenes. The dissolution of the body is repellent to all our senses. The experience of men in dreams appeared to primitive peoples to indicate the fact of survival of death but in a form shadowy, weak, almost non-existent. Even as late as Homer's day, the psyches in the underworld are likened to bats in a cave. Different gods from those known upon earth are in charge of the listless and unhappy people in Hades. Rabbinic speculation among the Jews regarded death as a curse which came upon man as the result of sin. And there can be no doubt, as Paul taught, that sin does give quality to our experience of death. He declared that the "sting" of death is sin. One of the major concerns of religion everywhere is to effect some manner of triumph over death.

There are few things more important than a right estimate of death. Forget death as we may, it throws its shadow over countless lives. One of the services rendered by science is a larger appreciation of the utility of death in the world process. It is agreed by scientists and theologians that the lower forms of life appeared first upon earth. These creatures, whether fish or rabbits, multiplied rapidly, and if there had been no death, there would have been no room for

human beings. Death has been an indispensable factor in evolution. It is also an educational power of the first magnitude in human life. It puts urgency into life. A large part of our activities are efforts to preserve our bodily life and to keep death at a distance. All our appreciations of one another are deepened, softened, purified by the thought of death. Possibly it is death, with its mystery, which does much to motivate our quest for God and to make us religious. And if there is a realm beyond the grave, death is doubtless the way we enter it; for death signifies not a mere change of locality but a rise into a new type of experience. Altogether, therefore, a survey of the place of death in nature justifies the conclusion that it is a normal and beneficent part of the divine plan.

One of the ways in which nature is made serviceable to man is by miracle. Here is the dearest child of faith because it is assurance that the order of the world is at the command of personal goodness. The essential idea of miracle is that it is an event in the phenomenal world, unusual in character, wrought by God in our behalf for a moral purpose. In primitive religions the idea of "law" did not enter the situation, for men believed that the spirits or gods were constantly and arbitrarily at work in the natural order.

Real problems confront men to-day through the rise of the scientific view of the world and through the development of historical criticism, especially in the field of comparative religion. The temper of our age found expression in Napoleon who once expressed a preference for Mohammedanism, for it was not overburdened with miracles. Christian apologetics a century ago attached great importance to miracles as credentials of the teachings of the Bible. An increasing

number of voices to-day insist that the central truths of Christianity are true in their own right and need no certification or support from miracles, as events inexplicable by natural laws or contradictory to them.¹⁴

It is not difficult to validate philosophically the possibility of miracles, especially if one has the right of definition. Evolution itself speaks of "creativity," the unannounced appearance of the new in the order of nature. The first blade of grass was a miracle. So was the coming upon the stage of history of such a personality as Jesus. What we call "law" represents only our present experience of the sequence of events. With every new factor in the situation, there is modified action of law. Who knows but that laws now unknown to us are at work in unusual events? If God is immanent in his world, then he can as readily modify its movements as a man's soul can direct the body in which it dwells. Deeds are proportioned to personality, and to an extraordinary personality, remarkable deeds are divinely natural. All these philosophical considerations cannot prove that any given report of a wonderful event is true. That can be done only by testimony to which all the legitimate tests of historical truth are applied.

Faith in miracle, as the assurance of the direct and kindly activity of God in his world, is at the heart of all religion. We demand freedom for God, freedom to do the things which need to be done. A mere thaumaturgy, a dealing in "signs and wonders," is without religious value, and both Jesus and Buddha despised them.¹⁵ Luther called them "apples and nuts for children." But events which disclose the riches of personality, like the healing deeds of Jesus, are full of religious power. There is a view of the world which

conserves for us, in an age of science, the essential truth of miracle. The world, by its very structure as wholly dependable and orderly, is built to promote our moral welfare. God is in the ripening harvest as truly as in the falling manna. Natural versus supernatural expresses a false antithesis. These are complementary terms; one has reference to the divine method of operation in nature, the other to the reality of causation in nature by the present and loving God. Nature, as a whole, in the unforgettable phrase of John Keats, is "The Vale of Soul-making."¹⁰

CHAPTER V

THE LOOM OF HISTORY

THERE is a well-worn adage coming down from the days of the Greeks that history is philosophy teaching by examples. The philosophy, thus illustrated in the long story of mankind, deals with personality in its various aspects. History, as the written record of human life on our planet, gives us only the most recent chapter of a book whose earlier chapters are lost in the mists of an immemorial past. Some things we learn as we trace the drawings made by primitive men on the walls of caves, or view the memorials of the dead found in ancient tombs. The invention of writing, by which libraries became vast artificial memories, made history possible in the true sense of the word.

Our records of the past give us no certain ground prior to seven thousand years ago. Some authorities believe that men have dwelt upon earth at least five hundred thousand years and that, relatively speaking, Abraham, Hammurabi and Menes are our contemporaries. In recent years, there has been a tendency to abbreviate the period of man's terrestrial residence. H. G. Wells estimates that "true man" first appeared sixty thousand to twenty thousand years ago; James Orr believed that evolution by "leaps" made chronology of vast length unnecessary and that twelve to fifteen thousand years are sufficient to cover our human activities on earth.¹

Interest in the general course of human life awaited a considerable degree of intellectual maturity. The struggle for existence through long generations left little leisure for philosophies of history, even if adequate data had been at hand. And yet even the mythologies often deal with the origins and also with the issues of human existence upon earth. Every apocalyptic program is in its way a philosophy of history, as truly as are the findings of Vico and Hegel. Generally speaking, the attitude of primitive races toward the stream of history is like the attitude of King Cazemba toward the rivers of Africa. "We let the streams run on and on," said he to David Livingstone, Seeker of Rivers, "and do not inquire whence they rise and whither they flow." ² The intellectual heirs of Polybius and Thucydides cannot be content, however, until they have learned the lessons which history in its largest sense is able to teach them.

The relation of history to the truths of religion presents many difficult problems. These truths are presumed to be parts of an everlasting gospel superior to the vicissitudes of time and independent of them. But the facts of history are notoriously dependent upon the imperfect observation and reports of men. In the realm of history, "probability" is our guide and our certainties are never absolute. Lessing insisted that contingent historical truths can never afford proof of the necessary truths of religion, a statement which deeply disturbed men who argued for the finality of Christianity on historical grounds. We do, however, have in history moral certainty, and even the scientist has no more in his expectation that certain causal conditions will have certain effects. Our faith does not rest on abstract ideas unrelated to historical person-

alities but the eternal comes to us in and through the temporal. And it is base ingratitude to kick down the ladder by which we climbed. The history of an idea goes far toward giving us an understanding of it. The knowledge of the past emancipates us from the thrall-dom of the present, even though the past is nothing except as it gives content to the present. In history, we see a growth in the appreciation of personality, and a moral process for the education of personalities.

1. *History as an increasing appreciation of personality.* History, on the whole, shows an ever deepening sense of the significance and worth of personality. Human life, no doubt began in the utmost simplicity. Man possessed a rich store of instincts, including those we find in the higher animals, but as a strictly human being, a self-conscious personality, he had everything to learn. He was "innocent" until the habits of his animal nature constrained him to choose contrary to the demands of his new spiritual status. John Milton's Adam was a philosopher and gentleman of the English Puritan era but the real Adam, or first man, was a pupil in the very beginnings of knowledge. The theory of human history, as a long degeneration from the idyllic conditions of sinless perfection, has given way to the conception of a long ascent from primitivity to civilization. And the milestones which register the upward climb are insights into the meaning and value of personal life. We note some of these insights as they have appeared in the ancient world in general, in the course of Biblical history, and in later Christian centuries.

In the earliest human groups, the sense of personality was feeble and confused. Our opinions concerning pre-historic human groups are largely inference,

doubtless, oftentimes precarious, based upon analogies of childhood and upon our knowledge of present-day primitive tribes. In the earliest mythologies, there are tales of metamorphoses which show that man did not clearly differentiate himself from non-human objects, such as trees and animals. His heroes, like Paupukkeewis, in Longfellow's *Hiawatha*, could assume other forms at will. Of course, animals like Balaam's ass could take human rôles and speak to us. There are tribes in Africa to-day who think that the ass abstains from speaking through sheer laziness. Among primitive peoples, the individual is submerged in the tribe. The supreme consideration is the perpetuity of the tribe, there is not enough interest in the individual to provide him with a worthy survival of death. Relatively slight valuation is put upon man as man; as a result, infanticide, cannibalism, slavery are widely prevalent.

In the first days of humanity, there is no clear personal conception of deity. Religion seems to have begun as a sense of awe in the presence of a mysterious power which the Melanesians called "mana." This power man sought to propitiate and use. It is an interesting fact, however, that man ascribed intention to this mysterious force, whether a rock fell on him or the lightning smote him. And as intention is an activity of personality, George Foot Moore is right in saying that while primitive people did not have our conception of personality, nevertheless, "man from the beginning necessarily assumes the personality of the power with which he is concerned." ^a The dimness of his appreciation of personality may be seen in the fact that class names, such as "Baalim" preceded personal names for the gods. The adjective, descriptive

of the god, was first in time, and then the noun. At length, the great nature powers came to be fully personalized. Truly remarkable, however, is the fact that along with the worship of gods and spirits, there is among primitive peoples the notion of one deity back of all things, an "Urvater," who is Lord of heaven and earth.⁴

In the Far East, particularly in India, pantheistic tendencies have obscured personality, alike in God and man. Religion evidently had two roots—faith in a high God who is Creator, Lawgiver, Determiner of destiny and faith in a mysterious power, *mana*, which manifests itself in things and in men, in short, a germinal pantheism. From the latter root sprang a vigorous growth in philosophical Hinduism and its offspring, Buddhism. The inadequacy of impersonal deity is shown on a vast historical stage in India, in the rise of the *Bhakti* religions of devotion to such personal deities as Vishnu and Siva, and in the transformation of original atheistic Buddhism into theistic Mahayana Buddhism. The heavy pall of pantheism in India has discouraged the growth of reverence for individual personalities; the caste system, particularly in its dealing with millions of untouchables, has evinced a contempt of man as man to which probably history has no parallel. A new appreciation of the worth of personality, even in pariahs, is visible in a host of noble Hindus, inspired in large part by contact, direct or indirect, with Christianity.

In the Græco-Roman world, to which we are so deeply debtors, the idea of personality divine and human has had decisive formative power. Our first clear acquaintance with the religion of the Greeks is made in the poems of Homer and in them the gods are

frankly anthropomorphic, as embodiments of both human virtues and foibles. Prior to their adoption into the Greek pantheon, the deities of the Romans appear to have been virtually mere numina or powers. In the development of philosophy, as represented by the noble three—Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, we have a theism which has profoundly influenced Christianity and also Mohammedanism and Judaism. At a later time, Stoicism evinced pantheistic tendencies, yet its faith in a divine Providence gave it vital religious power.

It must be conceded that philosophy, especially in the school of Aristotle, made much progress in the understanding of human personality, even from the point of view of physiological psychology.⁵ The sense of the worth of personality, although it received occasional high expression, was not characteristic of classical ancient civilization. Plato spoke nobly of the soul as immaterial reality, divine and immortal. Yet even Plato had the aristocrat's disdain of the common man. As for Aristotle, he taught that some men were by nature "barbarians," as others were by nature "slaves." Woman, he regarded as nature's failure in the effort to produce man.

To Stoicism, with its doctrine of the divine Logos as a seed of truth in all races of men and its teaching of a law innate and not merely statutory, is given the credit for contributing invaluable elements to our idea of selfhood. It was the logic of its own premises which led Stoicism to make the world's first protest against human slavery. In many ways, the social life of the Græco-Roman world was a denial of the worth of personality. As late as the time of Alexander, pupil of Aristotle, the men in captured cities were put to the

sword, the women and the children were sold into slavery. It was Asinius Pollio who explained to his guests, among whom were Mæcenas, Virgil and Horace, that the delicate flavor of the fish was due to the fact that they had been fattened on the flesh of slaves. Nevertheless, a new spirit was moving in the hearts of men and Terence gave it resounding expression when he said, "I am a man and nothing that concerns a man do I deem a matter of indifference to me."

When we turn to Biblical history, we find that the world's chief creative religious literature deals with personality. The Hebrew people, when they first appear on the stage of history, were much like their neighbors as sharers in a common Semitic heritage. Their significance lies not where they began but whither they made their way. Some historians, like Renan, credit them with having a "genius" for religion. As captives, exiles, subjects, they had abundant opportunity to learn what powerful neighbors had to teach. The fact of chief importance seems to have been an unbroken succession of prophetic personalities who progressively ethicized and rationalized the old tribal religion and who called men to an ever loftier conception of God. The literary memorials of over a thousand years of experience are the books of the Bible, Old Testament and New. Upon their pages, the basic truths of ethical monotheism, of personalistic religion, emerge into clear historical expression. With good reason, we speak of divine revelation in a pre-eminent sense, and recognize in the record of that revelation a volume of permanent value in the religious life of mankind.

The revolutionary fact about the Old Testament is its presentation of a God of history rather than a God

of nature. Yahweh may have begun as the storm god of Sinai but, thanks to his own prophets, he became the God of the moral order and of history. This fact may be regarded as the most original aspect of the Hebrew religion. We move no longer among nature cults but in a world of faith, where emphasis lies upon personal values. Already the pre-literary prophets, such as Nathan and Elijah, had laid the foundations of the higher faith, they were practical monotheists. In Amos, we have the first thoroughgoing internationalist, who applies the same plumb-line righteousness to Israel and to other peoples. In Hosea, the sacrificial, forgiving, redeeming love of God finds a dramatic voice. The requirements of God have never received more succinct and beautiful expression than in the words of Micah which bid us to do justice, to love kindness, and to walk humbly with God.⁶

The growth of individualism, within the period of Biblical history, is one of the most significant aspects of the life of Israel. When the story opens, the clan is the overpowering fact, although in every social group the individual has his importance. Responsibility is communal, as we learn from the punishment of whole families and communities for the crime of an individual. Beyond death, there was only the dim, aimless, empty life of Sheol. After the settlement in the land of Canaan many influences brought about a higher view of personality. The new social complexity gave added importance to the individual, as is always the case when he is a vital factor in the welfare of an interdependent society. Of special significance, however, was a nobler conception of God and a deeper appreciation of the meaning of personal fellowship with him. Out of these convictions came the assur-

ance that death itself could not separate man from God and the blessedness of life in God.

The destruction of the Jewish state by the Mesopotamian empires led to a clearer recognition that the real Israel was the spiritually minded portion of the people, the church within the church. This truth was driven home by Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel. The humanitarianism of the Deuteronomic code revealed the growing sense of personal values. And the worth of men as men, everywhere, stands revealed in the universal love of God as pictured in the beautiful book of Jonah and in the lofty words of Deutero-Isaiah concerning the religious mission of Israel to all mankind.

In the New Testament, the truths of the older dispensation came to full efflorescence. During the two centuries, prior to the beginnings of Christianity, the inter-Testament period, there had been a notable growth in thought, and all in a personalistic direction. The idea of God had become more intimate; the phrase, "Father in heaven," was a current phrase in pious circles. One evidence of the increasing sense of the worth of personality was the belief, which had become part of Pharisaic orthodoxy, in a blessed immortality for faithful souls. The general political situation encouraged an emphasis upon individualistic salvation. Political activities were largely proscribed by Roman despotism, and the intellectual energies of the people were turned into the formulation of hopes of apocalyptic deliverance. The devout Jew believed that the individual could hasten the day of the Lord by a righteous life and assure himself a place in its triumphs. The Kingdom of God embodied a social ideal but in transcendent terms. And in Christianity itself, it was soon displaced by the idea of

"eternal life," which pertains essentially to individual personalities.

The central figure in the New Testament is Jesus, to whom we owe supremely the gospel of personality. His antecedents were Jewish, evidently wholly so, although it seems that atmospheric Greek influences in the frontier province of Galilee affected his sensitive and liberal spirit. He was reared in the pieties of a Jewish home and in his essential ideas he was a child of his race. He clarified and deepened the truths enunciated by the prophets, and, most significant of all, he embodied those truths in his own personality. To him, God was no blind, unthinking force but a being best understood in the most vivid of personal symbols—Our Father. And while others had used the term, Jesus so vitalized it by his filial and fraternal life as to make it increasingly influential in human history.

No higher evaluation of personality is conceivable than is declared by the manner in which Jesus spent his life for men, even to the limits of death. He said that it profits a man nothing to gain the whole world and to lose his own soul. The apocalyptic background of his teaching enabled him to state his ideals of duty in the absolute terms of the coming divine society. His sense of the worth of personality is seen in his attitude toward children. Of what other man in antiquity do we read that he publicly caressed children who were brought to him and declared that such as they constitute the ideal society? Jesus is the discoverer of the child. He is discoverer, also, of social outcasts. He saw their potential worth and sought to save those who had actually strayed from God, as well as those whom a legalistic piety called "the lost." Jesus did not seek to do the work of a social reformer.

He was the regenerator of individual lives and as such his work has had revolutionary social significance. The personality of Jesus himself possessed such purity, grace and power that it has become for multitudes the redemptive revelation of the Christlike God.

Next to Jesus, Paul is the most creative personality in the history of Christianity. His letters are one of the most remarkable phenomena in the history of literature as revelations of the personality of the writer. In Paul there met the two great streams of ancient religion—the ethical rigor of Hebrew prophetism and the mystical depth of Hellenistic religions of redemption. He was born in Tarsus and, apart from formal scholastic instruction, was deeply influenced by his spiritual environment. The real mother church of Christianity, as we know it in history, was the church at Antioch. And Antiochene Christianity triumphed over the other religions in the empire because it possessed distinctive excellencies to begin with, and because it proceeded at once to embody into itself their elements of appeal. Unlike the popular cults of a god who died and lived again, Christianity had a secure historical basis in Jesus. It possessed also an ethical passion to which the cults were strangers. Where do we find a more winsome and lofty morality than Paul expresses in his letters? And in all his utterances, we recognize a love for mankind, a sense of the value of personalities, which is the authentic mark of discipleship to Jesus.

In the centuries subsequent to the writing of the New Testament, the idea of personality, as presented upon its pages, has been the influential principle in the Christian religion. Opposed to the Stoic immanental philosophy of the divine, to the otiose deities of Epi-

cureanism, to the gross anthropomorphism of the gods of the populace, Christianity through its best representatives, presented a God worthily personal. It saw in Christ the manifestation of God and worshiped him as such. The philosophical problems involved in the relation of Christ to God precipitated the long debate which eventuated in the doctrine of the Trinity. In an age dominated by a dualistic philosophy, Trinitarianism safeguarded the personality of God as unitary, loving and absolute.

In the sphere of daily life, the emphasis of Christianity upon the innate worth of all men, including the barbarian and the slave, became a social force of great moment. Celsus sneered at the absurd notion of the Christians that God cared for the individual soul, but the faith of the Christians had within it the renewal and preservation of human society. It came upon the scene too late to save ancient civilization from dissolution, but within the doomed structure of paganism it laid the foundation upon which arose in due time our modern world.

The thinkers of the Catholic church, in those earlier Christian centuries, were personalists in their view of God and man, although there are discernible pantheistic tendencies in John Scotus Erigena and in some of the mystics. The idea of personality lacked many of the modern emphases. The famous definition of Boethius seems to overlook dynamic and social elements, "*Persona est naturæ rationabilis individua substantia*." The outstanding man in this period, from the point of view of personalism, was Augustine who has been aptly called the first modern man. He was truly, in Bevan's phrase, "The Prophet of Personality." ⁷ In his *Confessions*, Augustine gives us a self-

disclosure whose intimacy, subtlety, piety enable us to understand why the book has exerted such vast influence. Nothing in his writings is more significant than the passage, in the eleventh chapter of *The City of God*, wherein he bases our knowledge in self-certainty. "For, as I know that I am, so I know this also, that I know." The influence of this utterance upon modern thought, through René Descartes, has been profound.

Recognition of indebtedness is due to Thomas Aquinas also, the theologian of the Roman Catholic church, par excellence, even to this day. He supplemented the Aristotelian theism in many ways. To Aquinas, God was not "unmoved Mover" but a loving Redeemer, who was actively at work in his world and not merely its final cause. Furthermore, it was man in his completeness who survived death and not a vague "active reason."

/ Protestantism is a movement which centers in distinctive ways about the idea of personality. It is, indeed, the flowering out of truths present in the Roman faith—Staupitz instructed Luther—but those truths had been overshadowed by legalistic practices and papal absolutism. Luther emphasized justification by faith, the right of private judgment in the interpretation of the Scriptures, and the inviolability of the individual conscience before God. Protestantism stood for the rights of personality as opposed to an oppressive institutionalism. We know to-day that our experience of religion is socially mediated, and that individualism and universality are correlative terms, but the neglected truth which Protestantism enunciated was the sacredness of personality. Calvinism leveled all human pretensions alike before the greatness of God and so became the mother of political democ-

racies. The Anabaptist movement, in spite of incidental excesses, carried the Protestant principle to its full length and made important contributions to the freedom of the individual conscience and to democracy within the church.

The deeper sources of our modern democratic world have been succinctly stated by Ernst Troeltsch in eloquent words:

Were it not for the religious Personalism which we have had ingrained into us by prophetism and Christianity, individual autonomy, the belief in progress, the all-embracing community of mental outlook, the indestructibility and strength of our confidence in life, and our impulse to work, would be impossible.⁸

And it is significant that wherever Christian missions, especially of the Protestant type, carry their message and their institutions, a democratic social order begins to struggle into expression. The illimitable worth of man as man is the most simple, the most revolutionary, and the most formative idea at work in history.

In our own twentieth century, the central importance of the idea of personality is becoming axiomatic in all of our Western democracies, and indeed, in the rising democracies of both the Near East and the Far East. As for philosophy, the main stream in modern times has been the idealistic. Notwithstanding the vigorous activities of opposing schools which have arisen in the twentieth century, the idea that mind is our ultimate explanatory principle is still philosophical orthodoxy.⁹ And present-day idealism is predominantly personalistic, whether in monistic or pluralistic forms. In individual and social life, the sense

of the worth of personality, is our one propulsive moral force. The progress of civilization, through the long centuries of human history, is measured by the increasing reverence which we pay to personality in God and in man.

2. *History as a moral process.* The fortunes of the idea of personality in the world of human thought introduce us to the inner realities of the movement of history. Can we say, as events unfold, that anything is being accomplished? Does a thread of purpose run through the separate happenings which make up our changeful lives and hold them together as a coherent whole? The shiftings of society may seem to Matthew Arnold on Dover Beach only the clash of ignorant armies who fight by night; and yet in hours of deeper insight he recognized that there is in history "a power not ourselves that makes for righteousness."¹⁰ History is, therefore, a stage where God discloses his character to us and where his dealings with mankind find expression in divine Providence and in human progress.

History manifestly offers a field for divine self-expression, such as we do not find in nature. It is not difficult to discover skill, intelligence, power in the realm of nature but the moral qualities of God are not clearly visible. In fact, it is what we have learned in ourselves and in our social human world which gives us categories for the assignment of any moral meanings to nature. But on the stage of history, before whose footlights the ever shifting dramas of countless individual lives and of nations unfold their plots, the moral realities of the personal world are disclosed. Only in persons can a personal God reveal his inmost nature. The self-disclosure of God must

come primarily, not in words, but in events personal and social. Revelation has not been a dictation of words by God, but an insight by men with illumined minds into the meanings of human experience. The Bible itself is not originally revelation but a record of revelation. We learn from it to accept as final no man's "Thus saith the Lord," for false prophets and true both use the formula. The unfoldings of history, as well as innate truth, alone authenticate the divine message.

The purpose of God in history has sometimes been stated in terms too subjective. Calvinism was so overwhelmed by its consciousness of the sovereignty of God that it defined all of God's activities in history as designed to manifest his own glory. Even a hell of endless torture for sinners was serviceable as a display of the divine justice. The self-glorification of God in history is manifestly language taken from absolute monarchism. The glory of the dynasty was deemed the sufficient goal of despots, to which the good of the people was itself contributory. The modern mind is disposed to draw its analogies from the home rather than from the Oriental state. The ideal parent seeks the welfare of his children, and the display of his own glory is incidental to that fact. The establishment of the Kingdom of God, defined as a fellowship of Christlike personalities, constitutes the divine objective in history. The eternal purpose is clearly disclosed in Christ; that is, God is trying to do on the vast stage of history essentially what Jesus was doing in Galilee by his ministry of self-forgetful helpfulness.

The nature of the power at work in history has always been conceived by man in two aspects—holi-

ness and love. These terms are not antithetical, for they are phases of the selfsame God, facets of one diamond. Holiness is love working by wisdom. Love is holiness seeking to impart itself. Our minds, however, can operate only as we break up unities into conceptual segments which we are able to handle.

Although holiness means the total excellence of God, it has generally signified in religion the separateness of God from sin, his opposition to it, and the punishments which he visits upon it. This is not a truth which some one picked out of the thin air of speculative thought; it is the message of human experience. As we see the retributions which soon or late fall upon evildoers, we know that God writes a legible hand. We have learned that there is an inviolable moral order because, when we break the laws of God written in the nature of things, these laws proceed to break us. The truth is not always clearly visible in the brief lives of individuals on our present stage of experience, but nations, at least, run their course in this life and the verdict of the centuries, whether it concerns the downfall of the ancient empires or the calamities of the World War, declares the reality of divine holiness.

The other aspect of God disclosed in history is love. In spite of the harshness of things which seem to be so large a part of experience, there is visible in history immeasurable grace and goodness. The very content we give these terms came out of our experience. Words in themselves are empty sounds apart from the objects and events which they symbolize. We know the reality of love, first of all, in human relations; but with growth in thoughtfulness, we recognize in human life itself a disclosure of the order of things which made it possible. And there is a sweep of events, too

vast to be the expression of individual human minds, which we ascribe to a providential goodness. Possibly no event in history has so resounded in song and story as the deliverance of the Hebrew tribes out of bondage in Egypt. The ordering of events which made it possible, they ascribed to God. Similarly they regarded the return from exile in Babylonia as an expression of the Saviorhood of God. There could be no doctrine of God as Redeemer apart from experiences of redemption out of which the doctrine arose and which alone give it validity. Whether, therefore, we think of God as holiness or as love, we find ourselves in agreement with Oliver Cromwell: "What are all our histories but God manifesting himself?" ¹¹

The historic teaching of Christianity concerning the divine direction of history has been expressed in the doctrine of Providence. It means foresight exercised by God in caring for his creatures. It declares that not alone through the order of nature, but through the control of history, God guards and promotes our welfare. Theories of divine Providence have been based upon the idea of God as transcendent over his world, and as immanent in it. In the one case, his providential activity appeared as an interference with the usual laws of nature. He was supposed to intervene, as in the case of trial by ordeal in the middle ages, when fire was to be kept from burning the feet of the innocent as they walked on the glowing plowshares. On the other hand, the thought of God as dwelling in his world, gives to the usual and orderly course of events, the assurance of God's activity in our behalf. It finds in the safe journey of a ship with all its passengers an even more signal expression of providential care than in the rescue of a solitary survivor of a ship

wrecked by a storm. But in all individual and national experience, there are, doubtless, unusual manifestations of a constant and universal Providence and it is permissible to speak of special providential events.

A major difficulty with regard to the idea of Providence relates to the reality of human freedom. The difficulty, of course, is not formidable to believers in foreordination or in determinism. The divine control of history is not difficult if the will of God is irresistible. Nor is it hard to predict what will happen to dominoes standing in a row, when we push down the first one. But if God has really created creators, the reconciliation of divine Providence with human freedom presents difficult problems. No doubt, our freedom is not unconditioned, it moves within limitations; but if it is genuine, it interposes obstacles to the divine guidance in human affairs. Perhaps, we are children who suppose that we drive, when all the time strong paternal hands back of ours hold the reins. Freedom cannot mean unmotivated action, there is no action of that kind. Through the use of motives, we are constantly influencing and controlling each other without violation of freedom. And if man is fundamentally and inalienably rational in his nature, his response to the will of God as he learns through experience, will be the realization of freedom. Our irrationalisms are incidental to the immaturities of our personalities. In and through and above our freedom, God may exercise a control of which we are not conscious but which long perspectives show to be real.

The chief difficulty with respect to belief in the providential guidance of history is the fact of evil. This evil is not cosmic, as in the case of the tornado in the realm of nature; the evil in history is moral evil, rising

out of man's inhumanity to man. As we read the volume of history, we find every page stained with some form of evil. It seems an endless story—oppression, rapine, slavery, vice, war. In the World War alone, ten million men in arms lost their lives and whole civil populations were decimated by trampling armies and ruthless starvation.

Such facts seem the utter negation of an overruling Providence. The novelist appears nearer the truth when he pictures the world as a train loaded with passengers, plunging through the night, and God dead in the cab of the locomotive. We relieve God of responsibility, to some extent, by insisting upon the reality of human freedom. It is we ourselves, and not God, who inflict upon each other the horrors of war. Nevertheless, God made us and the world in which we live, and can he prove a complete alibi when things go wrong? At least, he is pledged to be our helper in our moral struggles.

No one can survey the long reaches of history without becoming convinced that there is a power inherent in the world which works against the evil and for the good. This fact alone is proof that the God of history does not will the moral evil which afflicts us and that our freedom is a reality and not an illusion. Evil carries within itself the seeds of self-destruction. The addicts of vice eliminate themselves from the race, warlike nations sink under the impoverishment of their racial stock. Evil can exist only as the perversion, exaggeration and denial of good, while good exists in its own right. No doubt, evil is positive while it lasts, but it is not structural, eternal in the universe, and its utter destruction lies within the limits of hope.

It can be said, furthermore, that God in history does

overrule evil and bring values out of it for our spiritual enrichment. This is not to say that he desires men to do evil in any way, but taking evil as an existing fact, God proceeds to find salvage in it. Shakespeare with a terrible realism pictured the ravages and remorse of sin, but his observation of life convinced him:

There is some soul of goodness in things evil,
Would men observingly distill it out.¹²

The destruction of Jerusalem by Babylonian aggression, and later by Roman, contributed to the world-wide diffusion of ethical monotheism. Various writers have said that no providential good was served by the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, but is it not apparent that his crown of martyrdom has enhanced his spiritual influence over mankind? The treason of Judas, the machinations of Annas, the weakness of Pilate were not prompted by God, yet what values stream from the cross on which Jesus died! Everywhere, we see the alchemy of divine grace ceaselessly at work amid our human failures. And gathering up into itself all our troubled life with its strange admixture of nobility and baseness, one increasing purpose of goodness runs through history.

The scope of divine Providence is as wide as human life, otherwise it cannot successfully determine the issues of history. Every race has its part to play in our human drama, although some of the rôles seem more important than others. We cannot always accept a people's self-estimate as to their primacy in the divine favor. "You only," says Amos, "have I known of all the families of the earth." The spirit of impartiality finds expression in the words which immediately follow, "Therefore will I visit upon you all your ini-

quities." ¹³ Amos' own internationalism tempers his claim to exclusive favor of the Hebrews with God. There is no personal and racial favoritism with the God of the whole earth. Too often, tales of special providence offend against the impartiality of God.

In his dealings with mankind, the highest good of each of us is conserved in the divine purpose. It is within our power, by our spiritual attitude, to make all outward happenings serve us. To the good man, as Plato taught, "All things will in the end work together for good to him in life and death." ¹⁴ Character is achievable only through struggle against difficulties, and our world, with its evil, is an excellent place in which to grow personalities.

Outside of some strictly religious circles, the modern doctrine of progress serves as the characteristic interpretation of history. We have spoken so much of progress that it seems to be one of the long-established ideas. It comes to us with a degree of shock to be told that it is a very recent idea. Professor Bury adds to our discomfiture by assuring us that it is destined, along with our conception of Providence, to be displaced by some other ruling idea. ¹⁵

The ancients, as a rule, thought of history as an ever-recurrent *magnus annus*, with its ages of iron, bronze, silver, and gold. Humanity, in the long cosmic perspectives, is in a revolving squirrel cage, always in motion but never getting anywhere. Christian orthodoxy displaced the theory of cycles with apocalyptic programs. To the thinkers of the Illumination in the eighteenth century, particularly in France, we owe the idea of indefinite social progress as the goal of humanity. Evolution, especially as set forth by Herbert Spencer, encouraged us to look forward to a

perfected adjustment to environment, a golden age guaranteed by irresistible cosmic law. Social progress has even been made into a religion, as humanism in its various forms bears witness.

The word "progress" is one of the magical terms which we often use but fail to define. Mere growth of population or territory cannot be progress. Holland and Switzerland are not inferior to vast, amorphous empires. Nor is increasing wealth necessarily progress. It may be won or distributed in ways which spell national decay. Even the advance of science may not signify progress, for we may use the resources of science to destroy each other in the madness of war. Progress must be measured by the degree in which we possess life, the life which is proper to humanity. The mammal is higher than the mollusk, because it is responsive to a wider environment. In our judgments with respect to progress, we must take account of mass, complexity, and coördination of social organisms. The last and crucial factor is coördination, the ability of the units in society to subordinate purely selfish aims and to work for the common good. We arrive, therefore, at the inescapable conclusion that progress is growth in love.¹⁶

Progress is not, then, something mechanically inevitable. We cannot drift upon a cosmic tide into a golden age. Progress comes only as men grow coöperative, altruistic, socially minded. Its secret lies in the world of personal freedom. The chief force for progress has been great personalities, conservative enough to build on the ideal elements of the past, radical enough to set aside the established order, unselfish enough to spend themselves even unto death for their cause. Education and religion are our sole hope, and

yet both, as history shows, may be used to sanctify special privilege, to hallow superstition, to keep the past upon its throne. An education which is imbued with the untrammelled spirit of modern science, a religion which is the spirit of reverence in the presence of the personal values of truth, goodness, and beauty in God and man—these alone can lead history into its consummations.

The reality of progress must take account of both the past and the future. Belief in progress is a judgment upon the past and, at the most, it is only a hope for the future. We believe that a survey of the river of history, large enough to enable us to see the relativity of the stagnant waters along the shore, the eddies in midstream, and the bendings of the whole river among the hills, shows an onward movement. There has been advance, economic, intellectual, moral, and religious. It is our faith that this progress will continue, although we are far from believing that social progress, to the exclusion of the fate of individual personalities, constitutes the goal of history. Planetary conditions may not always permit human society to exist here upon earth. Nor can any conceivable progress eliminate from human experience disappointment, sorrow and death. It is a shallow liberalism, blind to some of the major realities in human life, which substitutes social progress for God and personal immortality. We confidently hope for the coming of a nobler communal life than we have ever known, but our interest does not lie in the abstraction called "society" but in the personalities who will find in social relations a better opportunity for self-realization.

CHAPTER VI

THE NEW APPRECIATION OF JESUS

THE place of Jesus in history is becoming increasingly clear in the light of modern thought with its critical methods and its deepened consciousness of world unity. H. G. Wells, who is at trouble to inform us that he does not call himself a Christian, expressed the general judgment when he said concerning Jesus, shortly after the issuance of his *Outline of History*, "His is easily the dominant figure in history."¹ He declared, furthermore, that the historical picture irresistibly centers about the life and character of Jesus.

Historians who pass the centuries in review and appraise the foremost personalities of the race are led to accord primacy to Jesus in the field of religion, on the basis alike of his character and of the influence which he has exerted in human affairs. The flood of books about him, written from every conceivable point of view, shows no diminution in its flow. No other personality has ever been the object of such intensive study as Jesus is receiving in our time. A discussion of his career, however brief, must take account of two things—the facts concerning him and the interpretations which have been placed upon them.

1. *The facts concerning Jesus.* The foundational character of facts is axiomatic in an age of science. We do not consider theories pertaining to nature, society, history, as possessing any value, if they are not

accordant with all ascertainable facts. Mere fact, of course, is not adequate; truth is more than fact, it is the meaning and the value of the fact. The poet and the philosopher are as indispensable as the historian. The eternal is the bread of the soul, but the eternal comes to us in and through the historical.

Men have not, everywhere and always, attached to literal historical fact the importance which we give to it to-day. The mystical speculations of the people of India are little hampered by the historical method. Buddhists, in their most influential present-day sects, have found ways of making Buddha sponsor for teachings concerning God and the future life widely divergent from those he actually enunciated. The needs of the human spirit take precedence over the demands of history as a mere record of facts. To Plato, and to Platonists generally through the ages, the "idea" is primary, its historical embodiment is secondary. Plato would probably regard our painstaking effort to learn exact facts as largely a waste of time.

The Christian religion, in a preëminent way, is identified with facts of history. Its canonical biographies of its founder, used everywhere in its worship, have kept it loyal to their presentation of the realities of his life. Theological speculation, nevertheless, is often more interested in logical structures than in the data of history. Unquestionably, Jesus from the first was understood in the light of the messianic expectations of the Jews, of the redemptive ideas of the popular Mystery religions, and of the Logos speculations of Greek philosophy. Paul himself, although he knew about the historical Jesus and, doubtless, valued him, was not so much interested in knowing him "after the flesh," as in knowing him as exalted Lord, one with

the Spirit of God. The problem, consequently, has been presented to the historical temper of our time—Jesus or Christ. Have we a Jesus of history or a Christ of faith? No doubt, Christianity in every age has made its founder the bearer of its ideals; yet in the great essentials of faith, we are confident that we can say in the name of history, Jesus is the Christ.

The ascertainment of the facts concerning Jesus, certainly in many details, is attended with difficulties. Men must begin by evaluating the sources—the references to Jesus in extra-Biblical literature contemporaneous with the rise of Christianity, the letters of Paul, the four gospels, and the institutions of the early church. Paul is our earliest Biblical source. His letters carry us to a time scarcely more than twenty years after the death of Jesus.² And from his letters, we can construct in outline the life of the Lord—his birth, his character, his ministry, his triumph over death. Twenty years, in the very lifetime of the men who knew Jesus, is a short time, too short a time for the rise of an elaborate mythology.

Our chief source of facts concerning Jesus is the four gospels, all of them, including even John, written in days when contemporaries of Jesus were still living. The Gospel of John plainly has large interpretative elements. It gives us the spiritual significance of Jesus in the light of two generations of Christian experience. Nevertheless, in some respects, it has greater historical value than the earlier gospels; it is probably more correct in its statement concerning the time of Jesus' death. Luke tells us that many accounts of Jesus' life were extant in his day. Scholars to-day are generally agreed that our synoptic gospels are largely based on two documents—Mark essentially as we have

it; and a writing made up largely of the teachings of Jesus, sometimes called by us Logia, "Sayings," or "Q," the first letter of the German word *Quelle*, meaning "source."

The same historical tests, no doubt, must be applied to the canonical gospels as to the apocryphal gospels which have survived to our time. It would be strange, indeed, in such an age and land, if poetic idealizations and interpretations did not rise about a famous man. Here as elsewhere the historical spirit must make its discriminations. No one believes the tale in the apocryphal Gospel of Peter that the Holy Spirit took Jesus by a hair of the head and transported him from one locality to another, but such a tale does not negate the factual certainties of his life recorded elsewhere. The problem for appraisers of our accepted gospels is what development of thought, after the days of Jesus, lies back of these gospels. It is the contention of the *Formgeschichte* school that the demands of the Græco-Roman populace for a Hero, rather than a Teacher, led to the transformation of the Galilean rabbi into a supernatural Savior. Those who believe in the essential historicity of the narratives concerning the Jesus of the gospels have upon their side the nearness of the records to his actual life, the stamp of sincerity and originality upon their pages, and the need of an extraordinary personality like Jesus Christ to account for the movement which bears his name.

The new factor which enters into our understanding of the personality of Jesus is our greatly enlarged knowledge of the Jewish and Hellenistic world in which Jesus lived, and our deepened appreciation of the social sources of personality. The great man is always a creative fact and a social product. We can neither

explain Jesus by his environment nor can we explain him without it. We have traveled far since Horace Bushnell wrote concerning Jesus, "Indeed, there is nothing in him that belongs to his age or country, no one opinion, or taste, or prejudice."² There are assuredly universal values in Jesus which we may rightly call timeless but these values have as their setting the religious and political conditions in Palestine nineteen centuries ago. Jesus was reared in a pious home and under the religious institutions of the Jewish people. He grew up when the agitation against Roman domination of the country was proceeding toward its fatal dénouement in the destruction of the nation by Titus and the dispersion of the people. His gospel shaped itself as a message of peace and moral regeneration, whereby Israel could win an inward victory over Rome and the world. His expectations were colored by the current eschatological hopes; but the original contribution of Jesus was the essentially inward and spiritual nature of the Kingdom of God, whatever the time and method of its establishment. The Gospel of John, with its transmuted eschatology, represents the genius of the new religion, the deep underflow of the Master's ideas.

The facts concerning Jesus of which the modern man needs to take account are, no doubt, multitudinous, but there are four which stand out as possessing special significance—his spiritual consciousness, his ethical insight, his moral character, and his redemptive influence.

The inner life of Jesus is the holy of holies of the Christian faith. The biographical data concerning Jesus are brief, fragmentary, occasional. We have only a single incident from the thirty years, more or less,

which stretch from his infancy to the beginning of his public life. How can we appraise a career where there are such gaps in our knowledge? A look within his inner life tells us all that we need to know, for there his entire past is mirrored and the quality of his personality stands revealed. It is true that we can know a man's inner life only through his deeds, words, and attitudes, but these we have in the gospels. The anecdotes, of which the gospels largely consist, disclose the really significant aspects of Jesus' personality, possibly more effectively than would a formal biography after the modern fashion, wherein we fail to see the forest for the trees. The spiritual consciousness of Jesus stands related both to God and man. It includes his attitude toward the divine order and toward his life-calling and possibly is best expressed in the terms filial and messianic.

The basic fact in the personal religion of Jesus was his God-consciousness. And the symbol in which that consciousness found characteristic expression was Fatherhood. How wonderful a tribute to the home at Nazareth is implied in Jesus' apprehension of God in terms of idealized parenthood. The boy of twelve in the temple, with the prophet light upon his face, spoke of God as "my Father." The teacher bade his disciples pray, "Our Father." And when Jesus died, his last recorded utterance, like his first, enshrined the word, "Father." The full significance of Jesus' use of the term is brought out in the most important Christological passage in the gospels—"All things have been delivered unto me of my Father: and no one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither doth any know the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal him." * These words are

found in our earliest source and there is no sufficient reason to question their authenticity. They declare two things—that Jesus felt that he possessed a unique knowledge of God, and that he could impart this knowledge to others. His ability to know God with such intimacy and certainty pointed to an unparalleled moral unity with God. And history is witness to his ability to impart his God-consciousness to men. One of the most convincing arguments for what is called the deity of Christ is his power to awaken in us the sense of the reality of God.

The messianic consciousness of Jesus grew out of his filial consciousness. He knew that he had in himself such treasures of love and peace and joy and hope that the impartation of them would enrich his fellow men. Naturally, as a Jew living in the first century of our era, his high vocational impulse expressed itself, not only in prophetic, but in messianic terms. Prophecy and apocalypticism are not utterly separate but are interwoven. "Messiah" was a fluid term which could signify anything from a divinely commissioned political deliverer to a God-sent supernatural savior. To deny that Jesus assumed and accepted the term in some sense is to render the gospel story unintelligible. His conception of messiahship was a blending of the prophetic ideal of Isaiah's "Servant" and the apocalyptic ideal of Daniel's "Son of Man." The latter term, particularly, carried with it the high Christology of a preëxistent divine being. And the expectations of the day concerning the Messiah furnished the rôles in which believers defined the functions of Jesus, as redeemer, judge, and coming king.

The ethical insight of Jesus placed him in the prophetic succession of Israel and won for him the name

of Teacher. He was not at all an illiterate peasant. His utterances in the gospels show a profound acquaintance with the literary treasures of his people which constitute the Old Testament.⁵ It is idle to deny his originality by pointing out parallels to his words in rabbinic writings; his originality was expressed in what he left out, as well as in what he selected. Originality is insight, emphasis, proportion. The metal in a coin may have been long in circulation but when it goes to the mint and is there melted and stamped, it becomes a new coin. Originality is the stamp of personality upon truth. Shakespeare could take oft-used dramas, and with the magic of his style make them immortally Shakespearean. And when Jesus stamped his incomparable personality upon a truth, whether golden rule, fatherhood of God, worth of man, law of love, eternal life in a Kingdom of God, the truth became forever associated with his name and henceforth passed as coin current among men everywhere.

An absolute originality, the presentation of the utterly new, could make no connections with human life. Jesus lived in a given historical situation wherein he was debtor to the past as well as molder of the future. A nobler future is always an unfolding of the ideal elements in the past. Jesus discerned the basic religious and ethical truths with a marvelous clarity and gave them impressive expression. There is supreme originality in the emphasis which he placed upon the inward, spiritual character of the Kingdom of God and the confidence he felt in the power of mercy to transform human character.⁶

The vitality of Jesus' teachings lies precisely in the fact that he infused them with his own personality. They come to us, not from his lips only, but embodied

in his life. His idea of God was given to us, not in words merely, but was implied, stated, energized by his limitless confidence in God and loyalty to him. Nor did Jesus seek to stifle the mind by externally imposed doctrines and precepts. As he himself said, according to the fourth gospel, whoever believes on him, from within him shall flow rivers of living water. He came to open in men fountains of originality, to make them creative sources of spiritual power, to impart life abundantly. The positiveness with which Jesus speaks, putting his authority above the revered teachers of the past, arose out of his experience of the truth. He made no pronouncements in many fields of human interest, such as the technical fields of science, history, and philosophy. His training and experience pertained to the basic realms of religion and ethics where motives and ideals are the regnant considerations and whence all our life receives its quality and direction.

When we turn to the moral character of Jesus, we find one of the major phenomena of history. It is the objective expression of his spiritual consciousness. Due credit belongs to Jesus for his character because it was a personal achievement. Doubtless, his personality had its source in the Divine and was thus an incarnation, but the character we meet in the gospels did not come upon the scene as a ready-made Christ. He grew, "becoming full of wisdom." And wisdom is more than knowledge, it is moral goodness. Growth means that any perfection attained is relative; the bud is perfect as a bud but it is not yet the full-grown tree. We are told that Christ learned obedience by the things which he suffered; he advanced in the ethical sphere. These facts simply state the truth that the character of Jesus was humanly conditioned. His

knowledge, as he said, was limited. He was no stranger to temptation and his struggle with evil, on levels however high, was no sham battle with the result guaranteed. The character of Jesus, as we see him in history, is no mere donation to him. It is both a gift of God and a personal achievement.⁷

The effort to analyze the moral personality of Jesus reveals many elements.⁸ There have not been wanting critics who point out what they believe to be imperfections, such as the intolerance of Jesus toward the Pharisees. A more adequate view, however, finds a place for a just moral indignation as an element in a complete personality. The absence of any repentance or remorse in Jesus, of any sense of personal wrongdoing, points to a continuous loyalty to the widening demands of conscience and an unbroken moral fellowship with God. All who contemplate his character are struck with its remarkable blending of gentleness and strength:

That heart of love, that spirit of steel.⁹

Children were drawn to him and broken lives found in him a refuge, yet he was strong enough to believe himself the divinely sent spiritual ruler and guide of mankind.

In Jesus idealism and practicality are joined in a single life. He cherished the loftiest aims for mankind, and history increasingly shows that his principles are the only practicable basis for successful personal lives and for an enduring and progressive society. Wisdom and courage, humility and self-assertion, sociality and independence, joy and seriousness, serenity and force, love and justice, all these we find in Jesus. By virtue of the many-sided perfection of his

character, Jesus appeals to men of every race and age. They find in him the embodiment of their ideals and the pledge of the realization of those ideals in their own lives.

In the redemptive influence of Jesus, there is a further disclosure of his moral personality. We use the word "redemptive" in its large significance as designating formative and not merely reformatory forces. It is a postulate of the modern dynamic theory of reality that the nature of anything is revealed in its activities. A thing is what it does. The deadliness of the shade of the upas, or the life-giving power of the shade of the palm, these reveal the inmost nature of the tree. There is no better pathway to an understanding of the person of Christ than the pathway of the work of Christ. By their fruits we shall know them. The influence of Jesus is seen both in the realm of personal character and in the realm of social progress.

The power of Jesus to mold the personalities of other men is seen in the group which accompanied with him in the days of his public life. It is disclosed also in later centuries wherever men have had true contact with the historical Jesus, who is also a spiritual Presence with them. The impulsive Peter, the vehement John, the cautious Thomas, all find their larger and better selves called forth by association with Jesus. It is true that Judas was a member of the apostolic band, but it is also true that the same sunlight which softens the wax, hardens the clay. Our subjective attitudes determine the significance of all external forces. And the strange repentance of Judas shows what tremendous power the personality of Jesus continued to exert. All through history, men have found through

Christ a sense of deliverance from sin, a consciousness of acceptance with God, an inward moral power and an emancipating hope.

This power of Christ superior to the limitations of place and time points to a mystic oneness with the Spirit of God which justifies the concept of a Living Christ who transcended death. Jesus himself, his humanity still real, is in the eternal world; he is present with us in the Holy Spirit, for it is Jesus who gives spiritual content to our thought of the immanent God.

The quality of Jesus' personality is seen also in its effect upon society in general. This was not a consideration which possessed any special pertinence during his lifetime. It could emerge in a large way only as history unfolded. In some ways, we know Jesus better than did the men of his time, for we can view his influence through the centuries. The Jesus whom we see in the gospels did not address himself to the public evils of his day, as a social reformer of the modern type. His self-chosen task, defined in part by both the political situation and the current apocalyptic hopes, was that of a regenerator of individual personalities and enunciator of those truths which underlie all moral advance.

All progress goes back to free and forceful personalities; and through the men and women whom Jesus has molded he has profoundly affected the course of history. It was the spirit of his gospel which abolished gladiatorial combats, mitigated slavery and placed it on the path to extinction, and lifted the status of womanhood and childhood. And to-day no one can realize what our modern world owes to the truth, of which the Cross is symbol, that love and not force is the inmost fact in God and in the moral uni-

verse. Like the influence of the Gulf Stream which confers warmth, productivity and civilization upon northern Europe, is the influence of Jesus upon society as it carries brotherhood, philanthropy, education and democracy throughout the world.

2. *Historical interpretations of Jesus.* The facts concerning Jesus, to which we have so briefly referred, challenge us to give them a proper place in a consistent world view. We are at times advised to accept the facts about Jesus presented in the gospel, "the simple gospel," just as they stand. The truth is that the four gospels give us not merely facts but interpretations also, and the interpretations are "simple" only through long and perhaps superficial acquaintance. The oldest of the gospels has for its opening sentence, "The beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God." The terms "Christ" and "Son of God" are theological interpretations. The main body of the gospel, according to Papias, consists of Mark's report of the preaching of Peter, "who adapted his instructions to the needs of his hearers." John frankly tells us, at the close of his gospel, that he has written in order that men may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing, they may have life through his name.

There is, therefore, abundant Scriptural sanction for "Christology," or the theory of the person of Jesus. Apart from evaluative terms Jesus is a mere blank to us. No doubt, speculative refinements can be carried to excess and at cost to practical values. As one attempts to follow the intricacies of theological discussion centering about Jesus in the early Christian centuries, he is tempted to regard the endless conflicts of thought as a profitless war of words. He will assur-

edly feel that many of the terms used are obsolete to-day and that a goodly measure of the theological zeal displayed might have been profitably diverted to missionary work among Arabian and Teutonic tribes. At the same time, to men as thinking beings, the Christological speculations were inevitable. A Christ who does not challenge the highest thought of men can have no value in the field of the emotions or of practical life. What we need is historical sympathy with men of other days who thought, as we do, with the terms available in contemporary life. And a just estimate of the general course of thought about Jesus confirms the conviction that the Spirit of God has been present with the church through the centuries.

The problem with reference to Jesus was concerned with his relations to mankind and to God. It is very plain that he had lived a human life. He ate, slept, toiled, inquired, died, as did other men. In an age when men were familiar with stories of visitations of gods, with theophanies out of a heaven directly above them, there was a temptation to make the human life of Jesus a mere appearance. But the great Christian creeds have consistently condemned "docetism" as a heresy, however frequently believers have themselves been heretics in this particular.

On the other hand, it was apparent that in Jesus we had received a veritable disclosure of God. The divine credentials were in the very quality of his character as holy love incarnate. But in what way was he God manifest? Was he God himself, or a mediator of God? And as divine, how was the divine in him related to the human? We know how desperately and triumphantly the Church has clung to both truths—his humanity and his deity. It has expressed its con-

victions in the historic Logos Christology, and it is seeking to-day to express it in a Personality Christology.

The Logos Christology, terminating in the formal doctrine of the Trinity, was an achievement of Greek thought. It was preceded by an interpretation of Jesus by the first Christians who, of course, were Jews. Naturally, they used their great evaluative word which was Messiah, a Hebrew word meaning "anointed," whose Greek equivalent is Christ. But as to when his messiahship began, whether at his resurrection, his baptism, or earlier, and as to what constituted it, there was a variety of opinions. At the first, these Jewish Christians seemed to have literal political ideas of messiahship. They ask on the first page of the Acts of the Apostles, "Lord, dost thou at this time restore the kingdom to Israel?"

The Gospel of John, written in a later generation, transmuted the primitive eschatological ideas into concepts which appealed to the Græco-Roman world, and thereby this gospel enabled the Christian ship to sail from the provincial harbor of a Jewish sect out upon the broad oceans of a universal religion. But while the word Christ received a widened meaning, in its technical and original sense, it was a purely Jewish word. The men in the Roman empire at large, in their schools, or even upon the streets, were not talking about Messiah. Their chief evaluative term was Logos, a term destined to give technical meaning to the noble, universal word, Son, as it is used in the creeds.

To understand the course of thought which related Jesus to God it is necessary, first of all, to remember that the later creed-formulating centuries regarded God in his inmost nature as transcendent, absolute

substance. The earliest emphasis of Greek theology, as represented by Clement of Alexandria, on God as immanent, shifted more and more to the thought of God as transcendent, apart from his world, far removed from it.¹⁰ This idea of God, as standing wholly apart from his world and over against it, we call "dualism." In the days of the decline of the Roman empire, when human evil seemed too vast for God to overcome, when human nature itself was regarded as utterly corrupt and opposed to God, it was natural for men to think in dualistic terms. Plato had represented God as distant from his world. Philo, the Alexandrian Jew who sought to reconcile the ideas of Moses with Platonic philosophy, taught that it was necessary, in order to get at God in himself, to strip him of all his attributes. In neo-Platonism, influential in the days of the creeds, these ideas were accentuated.

Moreover, there was no adequate philosophical conception of personality. The inmost reality in God, as in man, out of which he was constituted, was substance. This substance was not necessarily physical, although Tertullian made God out of rarefied stuff; it was regarded by the highest thinkers as metaphysical or immaterial. On the other hand, man was constituted of human substance, wholly different from divine substance. And thus philosophers were without a common denominator for God and man. They could talk of such impossibilities as impersonal manhood, which could be taken up and laid aside. In short, God and man were radically different. The way to save man was not to evoke his innate divine potentialities, it was to implant a new nature, to deify him by inoculating or transfusing him with divine substance.

At this point, it may be well to say a few words about the Holy Spirit, for the Spirit, as truly as the Son, is an integral member of the Trinity. Theological disputation rarely mentioned the Spirit. Gregory of Nyssa tells us that some thought that the Spirit was a creature and some knew not what to think. The Holy Spirit, however, was mentioned in the Scriptures as an equivalent for God and it was necessary to include him in the Trinity. We recognize to-day that the idea of the Divine Spirit arose out of the application of human psychology to God. Just as man seems to have a separable second self by which he goes forth in his activities in dreams and in real life, so God has a Spirit who is distinct from himself and yet identical with himself. In general, men have always thought of the Spirit as God active in human experience. It was not by the Spirit, however, that theologians brought the far-away transcendent God into relation with his world. They did it through the Logos.

The key to the problem imposed upon theologians by a dualistic philosophy was found in the declaration that Jesus was the incarnation of the Logos. Here is a term carried over from the Greek language into our own. It signifies both reason and utterance. It has its analogues in Jewish thought in such expressions of mediation between God and the world as "Word of the Lord," "Wisdom," "Angel of the covenant." The prologue of the Gospel of John employs the term Logos and we have translated it as "Word." John does not use the term later in the gospel but the term Son is imbued with its meanings.

In the far-off days of Heraclitus, Logos signified the rational self-evolution of the universe. The Stoics

thought of God as dwelling in the world by means of the Logos. To the later Platonists, the Logos was the intermediary reality which brought the transcendent Absolute into relation with the world. Hence, all that God did was done through the Logos. Through him were all things made and in him all things subsist.¹¹ In brief, the Logos is the self-expressive aspect of the Divine being; it is another name for God in his forth-going activities.

Manifestly, here is a term in which philosophic Gentile Christians could express their appreciation of Jesus and by which they could commend him to their fellow citizens in the empire. Jesus was the incarnation of the Logos. This identification of Jesus with the Logos, Harnack calls the most important step ever taken in Christian theology.¹² The meaning did not change when the more human and religious term Son took the place of Logos in the formal creeds. They declare that the Son of God is preëxistent, forever in the bosom of God, one in essence with God. In Jesus, the Logos or Son, is made flesh and dwells among us. In the mystical faith of Christians in all centuries, Jesus is God, for in Jesus we have in human form the spiritual life-content of God, but we speak full, careful, correct theological language when we say that he is the incarnation of the Son of God.¹³ And of course, it is true that the Logos, as God self-expressive, is revealed in all truth and goodness in every age and country. He is the light, as the prologue of John's gospel declares, "which lighteth every man coming into the world."

The complete formulation of the meaning of Jesus in relation to God, as conceived by Christian orthodoxy, is expressed in the doctrine of the Trinity. In the New Testament, we find a Trinity of experience.

It is later theological speculation which gives us technical, metaphysical Trinitarianism, wherein God is declared to be one substance and three persons—Father, Son and Spirit. Into the complexities of ancient Christological discussion, we need not enter; it is sufficient to note that the crucial idea, expressed in the word *homoousios* (ὁμοούσιος) of the Nicene creed, was the oneness of substance of the Son with the Father. The declaration was motivated by the desire to find the very reality of the life of God in Christ and to base our salvation in an actual acquaintance with God.

The doctrine of God the Son is the affirmation that God is self-revealing and self-imparting. And the doctrine of the incarnation of the Son in Jesus is the declaration that God forever is what we see him to be in Jesus—he is sacrificial love. It is easy for H. G. Wells to ridicule defenders of the Trinity as “groaning camels” but a distinguished Unitarian scholar properly replies, “If there had been no Council of Nicæa, there would have been no Mr. Wells.” He explains by saying that there is hardly a phrase in Mr. Wells’ description of God as “our friend and brother and the light of the world” which would have occurred to him had he not been born, cradled and nurtured in the atmosphere of historical Christianity.¹⁴

Having defined the relation of Jesus to God, theological discussion concerned itself with the inner life of Jesus. How could he be both human and divine? Here we see the limitations imposed upon Christian thinkers by the dualistic philosophy of their day. They regarded God and man as unlike; one possessed divine substance; the other, human. How could two such different realities be present in one life? The

answer was the doctrine of "two natures" in Christ, promulgated at Chalcedon in 451 and echoed in the Westminster Confession. It was the best answer which could be given in the terms of a dualistic philosophy and it conserved through centuries the religious values in Jesus' personality.

From our point of view to-day, the psychology implied in such a view is utterly inadequate. It reduces the divine and the human to impersonal, non-ethical categories and violates the fundamental fact of the unity of personality.¹⁶ Edward S. Drown justly characterizes the doctrine of the two natures as the splendid attempt of Christian faith to maintain and express itself in a scheme of thought that was itself un-Christian.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the teaching concerning two natures in Christ did, at least, preserve through centuries of controversy the basic beliefs that Christ was true man and true revelation of the Father.

We must now ask if the modern view of personality casts any light upon the facts concerning Jesus. It is our belief that in this field of thought, as elsewhere, personality is our most luminous term. The essential considerations involved in a truly personalistic Christology have been structural in the Christian experience from the beginning. They have been obscured, however, by metaphysical clouds and have failed to exercise their inherent power. Our generation, deeply impressed by the figure of Jesus as revealed in the new biographical studies, asks for an interpretation of his personality which shall accord with modern psychology and philosophy. Such an interpretation, if it can be given, will win wider circles of men to his allegiance and augment his beneficent influence in the world.

It is well to recall the view of personality which

prevails to-day. We do not think of personality as a thing-like reality or substance out of which our beings are constituted. Personality is the living, conscious unity of all our powers. For want of a better word, we may use "nature" to designate the bond which holds our powers together but there is no "nature" in the sense of stuff, material or immaterial, in which qualities inhere. Outside of self-conscious activity, there is no inert and passive substratum which constitutes our ultimate being. We must accept the full implications of the spiritual character of personality and find its reality in reason, will and love existing in self-conscious unity. We thus define personality as we find it in ourselves. Good reasons appeared for conceiving of God himself in terms of personality, divested of anthropomorphisms, the highest category available for our apprehension of the cosmic power who is source and goal of all things.

Here we clearly discover a truth of epoch-making importance—personality is common denominator for God and man. The pre-supposition with which we approach the significance of Jesus is the kinship of God and man; and the conclusion to which we are irresistibly led is that God is revealed in Jesus by virtue of the spiritual and ethical riches of his personality.

The doctrine of the Trinity enshrined the fundamental values of Christian experience. In its Scriptural form, it gives us an analysis of the complex life of God which we believe will be forever helpful. We cannot outgrow the truths in the benediction of Paul, "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Spirit be with you all."¹⁷ But when we come to the Trinity of meta-

physical theology, a restatement of values is needful. It used the noble terms, Father, Son, Spirit, in a highly technical way to designate hypostatic distinctions in the Godhead. Broadly speaking, Father was God absolute, unrelated, unexpressed; Son was God self-revealing, forth-going, self-imparting; Spirit was God indwelling, individuated, inwardly active in human life. And we may transvaluate the historic Trinity after this manner—Personality as it is in itself; Personality dynamic; Personality immanent. In particular, Son was a term made necessary by the philosophic idea of God as in himself the unrelated Absolute. But we have no such idea of God, for we conceive of him as a personal being. In its very nature, personality has will at its core. It is essentially dynamic. And our modern doctrine of God as self-expressive personality is the equivalent of the Trinitarian doctrine of God the Son.

In dealing with the humanity and the deity of Christ, we deal with a single, indivisible reality, namely, his personality. No doubt, we need "human" and "divine" as antithetic terms, for the one speaks of weakness, limitation, unrealized possibilities; the other speaks of the infinity, the perfection, which distinctively mark the life of God. But the antithesis in these terms moves within the sphere of personality. Jesus is not God and man, he is God in man. His deity is in the perfection of his humanity. And the proof that God is in him lies not in mysterious metaphysical essences but in the realized moral values of his personality.

The precise nature of Jesus' ontological relation to God it is impossible to define. But that fact ought not greatly to trouble us when we cannot even tell

how God has constituted the being of any one of us. The best we can say, and the most we can say, is that Jesus is the supreme expression, within the sphere of human life, of God as self-revealing personality. In thus entering human life, God does not vacate his own life. He can impart himself and yet remain himself. Whittier in "Our Master" teaches us that in spiritual things, unlike material things, giving does not divide or deplete.

Immortal love, forever full,
Forever flowing free,
Forever shared, forever whole,
A never ebbing sea.

This manner of conceiving the deity of Christ, we believe, greatly simplifies the Christological problem. We find the evidence of it, not in inexplicable considerations which lies outside our human experience, but in the spiritual realities of holiness and love which are the highest glory of God and the utmost goal of human striving. Proofs of the divinity of Christ have been sought in his supernatural birth, in his fulfillment of prophecy, in his performance of miracles, in his physical resurrection. Alfred Garvie expresses the attitude of progressive orthodoxy in our time when he declares that he accepts them all and yet declines to believe that any of these considerations gives the Godhead of Christ an objective character.¹⁸ That must be found in personality and beyond truth, holiness, goodness, love, it is impossible to go in our quest of the divine. Historical criticism may eliminate from the gospels every story of the miraculous—which it cannot do—but the foundations of our faith in Jesus remain unshaken. He is himself the supreme miracle who makes credible the events which are truly con-

gruous with his extraordinary character, but the ultimate basis of our faith in him is the riches of his moral personality.

The relation of Jesus to other expressions of God is a matter of vital importance. Do we find God revealed exclusively in the personality of Jesus or are the personalities of good men and women everywhere, in their measure, revelations of the divine life? God, as apprehended in his distinctively Christian character, is of course known only through Christ, and the distinctively Christian experience has been mediated to us through Christ, but it cannot be said that all knowledge of God depends on the historical Jesus. We learn something about God from a beautiful sunset and that is not part of the life of Jesus. The fact is, as the Letter to the Hebrews instructs us, that God has spoken to us "in divers manners."

The Logos doctrine distinctly recognized the universality of the divine self-expression. Justin Martyr is credited as being the first who in a formal way identified Jesus with the Logos and he tells us in a noble passage in his *Apology* that every race of men are partakers of the Logos and that Socrates and Heraclitus, as well as Abraham and Elijah, were "Christians." To respond to the realities expressed in the personality of Jesus, however mediated to us and under whatever names, is to believe in the essential Jesus, the eternal Christ. The immanent God is revealing himself through all personalities in whom he dwells. But the immanence of God in Jesus rises to such unique heights that a new word is necessary and we speak of "incarnation." To ask whether Jesus differs from us in degree or in kind is a quarrel over phrases. A difference in degree may be so great as to constitute a

difference in kind. Christians believe in both the representativeness and the uniqueness of Christ, who in the words of the New Testament, was both "the first born among many brethren" and "the only begotten Son of God."¹⁹

The challenge of Jesus to us lies in the sphere of personal realities. There is a common denominator for God and man and Jesus, and that is personality. In Jesus, therefore, both God and man find expression in a single indivisible life. It ought not to be hard for modern-minded men to agree essentially on the objective truth concerning the historical Jesus. The same fact of Jesus, however, is capable of a twofold interpretation. We can see in him an ideal life which is an example and inspiration to us in our moral struggle. But we can see also in his personality a revelation of the nature of the Ultimate Reality, a way into the presence of the Everlasting Father.

Doubtless, we need to view Jesus in the totality of his relations, but the interests of religion, in distinction from ethics, lie in the recognition of the Godward aspect of his character. It is here that Trinitarian and evangelical Christianity has placed the emphasis. The knowledge of God, as the supreme blessedness of man, brings with it peace, joy and hope and thus awakens gratitude, love and devotion. In the inspirations of mystical fellowship with God, morality itself finds its highest dynamic. A faith, which discovers through Christ the Christlike God, possesses the secret of spiritual vitality, propagative power, and social transformation.

CHAPTER VII

THE WAY OF SALVATION

SALVATION is the universal human quest, however variously men define its nature and its method. The query may come to us laden with theological associations, perhaps unacceptable in doctrinal formulations or emotional demands, but in one way or another the cry has been wrung from each of us, "What must I do to be saved?"

Salvation has been conceived in both temporal and other-worldly terms. Men have longed for deliverance from the ills of life, from hunger, disease, loss, sorrow and death. They have desired property, progeny, victory over enemies, health and long life, considerations which bulk larger in the Old Testament than in the New. At the other extreme have been the men who sought to escape punishment and to gain bliss in realms beyond this present life. On the higher ranges of religion, salvation has spiritual and ethical connotations. And the whole complex fact of religion shows how zealously peoples have endeavored by magic, prayer, sacrifice, ritual, creed, sacerdotalism, legalism, moralism, mysticism to gain salvation in this world and in the next. Religion had its origin in man's sense of need, his wonder in the presence of the mysteries of existence and in his urge toward self-realization. And to satisfy the demands of his life, man sought to enter into right relations with more-than-human Power.

The word "salvation" deserves a content both positive and negative. Historically, as well as etymologically, the emphasis has been upon deliverance rather than upon attainment. Religions have often been classified as religions of law and religions of redemption. In the former case, men seek to please God by obedience to custom or law as the expression of his will; in the latter, they seek escape from sorrow, sin and retribution. Christianity is a religion of redemption, and as such it reaches the deeper levels of human experience. But Christianity is also a religion of culture. It ministers both to the "sick soul" and to the "healthy minded." We must acknowledge that Christian piety has stressed the idea of deliverance, often largely in terms of futurity and stellar geography. But it cannot be said too earnestly that full-orbed Christianity is both redemptive and perfective.

The clearest light upon the way of salvation comes through the idea of personality. It enables us to understand our need of redemption, the objective divine work which has been wrought in our behalf, and the subjective experience by which salvation becomes actual in our lives. These three aspects of salvation have been historically defined under the headings of sin, atonement, and Christian experience or the work of the Holy Spirit. As these phrases lie so deeply in Christian usage, possibly the best service which can be rendered is to restate them, if possible, in truly personal terms.

1. *Our need of redemption.* At the background of Christianity, as a redemptive religion, lies the fact of sin. Salvation, therefore, must concern itself not merely with calling out the ideal potentialities of human nature, but with deliverance from sin and its

consequences. Primarily, sin itself must be overcome, then the new causations at work in the personality of the sinner and in the morally loyal members of his community will deal with the consequences of sin. Salvation is not by character, but it is assuredly unto character. The dynamic of salvation is found in personal relationships, divine and human, and out of these come the moralities of life. A truly ethical and spiritual conception of sin is the result of long centuries of religious insight, yet even to-day the truth is dimmed by theological survivals. The personal aspect of the problem of sin becomes plain when we evaluate the ideas which gather about "original sin" and "volitional sin."

What is known as "original sin" has its roots deep in primitive religion. It is clear that truly ethical elements were not prominent in the early stages of religion. "Holy" was not an ethical but a numinous term. It defined the Something There which awakened awe, terror, fascination, wonder and devotion in the mind of the worshiper. This divine object was "holy," separate from common things, tabu, sacrosanct. Whatever pertained to it, or to him, partook of his holiness, whether the mountain in which he dwelt, the temple which was built for him, the priests who served him, or the garments which they wore. All of these distinctions were no doubt valuable object lessons, a kindergarten where people acquired a religious vocabulary, but they were phases of religion only partially personalized. To violate the holy was sin but it was sin in a ceremonial rather than in an ethical sense. The guilt which followed was of a mysterious physical kind, contagious like a disease. Ritual purification was necessary to protect the whole group from infection.

The prophets, particularly those whose messages are preserved in the Old Testament, lifted Hebrew religion out of the magical into the truly personal. They ethicized the character of God and, therefore, the demands which he made upon men and they regarded sin as failure to do the moral will of God. Isaiah pronounces incense an "abomination" when offered by unrighteous men, however scrupulous in observance of ceremonial rules. Sin was defined in ethical terms as monopolistic greed, perversion of justice, unbrotherly conduct. Jesus continued the prophetic tradition. Sin was the absence of love, the violation of love. But theological speculation among the followers of Jesus lapsed to lower levels of thinking and the old Hebrew infection idea of sin reappeared in Christianity as "original sin." In pre-Christian Jewish circles, there were those who taught that all our ills were due to the first parents of the race, although others taught that every man was his own Adam.¹ The Old Testament, even the book of Genesis, afforded little basis for the historic doctrine of original sin, although theology in later centuries built, apex down, huge pyramids upon isolated texts.

The chief proponent of the historic doctrine of original sin was Augustine. He taught that Adam possessed freedom of choice but lost it through the corruption of his nature when he sinned. Through concupiscence, this corrupt nature was transmitted to all his descendants and the universality of sin is thus explained. Gregory of Nyssa declared that the sex relation was itself evil, as the channel for the transmission of sin. Roman Catholic theology has never carried the doctrine of original sin to its extreme; it teaches that human nature has remained substantially

sound.² Protestant scholasticism magnified the doctrine, as the Westminster Confession bears witness in its declaration that the guilt of Adam's sin was imputed to us and the resultant corruption was transmitted to us through ordinary generation.

In our estimate of the doctrine of original sin, we must recognize that it expressed great truths, else it could not have commanded so many noble minds. It declared the indisputable fact of social solidarity. The idea of sin as a "nature" set forth the deep-seated and radical character of sin in human life. "The doctrines of predestination, of original sin, and of the innate depravity of man," wrote Thomas Huxley in his vigorous way, "faulty as they are, appear to me vastly nearer the truth than the liberal illusions that babies are all born good, and that the example of a corrupt society is responsible for their failure to remain so." ³ Possibly it can be said that babies are born neither innately good nor depraved but non-moral candidates for goodness or depravity. A materialistic view of sin or of goodness, as things physically transmissible, is untenable; these moral terms apply only to attitude of personal will.

The objections, moral and scientific, to the undiluted doctrine of original sin are fatal to it. There is undeniable injustice done to the individual personalities who constitute the race. It violates our freedom by putting us in complete bondage to a choice made by a far-off ancestor. If we are born prone unto sin and only unto sin, we are free to act out our natures, but so is the town clock. Original sin is determinism. If evil consequences have come down to us from Adam, that is our misfortune and not our guilt. No man ever seriously attempted to repent for Adam's sin,

Mark Twain, it is true, wept over the reputed grave of Adam, but that was due to a sense of filial bereavement and not to moral contrition.

Science in our day, furthermore, has advanced a doctrine of heredity, which is by no means an equivalent of the theological doctrine of original sin. The heavy weight of scientific opinion is on the side of the declaration that acquired characteristics, in distinction from congenital, are not transmitted. The germ plasm may be weakened through innutrition but it cannot be modified by our particular deeds. If Adam acquired a characteristic by his disobedience, science knows no way by which it could be transmitted by physical heredity to his descendants. James Orr acknowledges that the non-transmission of acquired characteristics takes the foundation from under the doctrine of original sin, although he seeks to mitigate the conclusion by certain general considerations.⁴ In the light of present preponderant scientific conceptions of heredity, the conclusion seems plain that the child of sound stock in each generation is morally free-born as far as physical heredity is concerned.

The transmission of sin from generation to generation has its explanation in distinctively personal terms rather than in physical continuities. There is a social heredity which visits the sins of the fathers upon the children.⁵ It acts through personal relations and that general social environment to which all generations make their contributions. The sum of the unrighteousness which comes to us as a heritage from the past may well be termed a kingdom of evil. This evil has intrenched itself in custom and institution and in the personal characters of parents and associates in the general community. Social heredity transmits the good

as well as the evil; whereas original sin seems to have been a one-sided arrangement, however tempered in recent days by a theory of "original grace." Social heredity plainly opens the door to illimitable progress and to the widest personal usefulness. Eugenics may teach us how to breed from the congenitally strong, otherwise our hope of a better world lies in the enrichment of the social environment through education and religion.

The "volitional" conception of the origin and propagation of sin accords with the centrality of personality in the ethical realm. It finds the fact of sin in the will of man. It recognizes that there is an evil entail from the past which conditions our activities but that evil entail is not in itself sin. There is a depravity which results from our personal wrongdoing and which stands in vital relation to the evil in our social environment but the word "sin" is properly reserved to characterize volitional wrongdoing.

In seeking to understand, very partially at the best, the dark mystery of sin, we must begin with man's evolutionary heritage. At least, man shares the appetites and passions of his physical and psychic nature with the lower animals, however he acquired them. These instincts or impulses were all necessary to the animal, even as they are necessary to man as the basis of his higher life—hunger, sex, fear, anger, combativeness, acquisitiveness, love of approbation, gregariousness. In themselves they are non-moral, the raw material out of which to build personality.

Man has much in common with the lower creatures, but he is called, by virtue of his power of conceptual thought and his freedom, to the progressive achievement of spiritual values. And he is tempted in actual

life-situations and not in a theological void, tempted to gratify himself through the pleasure-tone in the activity of the instincts, regardless of personal and social good. He is compelled to learn through experience; and when the clearer moral light dawns he is already doing things in conflict with it. Hence he is involved in a struggle between yesterday and to-morrow. Perhaps he refuses to rise to the new levels, perhaps he lapses to lower levels, but his failure to be loyal to the new call of duty is his sin. Baby is neither angel nor demon. He is at first a little animal with limitless possibilities for good or evil.

In the attitude, choice, consent of the will, we find the reality of sin. We have power to create ideals, that is, to form mental pictures of a more desirable state than we have yet realized. Because we can form many ideals, we are obliged to choose among them. This we do by the direction of attention to one ideal. And the movement of the self toward the chosen ideal, we call the freedom of the will. We cannot say that man's finiteness condemns him to choose a lower instead of a higher good, for that would be to place the responsibility for our sin upon God who made us as we are. The commands of God have not been grievous, the growing light of conscience was proportioned to our ability to be loyal to it. And yet the fact remains that all men have sinned and come short of the divine ideal for them. Sin is not in our immaturity, it is in our failure to attain the degree of development proper to a given stage of life.

The nature of sin is apparent from its conflict with our higher values. It is perversion because our true and divine self is refused expression and is put in bondage to undisciplined impulses. Sin is plainly self-

ishness. It prefers some lesser, imagined individual good to the good of the community as a whole. The demand of the sinner as he withdraws from the common life is in the words of the Prodigal Son, "Give me the portion of goods that falleth to me." Each of us realizes his life in society. Any injury to our fellows, or refusal of service which we could possibly render, is violation of the law of love which is the whole duty of man. Our wrongdoing has its relation also to God, as immanent in the moral order, for every sin is a personal sin against him. It is disobedience to his will and a thwarting of his loving purpose for us and for our fellows.

The volitional character of sin leaves the door wide open to the possibility of salvation. It is true that character tends toward finality, but if sin resides in an attitude of will then a redirection of personality is salvation. Sin is not something structural in the order of the universe. It does not lie in our necessary relation to the physical or moral world. It can be said, therefore, that sin does not possess "metaphysical" reality, as something ultimate and eternal in the universe. It possesses ethical reality, however, as a present state of character and it is perilous to assert its nothingness. It is not mere absence of light but falsity to light. Nevertheless, the discovery that sin is an attitude of personality carries with it the hope that personality can find a new orientation toward the eternal order.

2. *The work of Christ for us.* The deliverance of a wrongdoer from his sin and its consequences is a many-sided task. It is customary for Christian theology to speak of a divine work for us and a divine work in us. The former is concerned with the objective

activities of God in our behalf, prior to our personal experience of salvation or coincident with it. While those activities truly involve the whole historical process as an expression of spiritual purpose, yet they focalize and find supreme expression in the work of Jesus Christ, particularly upon the cross.

The word which historically describes this work is "atonement," a beautiful Saxon word which defines itself; "atoun," in Chaucer's day, signified to be "at one." In its widest sense, it designates the total work of Christ by which we are brought into harmonious relations with God. In a more limited sense, it describes the achievement of Jesus in his death. It has been so identified with various indefensible theories that its usefulness has been impaired. A more personal word, "reconciliation," is taking its place, not only in the revised version of the New Testament, but to a degree in theology also, as the titles of some recent books indicate. The other aspect of salvation, the subjective, is concerned with our inward religious experience. And the name for God, as he works in us, is the Holy Spirit. Under these two captions—the atonement and the work of the Holy Spirit—it is possible to evaluate the positive personal elements in the Christian view of salvation.

The problems which center about forgiveness, reconciliation, atonement, are a dense undergrowth through which passage is difficult. There are not lacking voices which deny the possibility of forgiveness in a universe of inviolable law. Omar is not alone in the conviction that what is writ by the Moving Finger can never be blotted out. Confucius declares that rotten wood cannot be carved. The sinner is bowed beneath the burden of an unchangeable past. His act of disloyalty

has become a part of history and he must live with it days without end. He is doomed to "the hell of the irrevocable,"^{*} described by Josiah Royce in words far more terrible than those with which Jonathan Edwards described a physical hell above whose fires sinners hang suspended by a spider's thread. Is it possible to pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow? The sinner has himself upon his hands, his finer sensibilities blunted, his will fettered by habit, his future haunted with forebodings. To such a man, salvation, to have any meaning, must signify, not merely a new legal status, but a changed inner life, so changed that it gives new meaning even to the past.

The sinner must take account of society also. He has put the poison of an evil deed into its veins, can he ever counteract the baleful effects? He has put himself out of normal relations with his fellows, is it possible to be reintegrated in the social structure? Furthermore, he has incurred the divine disapproval and thwarted the divine purpose. There is expiation to be made to God as holy love; and if he dares to believe in divine magnanimity, there is response which is due to the amazing fact of the forgiving grace of God.

The theories of atonement, with which men have sought to explain the mystery of the power of the cross, are as varied as the social and political backgrounds whose language they speak. Of course, in days of slavery, the metaphor of ransom was serviceable. The word redemption means a buying back. Men said that the death of Jesus was a ransom paid to Satan, as though rights had been acquired which could thus be extinguished. It was even said that the ransom was paid to God but Augustine brushed much

inadequate speculation aside when he declared that God would not have provided the atonement as an appeasement to himself, if he had not been gracious already. To Anselm, the theologian of feudalism, the cross was an act of homage to the violated honor of God which paid our arrears of obligation. Here we meet with those impersonal realities, such as honor, justice, which in their usurpation of the place of God himself, are so often the bane of later theology. In general, two views of the significance of Jesus' death have ruled the minds of men—the penal and the moral.

In the penal theory of atonement, the death of Jesus was a satisfaction to divine justice by meeting its claims and thus enabling God to be gracious. The extreme forms of penalism required a mathematical equivalence between the punishment visited upon Christ as our substitute, and the penalties of everlasting hell which were our just desert. The theory recognized in its way the seriousness of sin and the inviolable holiness of God, and it assigned to Christ a work of such decisive importance as to awaken toward him endless gratitude and consecration. "Jesus paid it all, all to him I owe"—a commercial metaphor, but as valid and helpful within its limits as any other metaphor.

Penal expiation seems in reality to deprive God of his attribute of grace and to make him implacable vengeance. Justice must, indeed, be vindicated but is it not vindicated by the inevitable retribution which follows wrongdoing and especially by the repentance of the sinner who thereby dies as sinner that he may live as saint? It is difficult to see how justice is expressed when strict legal penalty is imposed upon

the innocent. The good man can suffer for the bad man but he cannot be punished for him. The fatal objection to legalistic theories of atonement is the impersonalism which overstresses such concepts as "law" and "justice" until they take the actual place of God. It is not law which must be satisfied but God, and the fatherly God can be satisfied only by the realization of his redemptive purpose for his child. Strictly speaking, God does not forgive "sin"; he forgives the sinner. When we move out of the world of legal abstractions into the world of personal relations, light begins to fall upon our darkness.

The moral, or moral influence, theory of atonement finds the terminus of Christ's work upon the cross in man, rather than in God. The death of Jesus was not a legal propitiation which was offered to God, it was a disclosure of God's own attitude of righteousness and grace which was offered to man. This revelation of the divine heart is intended to move man to repentance for his sins and to the repentant soul God freely accords forgiveness. Lest forgiveness should be confused with moral laxity, "governmental" theories have seen in Christ's sufferings an expression of God's opposition to sin which guards the interests of the moral order.

The critics of the moral theory point out its theatric character. A God who makes a display of his feelings for its effect on us is likened to a mother who pretends to cry in order to influence her child. We must recognize that God uses all available methods to win men to righteousness. The exhibition of his feelings is incidental to the performance of objective redemptive tasks. Jesus did not make dying an end in itself, it was an incident of his campaign to establish the

righteous order of the Kingdom of God. In Christ we see what God is forever aiming to do and the inmost heart of God is therein revealed. Moral theories of atonement increasingly recognize the social aspects of the cross, both in the historical causes back of it and in its effect upon men in their social relations.

In every theory of atonement, there are elements of truth but the cross is too vast in its meanings to be compressed in all our theories. From a personalistic point of view, there are certain vital considerations which must be included in any satisfactory statement concerning salvation. Of primary importance is the fact that the inevitable punishments which follow sin must be interpreted in personal terms. We live in a universe where every deed whether good or bad has its appropriate consequences. The moral order is inviolable. Sin is a Trojan horse, when we drag it into the soul, the avenging Greeks are inside. The sinner never escapes. Retribution, however, signifies a due and proper penalty for every sin, the number of stripes is measured to the offense. Nor are we to restrict our thought to a punitive realm beyond death, for punishment comes in terms of law continuously operative.

In all our punishment, we may be sure that the personal God is seeking to achieve personal ends. No blind fate is visiting its fury upon us, but a loving Father is disciplining his children. We do not deal with impersonal law but with God. And in his intention, whatever the issues of our lives as determined by our attitude, God seeks our good. Enlightened criminology to-day adjusts punishment not to the crime but to the criminal. And it believes that all the ends of justice are best subserved by the reformation

of the wrongdoer. It is necessary for us to personalize penology, divine as well as human.

It is true, furthermore, that God bears the burden of our sin in an eternal atonement. God himself is our Savior, Jesus mediates the divine saviorhood. The all-important fact is the attitude of the ultimate power which constitutes the world order in all its vastness and which has our destinies in its keeping. We believe in the changeless justice and goodness of God. He was not a God of justice merely, before the year one of the Christian era, since which time he has been a God of grace. Forever the same in his moral perfection, God has loved men and has been responsive to their need in all ages and lands. His holiness moved him to save us, for a holiness which merely censures and punishes is Phariseeism at its worst; true holiness is satisfied with nothing less than the impartation of itself, and such holiness is indistinguishable from love. In its very nature, love identifies itself with its object and is vicarious in joy or pain. A moral God, immanent in his world, present with his creatures, inescapably takes squarely upon his heart the burden of our sins. This is the eternal atonement, the sacrificial love of God which in all ages since sin began, suffers with us and for us and toils to redeem us.⁷

Jesus is the supreme revelation in history of the eternal attitude of God toward men. This is the truth which gives his sacrifice on the cross universal significance. God can be known in his moral nature only as he expresses himself in terms of human life. All our names for him—Father, Lord—are metaphors from human relations. There must be an incarnation, or we must build an altar to the Unknown God. The entire life of Jesus had revelatory value. As Calvin

taught, Christ saved us by the whole course of his obedience, and not by his death only. At Calvary, however, the situation was such as to reveal his personality to its depths, and Calvary is, therefore, the crucial place in our redemption. But the love manifested there is a window in history through which we can see the eternal atonement which is in God.⁷ And in its measure, all sacrificial love, by whomsoever expressed, whether in the home or in the state, reveals the mind of God toward men.

The death of Jesus was the historically conditioned expression of his spirit of self-giving. It was no metaphysical drama but it had definite personal and social causes, which Walter Rauschenbusch analyzed as religious bigotry, graft, corruption of justice, the mob spirit, militarism, and class contempt.⁸ The spirit of self-giving ruled the life of Jesus in a remarkable way. The normal expression of such a spirit is service. And the most significant explanation which Jesus gave of his approaching death made it the climactic expression of the career of the Son of man who came "not to be ministered unto but to minister and to give his life a ransom for many." With this passage must be conjoined the statement in the Levitical law which disclosed the ancient faith in "blood" as the seat of life, and also the declaration in a New Testament letter that Christ through the eternal Spirit "offered himself" unto God.⁹ Plainly, physical death in itself possesses no religious significance. It is the person back of the death, whether Jesus on the central cross, or the thieves beside him, which gives meaning to death. The real sacrifice of Jesus was inner, it was the oblation of a life devoted to the will of God and the service of man. The blood which he shed was symbol of the life out-

poured in love. By the spirit of Jesus' self-giving, as reproduced in us, are we saved, whatever form the historical situation decreed that his self-giving should find expression.

The forgiveness which is mediated to us by Christ is primarily a restoration of right personal relations. Legal analogies properly speak of cancellation of penalties, but we are nearer the truths at the heart of the Christian salvation when we speak in the language of personal relations. The repentance of a sinner signifies a life now in its motive and direction inwardly righteous. Such a life God can look upon with approval and receive into glad, full fellowship. The paradox of divine grace is that God is "just" when he forgives, for he is giving recognition to moral realities. And in the presence of the God of the gospel of Jesus, the one sole condition of forgiveness is repentance. As John McLeod Campbell reminded us, there is more atoning power in one tear of contrition than in ages of penal woe.¹⁰ There is nothing in forgiveness, defined as reconciliation with God, which is inconsistent with a universe inviolable in its laws.

The consequences of sin alike in ourselves and in society tend to be overcome by the new redemptive forces released in our friendship with God. What we too often overlook is the possibility of new causations, themselves in full accord with the universality of law. Not only can these new forces neutralize and overcome but they can even overrule and transmute. We can save ourselves from the past by making a future out of it. Salvation in the largest sense must concern itself with the social results of our sins. Wherein we cannot expiate, as Josiah Royce so cogently pointed out, loyal souls can bear our treason in pain and sorrow

and thus enrich the world by their love, as Jesus did upon his cross.¹¹ Here we have but faith and hope that our sin will be counterbalanced, yet they are sufficient to enable us to enter at last into peace.

It is necessary for us to recognize that the law of sacrifice revealed in the cross of Jesus is normative for all men. In the death of Jesus there is supreme expression of a vicarious principle which is the very warp and woof of all social life. The fundamental truth in his atonement was his self-giving. There is only one path to self-realization and that is the self-sacrifice by which we die to a lower, imperfect self, in order to live to a higher, divine and social self. No social progress is possible, except through those who pour out their lives for their fellow men, whether in service or in death. Nor can we know the highest bliss of fellowship with God until we share his redemptive passion. These facts found such remarkable expression in the career of Jesus that his cross has become the center and the symbol of all the sacrificial forces which overcome human sin and promote human welfare.

3. *Aspects of Christian experience.* The work of God for us in its historical manifestations is preliminary to his work in us. The goal and crown of the Christian salvation lies in the sphere of personal religious experience. And in this realm, to use Scriptural terminology, we deal with the activities of the "Holy Spirit." By an age-long psychology, we speak, in the case of both man and God, of the spirit, as separable, distinct, objective, and yet none other than the person himself in his essential character and activity. The spirit of George Washington is George Washington.

In the rich and complex life of God, as historical

Trinitarianism defines it, the Spirit, as well as the Father and the Son, is the expression of the entire God. The Spirit is God at work in his world. The activity was cosmic when the Spirit brooded over the chaos described in Genesis, and made out of it our orderly and beautiful world. Ordinarily, however, the work of the Spirit is represented as within the sphere of religious experience. In earlier days men thought that the Spirit came upon heroes as an occasional and almost magical power, but later they conceived of his presence as constant, ethical, and universal. It is the Spirit who regenerates and sanctifies men. And the qualities in human personality which give it charm and power—love, joy, peace, kindness, self-control—are “the fruit of the Spirit.”¹² The work of the Spirit, therefore, comprehends both the beginnings and the realizations of the Christian life.

It is not possible to picture to ourselves the origin of the spiritual life in man. There is about it the mystery of the night wind as it comes and goes in the darkness. A child is born into a human circle and he is, doubtless, responsive to the spiritual forces about it more speedily than we ordinarily suppose. And in these forces, always with elements of good in them, who can doubt that the immanent God is at work? An unfolding, a crisis, usually in adolescence, we properly call “conversion.” And when we enter into the Christian type of religious experience, only one metaphor can adequately describe it and that is a new birth. Psychology, as a science, can tell us something about processes in its own restricted field, even though it is necessarily silent concerning ultimate causations. It informs us that in regeneration our instincts are reorganized about a new and divine ideal. But it would

be a mistake of major importance to suppose that discovery of the way in which God works in conversion is proof that he has nothing to do with it. Alike in the instrumentalities used, which are always persons, and in the friendship established between man and God, regeneration is a personal fact.

The spiritual character of conversion has been obscured through long ages by sacramental conceptions of salvation. No doubt, the immanence of God in his world makes all visible things expressions and avenues of divine grace. The argument from divine immanence, however, proves too much; it makes all things sacramental, whereas thoroughgoing sacramentalism must attach to some objects and acts a power which is ultra-exceptional, if not magical. It is sufficient to acknowledge the power in the symbolism of sacraments. As "*verba visibilia*," to use Augustine's phrase, these visible words convey their potent message to our souls. Catholic teaching insists that all the sacraments of the church convey grace "by the act performed," *ex opere operato*. The real significance of such a statement is apparent in the virtue attached to baptism, "by it we are made members of Christ and incorporated with the church." An adult may reach heaven by virtue of a baptism of desire or of blood (martyrdom) but an infant, utterly unconscious of the proceedings, upon whose skin no baptismal water has flowed while the priest repeats the Trinitarian formula, is doomed to permanent exclusion from the beatific presence of God.¹³ This shocking conclusion rests upon the belief that baptism effects an inward change in the infant by washing away its original sin, and by implanting a divine nature.

Even mysticism, in its doctrine of the "Unio Mys-

tica," seemed to regard salvation as the union in man of two impersonal substances. For this reason, the word mysticism suggests impersonality so strongly that it is hateful to men like Ritschl and Denney. As a heritage from the Mystery religions, and back of them from primitive religions, these realistic and unethical conceptions of sacramentarian and mystical salvation attached themselves at an early date to the gospel of Jesus. They tend to mechanize and materialize religion. Such conceptions, however devout and noble the lives of those who hold them, depress religion from the realm of the personal into the magical. The life of religion is transmitted by contact with people who possess it. The consciousness of God is born in us through acquaintance, direct or indirect, with men and women to whom God is a reality. Only personality is truly sacramental.

The Christian way of salvation is defined in the word "faith." It is the one preëminent message of the New Testament to men in quest of salvation. Unhappily, the English language, in its poverty at this point, has no verbal form of the word faith, so we have been compelled to use the verb "believe." And "believe" so strongly suggests doctrinal statements to be accepted that the personal character of faith has been clouded. Faith moves primarily in the sphere of personal relations. It implies knowledge, belief, evaluations, but in itself it is trust in a person and loyalty to him. It is essentially an attitude of personality, the attitude of receptivity and responsiveness toward God as he has revealed himself to us. Saving faith, therefore, is possible to any man, in any age, however imperfect his knowledge.

The most helpful analogy in the understanding of

faith is friendship, with its mutual open-mindedness and self-giving, its interpenetration of personalities, its interchange of personal qualities. The significance of every friendship for each of us, however, lies in the person whom we choose as friend. Certainly this is true in religion. It follows that religion is not necessarily a blessing. It is not when it involves the sacrifice of children to Moloch. What the world needs is not religion but the right kind of religion. Conversion is a phenomenon in every religion, but conversion to what? The significance of Christianity lies in conversion as conditioned by the knowledge of God through Christ. In such a conversion, we are pledged to live in the spirit of Jesus' life of loving service.

Such an orientation of personality is attended by far-reaching changes. In organizing our powers around so noble an ideal as that of God expressed in Jesus, personality becomes truly unified. Whether the orientation be gradual or sudden, order emerges from confusion, and with the integration of our nature, there come peace and power. And as every change in us brings a change in all outward things relative to us, we enter a new world. Our heightened appreciations discover new beauty, and beauty awakens love—love to God and man.

The realization of the Christian life, no less than its beginnings, takes place in the realm of the personal. The historic name for the progressive attainment of Christian character is sanctification. Here, also, is a word somewhat discredited by unctiousness, by indefensible claims of perfection and by other-worldliness; but its essential meanings give it basic importance in the Christian vocabulary. It signifies the realization of our potentialities as persons, growth in the attain-

ment of a good life. There are two forces which mold character, only two, and they are fellowship and self-expression. The persons we are with, whether God or our fellow men, and the work in which our personal powers are called forth, these make us what we are.

The relation of society to the development of personalities is a consideration of profound importance. Every personality in a very true sense is a social product. In the give and take of social relations its powers are evoked and disciplined. The family is the earliest and greatest school of character. All our social groupings are significant in the molding of personalities, not least of all the religious fellowship which we call the church. A baby starts without delay to receive the impress of its social world. Sooner than we often think, it begins to imitate the manners and to accept the ideals of the persons with whom its lot is cast. The language it lisps is the social achievement of long generations and apart from language the higher life of the mind is not possible.

The ideals which youth espouses are seen by close analysis to be largely the expectations which the best people they know cherish for them. Our religious nature awakens in the presence of religious people. Thus the church, as Ritschl taught, is indispensable, as the sphere in which we realize the divine life. As the stalks of corn fructify one another, through the pollen carried by the bees, so personalities become fertile through spiritual fellowship. And aside from the church, as the fellowship of faith and love everywhere, there is no salvation.

The necessity of "social salvation" is inherent in the interrelation of the individual and society. Social "institutions," which are simply the habitual way in

which people do things together, are a mold into which personalities are poured. On the other hand, institutions can be modified and changed by forceful individuals. New Jews will make a new Jerusalem, and the first step in social reconstruction is personalities who embody in themselves the ideals of the new day. The reality of social salvation in distinction from individual salvation is sometimes denied. Society is composed of individuals, it is argued, and does not the salvation of individuals tell the whole story? The answer lies in the fact that "relationships," as well as persons, must be saved. It is possible to have two men, who are good in their motives, but are held together by an un-Christian relationship. Such was the case with the institution of slavery which fostered tyranny in the master and obsequiousness in the slave and thus tended to undo the goodness of the men who were parties to it. The same thing is true in the extreme forms of capitalism. It will be said that good men will see the wrongfulness of un-Christian relationships and change them. As a matter of fact, they frequently fail to do so owing to ignorance or to the unconscious warping of judgment through supposed self-interest. For this reason, a full gospel of salvation includes its social implications as applied to all our human institutions.

If human fellowship is so significant in the growth of a Christlike personality, it follows that prayer, as fellowship with the supreme personality is a major fact in the religious life. Prayer, in the largest sense, is the social life between man and God. It is thus far more than words—it is life attitude, it is dominant desire. The thing a man lives for, this is what he asks of the universe. Prayer rises to its highest levels

when man enters into conscious fellowship with God. The possibility of such fellowship would seem to be axiomatic where two social beings are living together in the same universe. Robinson Crusoe and the man Friday, thrown together on the same island, established acquaintance. It is reasonable to believe that God and man can enter into fellowship with each other. To resolve our friendship with God into subjective psychological processes is no more defensible than to do so in the case of our human friendships. If the proof of the reality of human persons is the fact that the assumption "works" in practical life and gives coherence to our experience, the same can be said concerning the reality of the God who hears and answers prayer. In the contemplation of his excellence, we are changed into his likeness. In worship, we learn to view things from the divine point of view, to see them as a whole, and thus to win insight, peace and power. The inevitability of prayer is seen in the fact that aspiration tends to take the form of fellowship with an ideal person. And whatever else happens, the greatest of all answers to prayer is given to us when our human personalities are lifted toward the divine.

Together with fellowship with man and with God, work is formative in the sphere of character. The self we express, that self we become. And as each of us is a colony of selves, some base and some noble, a wise selection must be made; otherwise self-expression becomes a philosophy of degradation. It was said by John Stuart Mill that character is a perfectly fashioned will; and it is work which calls forth and educates the will. By work, we mean all the activities in which we engage whether vocation or avocation. In relation

to personality, there is no distinction of sacred and secular in our tasks. The energies of the vast majority of men are devoted very largely to problems of livelihood. It would be strange if the daily task was without religious significance. Religion is not a special interest apart from secular activities, it is the spirit in which we perform the duties of life. And the highest product of all work is the worker himself. When a mason lays a stone in the wall, he places one in the temple of his own personality. His powers are evoked by his labor and in his coördinations with fellow toilers his social nature finds development. The way to be spiritual is to attempt something so difficult that we cannot do it except by laying hold of the resources which are in God.

The progressive nature of religious experience implies a goal. It is not an aimless movement in meaningless circles. Each personality, according to its distinctive genius, seeks self-fulfillment. There is no painful monotony in the personal world but variety, even as star differs from star. The moral ideal of personality we find presented to us in the highest form in the Christ-idea and in the historical Jesus. The goal of character is Christ-likeness. Often it seems to the individual man that he makes but little progress toward the goal, but nevertheless the years bring their garnered moral development.

Whatever perfection we gain now, or ever shall gain, is relative, for to finite creatures no absolute perfection is possible. The vessel may be small, and it may have increasing capacity, but at any given moment, it may be one hundred per cent full. Judged by the higher standards, men come to the close of life in varying degrees of immaturity. Our creedal Calvinistic teach-

ing bids us believe in instantaneous sanctification at death when the souls of the righteous are made "perfect in holiness." ¹⁴ Catholicism, in its doctrine of Purgatory, a doctrine gravely open to abuse, declares the reality of moral discipline beyond death. Whatever the effect of the experience of death upon personality, it is reasonable for believers in a future life to cherish the hope of ever-continued progress.

CHAPTER VIII

THE DYNAMIC OF MORALITY

The evolution of morality. Problems of conduct have confronted man from the beginning of his career. The ability to create divergent ideals imposed upon him the duty of choice. For the most part, human activities are mechanized by personal or racial habit, and yet the tree of the knowledge of good and evil stands in the midst of the Garden of life and every path leads to it.

Man has always lived as a member of a group; otherwise he could not have become man, for one man is no man. If one must choose between the two accounts of creation in the book of Genesis, let him prefer the story in chapter one which presents us with a social creation and not with a solitary Adam, as in chapter two, whose loneliness was at length mitigated by human companionship. Every life is related to other lives in the fellowship of a society, however simple. And morality is the normal fulfillment of personal relations. In spite of various assertions to the contrary, religion has always had ethical elements. When morality turns Godward, it is religion; and when religion turns manward, it is morality.

It is usual to speak of three stages in the evolution of morality—instinct, custom and conscience or reflective morality. These stages are not sharply chronological in the race or in the individual. They coexist

in the most mature personalities in varying proportions. A stage of pure instinct at the beginnings of human society is hypothesis only. Instinctive action, without doubt, was relatively prominent but that is something we share with animals and is but the basis of distinctively human morality. We have inborn ways of response to particular situations. We do spontaneously, it seems, the things necessary to conserve and promote our vital interests. To get along successfully with our fellows, we must have a spirit of coöperation, courage, kindness. The order of things in which we live is a moral order and shapes us accordingly; and when we arrive at moral self-consciousness, we find that we need not make bricks without straw. Strictly speaking, instinct is not a stage of morality; it is preparation for morality, the raw material of morality.

Custom is the characteristic fact in relation to conduct in primitive human groups. Etymology here is illuminating, for ethics comes from the Greek *ethos* (ἦθος) and morality from the Latin *mos*, plural *mores*, words which mean custom. The way of doing things approved by the group, that was morality. And the group had its mind upon the whole range of life—the permissible things to eat, the proper person to marry, the way to build houses, the authorized manner of worship. The freedom of the savage in a state of nature is a myth; custom was everywhere at hand to say, "This is the way wherein you must walk." These customs grew up as the funded wisdom of the group, some of them embodying helpful social philosophy based on experiences of the utility of certain courses of action, and some of them arising out of ideas of luck and fantastic interpretations of events, and often

embodying cruel and harmful practices. Upon them all was invoked the guardianship of the gods who had ordained the customs and would punish all infractions of them.

We reach the stage of true morality only when man is able to order his conduct and pronounce judgment upon it in relation to general moral principles. In the light of a chosen ideal, his activity is "right" or "wrong." Here we are in the distinctively personal world, far beyond the instinctive drives which rule the lower animals. They respond to stimuli, scarcely knowing why they do so. "There is no reason to think," says Hobhouse, "that any animal except man can enunciate or apply general rules of conduct."¹ The moral life in the case of man thus presupposes the power of conceptual thought and the actuality of freedom. The reign of custom has never been absolute, moral reflectiveness is as old as the race. It represents insight, evaluation and progress. The divergent attitudes of custom and conscience may be seen with respect to the sabbath. To keep it because our parents do so or because a tablet of stone commands us, is to live on the stage of custom; to keep it because it promotes human welfare and was made for man is to live on a moral plane of intelligence and freedom. In the case of the immature, the necessity of a preparatory morality of custom is obvious. The compulsion of law is antecedent to the liberty of the gospel.

Moral progress consists in the revision, in the light of human welfare, of hitherto accepted ways of doing things. Such revision becomes an acute necessity when a social group finds itself living in changed conditions. It discovers that some customs remain essen-

tially valid; on the other hand, other customs once salutary are now obsolete and harmful. "Time makes ancient good uncouth." The science of ethics is born when men are compelled to reflect on the rationality of custom and to seek reasonable foundations of conduct. Such a condition marked the days of Socrates, when Greece moved out of her tribal life into wide commercial and ethnic expansion.

We live in a time of vast changes effectuated by scientific discoveries and mechanical inventions based upon them. The result is unprecedented moral confusion. Are we to be bound in matters of property, sex, manners, by an outworn code of ethics, by tabus and conventions? In the turmoil, we see a recrudescence of paganism in its shameless quest for sensual pleasure and its appeal to brute force, but we catch glimpses also of a nobler society struggling into expression. And the architectonic idea by which we frame a higher code is the idea of personality. We find in it both a sanction for morality and a principle of guidance in the moral life.

1. *Personality as a sanction of morality.* The foundation for morality is the worth of personality. This fact is assumed, if not stated, in every system of ethics. Material goods of all kinds possess only instrumental value, while spiritual goods are ends in themselves and possess intrinsic and ultimate value. The duties of the moral life require us to subordinate the world of sense to the world of spirit, the immediate gratification of the moment to larger and permanent good, the purely individualistic interest to the common social interest. Such requirements can be most successfully met only as we rightly estimate human personality and, it may be added, believe in a universe

friendly to our moral striving, which is really faith in God.

Our name for the moral nature of man is "conscience." It is possible to define conscience (*con scire*), as a knowledge accompanying our deeds and pronouncing them accordant with our moral standard or divergent from it. Conscience is the judge, and neither the legislature which enacts laws nor the sheriff who enforces them. It is, however, in keeping with the modern emphasis upon the unity of personality to think of conscience in the light of the whole legal system—judge, legislature, and sheriff. Conscience is the entire personality in relation to the moral order.

When we listen to the voice of conscience, we find that it speaks in imperatives and absolutes. It does not say "Please do," but "Thou shalt." There is in it both authority and freedom. It commands categorically but the law is self-imposed. If there is law external to us, conscience must reënact it, for conscience is self-legislative. And yet we can see on every hand that individual consciences reflect their social environment. Facts like these have given rise to the two great interpretations of conscience—the intuitional and the empirical.

Historic Christian theology, as expressed for instance by Bishop Joseph Butler, has been friendly to intuitionalism. Conscience is an innate faculty, implanted in us by God which gives us immediate apprehension of the quality of an act and is, therefore, independent of experience and antecedent to it, that is, *a priori*. It is an inner oracle infallible in its discriminations and commands. In such a conception of conscience one recognizes at once large elements of truth yet there are facts of which it does not take account. A

faculty so absolute and universal in its power ought to operate similarly in all men, yet nothing is more obvious than diversity in the findings of consciences. The same man thinks one thing to-day and another to-morrow. Paul declared that he persecuted the Christians in good conscience, yet he lived to see the day when he regarded himself as the chief of sinners because he did so. And how various are the moral codes of peoples contemporary to one another, to say nothing of the range of ethical standards presented by the centuries. We believe in marriage, ideally, as one man and one woman till death parts them; but in Solomon's day, evidently, one's royal and social prestige was partly measured by the size of the harem. We respect people's heads in general, whereas the Dyaks of Borneo take pride in collections of them. How can an infallible conscience utter such contradictions?

Empiricism, on the other hand, emphasizes experience as the necessary basis of the moral judgments of personality. It declares that the things which men found useful and helpful became ingrained in them as conscience. The study of psychology and anthropology shows that conscience has a biological and social genesis. Man often faultily interprets his experience and his ethical notions not infrequently have fallacious elements. It is necessary for us to criticize and educate our consciences so that they may have a self-consistent content and may keep abreast of the needs of the age in which we live.

It appears that empiricism gives a true account of the origin of our moral codes but it fails to explain the "ought" which is inherent in personality. To point out the socially useful does not make me feel that I ought to choose the socially useful. It must be

acknowledged that there is something in us, an original furnishing of the soul, call it a special faculty or an orientation of personality as a whole, which commands us to do the right and eschew the wrong. But what things are right and wrong we learn by consideration of consequences, by racial and personal experience. In the sense of obligation we have something qualitatively different from constraint by custom. All possible experience cannot grow a conscience in a chimpanzee. It is impossible to manufacture a conscience out of expediency. In all its grandeur, the moral imperative is structural in personality. It can be aroused in man by experience but not implanted. It must be accepted as an inherent category of personality, even though the empiric contents of our moral codes reveal historical evolution and are proper subjects of scrutiny and revision.

The idea of obligation has its basis in personality by virtue of the ideality and the freedom which belong to personality. How authoritative are its commands, George Eliot acknowledged in her oft-quoted words to Frederick W. H. Myers concerning God, immortality and duty, "How inconceivable the first, how unbelievable the second, and how peremptory and absolute the third." Whatever a man's theological beliefs or lack of beliefs, he is never exempt from doing the right, as he sees it. His ethical house may be without cosmic foundations but he must live in it. And the tacit assumption inherent in loyalty to obligation, is the sanctity of personality alike in one's self and in one's fellow men. In itself and apart from the content which it receives from our personal world, duty is a mere abstraction.

A "motive" may have all the importance which

Kant attached to it, but a motive is a hollow abstraction when it is unrelated to that whereto it moves us. There is nothing in the world absolutely and altogether good, wrote Kant, except "a good will."^a A will to what? The proper answer, of course, is the good of persons. And a motive receives content when we think of it as a consequence as willed. Good intentions are not in themselves adequate, a most undesirable locality is said to be paved with them. Intelligent morality is action which takes into full consideration the consequences of our deeds to individuals and to society.

The welfare of persons—this is the sanction of morality within the uttermost limits of our human life. To this truth Jesus gave vital expression in a saying, seemingly casual, and yet in the field of ethics as far-reaching and epoch-making as Newton's enunciation of the law of gravitation in the history of science, "The sabbath was made for man and not man for the sabbath."^a The worth of personality is the foundation and the criterion of duty. "Virtue for its own sake" is proverbial nonsense; "virtue for the sake of persons" is practical wisdom. The dynamic of morality lies not in bloodless categories but in loyalty to persons. If a man would subdue the subtle and fiery temptations which assail him, let him think resolutely, thoroughly, upon the possible consequences, to all persons concerned, which are involved in his decision. "For my sake" is the talisman of the gospel of Christ which has impelled men to martyrdom itself. And religion has moved into the electric field of force when it has embodied its moral ideals in a person to whom the human heart can be loyal.

The question now rises whether it is necessary to go

beyond the world of human persons to find an ultimate sanction for morality. Are there implications in our faith in the ultimacy of personal values which lead us irresistibly to the idea of God? Hitherto, in the long centuries of human history, God has been made sponsor for the moral code. Were not the ten commandments given to Moses by Yahweh himself whose finger wrote them on tablets of stone? And on the black basalt stele, in the Louvre, whereon are engraved the laws of Hammurabi, the god Shamash is depicted as giving them to the king. But to-day, we hear the plea for an autonomous morality. "It would seem then," says J. M. E. McTaggart, "that we should lose little, if anything, in the way of moral guidance by rejecting belief in God." ⁴ We are advised that we must divorce ethics from religion and let it rule in its own right. Radical humanists even regard religion, in the historical sense of the word, as an obstacle to progress and look forward hopefully to its elimination from our modern world.

The debate has been long in progress concerning the priority of metaphysics and ethics. Shall we first construct a theory of the universe and build our ethics upon it, or shall we start with ethics and infer from it the nature of ultimate reality? Possibly, both points of view are correct; one is logical, and the other chronological. God is the fact antecedent to all else, therefore, metaphysics conditions ethics. But in the order of our experience, we seem to discover God through our moral values. It was found that the soldiers in the World War believed that religion consisted essentially in "doing the right thing." ⁵ The task of the chaplain, manifestly, was to point out the implications of their moral faith. A universe which makes

such a demand and makes its fulfillment possible, and which conserves the values achieved in moral endeavor, is simply what traditional religion calls God and immortality.

Religion, however conjoined to ethics in experience, is more than an inference from ethics. Like art, it has independent rights. Our ascent to God is not wholly ethical, as the ethical obsessionists would have us believe. There is in us a power of divination which finds God through the true and the beautiful, as well as through the good, *aye*, which is aware of him in the impression which the world in its totality makes upon the receptive spirit. Religion is more than duties to man, it is relation to a cosmic power, who controls our destiny. We are bound to ask that most important of all questions, "Is the universe friendly?" If it is not, our moral efforts are doomed to futility; and if it is, there is no hope too high for us to cherish.

We are familiar with the denial, or at least the neglect, of any cosmic basis of morality. It matters not whether one speaks of humanistic naturalism or of naturalistic humanism, they signify the same thing—morality is independent of the existence of God. A religion of the social passion is offered to us as a substitute for a supernatural religion with an objective personal God. Exponents of a materialistic evolution, based on the idea of the struggle for existence, declared the universe was hostile to a morality based on love. Present-day naturalism is usually content to represent the cosmos as indifferent to us. In its own good time, it will obliterate our moral achievements and nature will resume her undisputed sway. It is thus assumed that the ultimate power in the universe is blind, brutal,

impersonal force. The logic of such a conclusion cuts the sinews of a sacrificial moral life and really bids us put ourselves in line with a world indifferent to ethical achievements. It is well that men are often better than their logic and yet who can doubt the blighting effect upon morality, if mankind generally accepted the naturalistic creed?

The spiritual interpretation of the world gives a secure foundation for moral effort. It tells us that the final fact in the universe is the nature of God as intelligent and loving personality. There have been thinkers, notably Duns Scotus, who grounded our duty in the "will" of God. A thing was right and obligatory because God commanded it. Biblical legalism proceeds on the same assumption, it is not for us to understand but simply to obey. Passing over the difficulty as to whether we have in any given precept the veritable command of God or merely some man's interpretation of God's will, we face the problem of God's spiritual education of his children. The ideal compulsion to obedience lies not in the fact that God commands but in the reason he has for doing so. In brief, our duty has its basis in his nature rather than in his will. And his will is our highest law because it is the expression of his nature. We do not build on the finality of abstractions like "justice" but on God in whom justice is embodied, for moral qualities have no existence apart from personalities in whom they inhere.

The evidence that God is the ground of morality is the evidence for the existence of a moral order. The fact that morality can arise in our dependent, contingent human world points to a universe which somehow makes the existence of morality possible, a uni-

verse which purposes morality and is friendly to it. We see in the general course of history, and in the life of individual persons, that goodness is the normal way of living. A society built wholly upon hatred, deceit, falsehood, could not function successfully. In a similar way, the man who violates the law inherent in the unfoldings of personality, and in the nature of society, comes to grief which is inward, if not outward. Ages of human experience declare that the way of the transgressor is hard. On the other hand, the spiritual satisfactions which come from a dutiful life are rightly regarded as divine approval, the voice of God within the soul.

In all devotion to right and confidence in its eventual triumph, there is implicit a faith which may truly be termed religious. The fact that a man gives himself to a noble cause, as he conceives it, is proof that the moralities represented in the cause are to him ultimate values, which have a right to demand of him the utmost sacrifice. One can scarcely make a great consecration to an enterprise utterly foredoomed to failure. The assurance that justice, sometime and somewhere, will find vindication lies back of the noble deeds of the heroes of the race. Buddha revolted against the futilities of metaphysical speculation and religious asceticism and founded a religion which virtually said, "Nothing counts but a good life." And yet the Karma, on which Buddha built his scheme of life, the exact justice in the universe which gives to every man according to his deed, was itself, as far as it went, a practical theism. The innate justice in the universe is not an attribute of matter; it is not, in itself, an impersonal objective existent, for as a concept it would never have arisen in our minds apart from our acquaintance with

persons who are just; it is God at work in the moral order.

Loyalty to moral obligation is often exceedingly difficult. We are asked to sacrifice the pleasure of the moment to a larger and later good, to subordinate ourselves, perhaps unto death, to the welfare of the group. If every one were a philosopher, possibly the path of wisdom would not be so hard to follow. Yet even the philosopher may falter and stray. Did not Seneca say of himself that he was full of vices? The notion that knowledge is a sufficient assurance of virtue is refuted by experience in every generation of humanity. No doubt, there is power in humanistic ethics, and many noble lives bear witness to it, but is there power enough? Margins of strength decide the issue in the case of individuals. And it is margins which determine whether society advances or deteriorates. Belief in God, as the ultimate sanction of duty, supplies added power in our moral endeavors. Why do religious men "project" their moral values into the universe? Because they can thus give to those values universality and absoluteness as a basis for social cohesiveness and personal righteousness. We may psychologically "project," but we ontologically "discover," for God is not the product of wishful thinking but is objective Reality.

The dynamic of conduct is found in religion. This is true, whatever the conception of God and the nature of the moral code. The Saktas of India who worship the female principle find warrant for their orgies in many of the stories concerning the gods. If religion is to be a moral blessing, it must present a moralized God. And we believe that it can be truly said that the loftiest view of God which the world has received, the one

with the noblest moral force, is the God revealed in the teachings and personality of Christ. The faith of men in God may assume partial and arrested forms but in their faith lie the sources of moral power. If it is said that many men abandon religion and get on very well, the same thing can be said of fish out of water, they survive—for a time. The capital bequeathed to us by generations of faith can sustain us, but not indefinitely; we must add to it or go morally bankrupt. When the rains of trust in God cease to fall on the hills, the river of altruistic and sacrificial power sinks to lower levels.

The appeal to history vindicates the idea that God is the ultimate sanction in ethics. It is difficult to disentangle the threads of influence in any individual life, and it is possible to make unwarranted claims and to generalize on too slender a basis of facts. But the volume of testimony is so large that our conclusions appear to be justified. We see the ethical power of religion, for instance, in the career of John Milton. In the sonnet written on his twenty-third birthday, he declared his purpose to live:

As ever in my great Task-Master's eye.

And at the close of a heroic career in which he had made large contributions to civil and religious liberty, he could say:

I again take God to witness that, in all those places where so many things are considered lawful, I have lived sound and untouched by any profligacy and vice, having this thought perpetually with me, that, though I might escape the eyes of men, I certainly could not escape the eyes of God.*

His experience does not stand alone, for men without number have learned what are the restraints and inspirations which inhere in religion.

The ethical power of belief in God is seen in society also. The historian who studies the social power of religion discovers that it is a most potent conservator of group gains and standards. In the person of the priest, religion is a conservative force, but in the person of the prophet, it is a progressive one. Both priest and prophet are indispensable, for it is quite as necessary to keep our gains as to make them. History reveals the fact that the centuries of the decay of religion are the centuries of social dissolution, for the foundations of common life and action have disintegrated. Such centuries are sometimes necessary transitions from lower religions to higher, but the times of genuine religious revival are the times of social hope and power. Recent studies in the Methodist revival of the eighteenth century in England show that ethical factors were prominent in ninety-two and four-tenths per cent of recorded instances of conversion.⁷ In our day, many social workers, conscious of the tremendous forces against them and of the need of a reënforcement of altruistic power, lift their weary eyes to the skies in the hope of a rebirth of religion. And the signs are multiplying that a Wind from heaven is moving with fresh power upon the hearts of men in all lands and that a new age of faith is at hand.

2. *Personality as a principle of moral guidance.* The basis of morality is our sense of the intrinsic worth of human personality. And the supremacy and permanence of our personal values imply a universe in which God and immortality are realities. Personality, however, is more than sanction for our moralities, it

is a principle of guidance. This truth received classical expression from the pen of Immanuel Kant, in words which deserve to be written on the doorposts of every earnest life: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, as in every case an end withal, never as means only." ⁸ It will be noticed that Kant does not say that we are never to employ our fellow men as instruments, for the whole interdependent life of modern society is built upon mutuality of service. The word "only" in his maxim is most important. We are never to regard or to use personalities as mere tools for gain or mere servitors of pleasure, but we are to coöperate with them for common ends under conditions which upbuild personal values in them and in ourselves.

The adequacy of Kant's famous maxim has been questioned because it does not tell us just what to do in specific situations. His words, it is true, are a principle and not a precept, but our deficiency usually lies in our lack of respect and consideration for others rather than in ignorance of our duties. We know what we ought to do, as a rule, but we are too selfish and too slothful to do it. If we are not well informed with respect to our practical duties, then acquisition of technical knowledge bearing on the particular moral problem is a primary obligation. Motive alone is never adequate. Well-meaning blunderers may do as much harm as unmitigated rascals; we are on our guard against the latter, whereas the former win our confidence by the purity of their motives. Altruistic feelings alone can never tell us what is a fair wage scale; that must be determined by technical study of conditions, although the primacy of personal values decrees that the first charge upon an industry is a living

wage for those connected with it. Eloquent discourses upon the Golden Rule must join themselves to a social technique in order to attain practical results. It may well be taken for granted that those who cherish a proper sense of the worth of personality will take the trouble to acquire the necessary knowledge. Love moves us to unselfish action but knowledge alone can give us proper guidance. Our program of action, however, is implicit in love. An appreciation of personal values gives direction, as well as impulse, when we inquire concerning our duty to self and our duty to others.

Each person has obligations toward himself. A spurious and sentimental altruism pleads for utter selflessness, whereas no one can operate without a self of some kind, any more than he can resolve himself into the void. The appeal for the abolition of the self, doubtless, is based upon a definition of the self in its lower relations. There is an individualistic lower self, intent upon the pleasures of the moment and the lesser goods of life, which is to be denied, subordinated, extinguished, but there is a social and divine self, and it is the true and normal self, whose preservation and growth are our highest duty. When we speak of "selfishness," we refer to the attitude and activities of the lower, animal, unsocialized self. But personality in its ideal meanings is to be valued wherever found, quite as truly in ourselves as in others. Our moral world is a unity and the familiar counsel of Polonius recognized that personal and social obligations are only two phases of the same reality:

To thine own self be true,
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man.⁹

The primary duty of every man toward his own personality is self-respect. If he believes himself, as personal being, to be a bearer of the likeness of God, he cannot well do otherwise than reverence his own selfhood in its ideal aspects. It may not be expedient to lift his hat whenever he looks into a mirror but he can avoid the false humility which depreciates the worth of his own being. The imperfections and sins which mar us justify the language of abasement which we find in the literature of religious devotion, but that is only the negative phase of the moral life. It has for its foil a lofty sense of the ideal and potential worth of personality. The blackness of the shadow bears witness to the brilliancy of the light. To think of ourselves habitually as "miserable sinners," however, is to violate the pedagogy which bids us emphasize the positive side of goodness. There is a fine self-reservation in the man who reverences his soul, which keeps him from descending into the meannesses and degradations of the world. We are to love others "as ourselves," no more, no less.

Both orthodoxy and liberalism have violated the law of personal self-respect. A century ago one of the tests of a Christian's personal piety and acceptance of the will of God who chose whom he would for salvation while he passed others by, was "willingness to be damned for the glory of God." The proposition was blasphemous in its assumption that any life, thus willing to give itself for others, could possibly be damned either in this world or in any other. John Lord, later the famous historian, when he was a candidate for ordination before a New England council, was stirred to indignation by the usual test question. In his well-remembered reply he remarked that he

was not willing to be damned for the glory of God but was willing the council should be.¹⁰ Strange to say, extreme modern liberalism in its blindness toward the permanent value of personality, has a parallel test question when it asks a man to be willing to suffer extinction for the sake of social progress. It makes the demand, so it believes, in the name of a higher social morality than it finds expressed in the evangelical hope of heaven, but it violates the fundamental law of all morality which requires us to make personality whether in ourselves or in others, always an end and never means only.

There is upon each man not only the obligation of self-respect but also of self-fulfillment. He begins life as a bundle of potentialities. These potentialities rise into actualities through both social and individual factors. The final word rests with the individual himself, as the architect of his own selfhood, if not of his external fortunes. To define the moral end as "self-sacrifice" is to substitute the negative for the positive. The self which we are called upon to sacrifice is the lower self, and that purely as an incident to the realization of the higher self. The word "self" is used in two different senses in that noble summary of man's ethical duty—"self-realization through self-sacrifice." In a very true sense, the good man can say, "I never made a sacrifice." It is impossible for us to define the moral goal as "pleasure," for pleasure has regard to the sentient life alone and all human experience declares that the deliberate pursuit of pleasure defeats itself. Perhaps it is permissible to speak of "happiness" as the moral end, if we identify it with "welfare," and identify welfare with the common good. Even self-realization, as a definition of the *summum bonum*, has its limitations

which can be transcended only by insistence that the self we seek to realize is the relational and social self.

A distinction must be made between "self-expression" and self-realization. The former phrase has come into vogue to designate the legitimacy of our natural instincts and the desirability of giving them right of way. In this philosophy, the mind is concerned with means for the satisfaction of desires rather than with the moral ends to be sought. Stress is laid on the harmfulness of "repression" as resulting in disturbing complexes and neuroses. As a consequence, revolt has risen against social restraints and conventional rules. We have, of course, many instincts but "self-expression" usually has reference to the instinct of sex. A little reflection shows that the setting aside of inhibitions upon the instincts of acquisitiveness and pugnacity is socially unworkable. It is equally true that the instinct of sex must be subordinated to personal and social values. A barnyard philosophy of family life is irreconcilable with the higher interests of society and with our nobler self-realization. It is necessary to choose the self to which expression shall be given, and this fact validates the principle of discipline as well as the principle of freedom.

Self-fulfillment is harmonious with all our social obligations. The question has been often debated as to a possible conflict between morality and self-interest. In helping others, may I not deny myself cultural advantages necessary to self-realization? No doubt, it is sometimes a difficult problem to find the proper proportion between the pursuit of culture and the rendition of service, but the interests of the higher self in us are in no antagonism with the enrichment we make to other lives. As the larger self is the sum

total of its possessions, including fellow men, then it is itself enlarged as these possessions increase. Physical things we cannot give away and yet retain, but the spiritual things which we share are more our own than ever. "The claims of *individuals* conflict," writes James Seth, "always and necessarily; the claims of *persons* never."¹¹ Thus egoism and altruism find their reconciliation in love.

The ethics of personality has reference to our fellow men quite as much as to ourselves. Indeed, it finds that self-realization is an inadequate statement of the moral goal. It is necessary to take full account of the subjective aspects of duty, for man has self-consciousness and the power and responsibility of the inward look, but the paradox of morality is the fact that the noblest self-realization can come only through self-forgetful service to other personalities. This truth is expressed in one of the most remarkable sayings that ever fell from human lips: "For whosoever would save his life shall lose it; and whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the gospel's shall save it."¹² The moral life, both in relation to effectiveness and happiness, calls for objectivity. If one would hit a golf ball, he must look at the ball and not at his stick. We despise as a prig the man who constantly thinks of the effect of some given course of useful activity upon his "character." No mother can conduct her motherhood successfully by thinking first of all about herself. She forgets herself in her child and then receives herself back enlarged, disciplined and ennobled. As a matter of ethical tactics, as the most complete statement of the *summum bonum*, it is well to say that the proper goal of our moral endeavor is the common good. In that good we share, and thus we find self-realization.

When we seek first the Kingdom of God and its righteousness, all things else, including the fulfillment of our personalities, are added to us.¹³

The basic obligation toward our fellows is reverence for personality. All life, because it is so wonderful, awakens our respect, even in the lower animals. We are not thereby restricted to vegetarianism but we are under bonds to inflict no needless pain. Albert Schweitzer calls attention to an area of obligation too much neglected in our Western world, when he writes that "thoughtless injury to life is incompatible with real ethics."¹⁴ He approves the man who, after the storm, aids the worm back from the paving stone into the lush grass or provides the insect, fallen into a pool, with a leaf by which it may save itself. We shall not, however, imitate the Hindu religionists who subordinate human life to the preservation of poisonous reptiles and disease-bearing insects. The refusal to take the lives of animals, injured or aged in many instances, is far more cruel than the infliction of swift and painless death. The domestic animals, which serve mankind as food, have a much happier existence than do their kindred in field and forest. The rightful subordination of the lower sentient existences to human needs is wholly compatible with the spirit of kindness.

While all life merits consideration, it is personal life which calls for the highest reverence. It possesses final and never merely instrumental value. In every personality, there is incalculable worth both actual and potential. Some elements of good are in every life, however depraved. It is wise counsel which bids us, if we do not like a man, to get better acquainted with him. Our judgments too frequently rest upon the mere accidents of life, such as the color of the

skin, the language spoken, or the clothing worn. The innate worth of personality transcends barriers of race, creed, and economic status. And where worth is unrealized, it is nevertheless potential. Every one recognizes this fact in the case of children. The great teachers of the world have been the men who lifted their hats, metaphorically at least, in the presence of the boundless potentialities in their pupils. Intelligent reverence for child life is at the very basis of social progress. In the case of lives wrecked by wrongdoing, there yet remain illimitable potential values to inspire redemptive effort. The unique quality of Christian love is nowhere more apparent than is its belief in the recoverableness of wasted lives. Jesus believed in men who had ceased to believe in themselves. Reverent faith is a creative force. It awakens faith in hopeless hearts and works its own fulfillments.

Reverence for personalities operates to abolish injustice. Man's inhumanity to man has its roots in disesteem. There is but one sin, out of which all others grow, and that is the spirit of contempt. It may express itself in open hostility or in self-centered lovelessness. But all exploitation and cruelty rest upon some fancied inferiority of its victims. Did not the pariahs of India proceed from the feet of Brahma while the Brahmans came from his head? The institution of slavery, once established in all the original American colonies, an institution in some form worldwide in earlier centuries, was clearly built upon assumed superiorities. In the long course of social evolution, no doubt, slavery played an important part. It was an advance over the massacre of conquered peoples but it proved itself economically inefficient and morally harmful. As every race, especially if it is politi-

cally powerful, regards itself as chosen, the enslavement of inferiors easily follows. In its last days, African slavery was sometimes defended on the ground that negroes were not fully human, or at least that they rested under the curse of servitude which Noah pronounced on the children of Canaan. The one force which ultimately abolished slavery, north and south, was the growing valuation placed upon human personality. Paul has been censured for sending a runaway slave back to his master, but it is overlooked that he sent him with a message which had in it the emancipation of all slaves. He commended Onesimus to Philemon, his master, as "a brother beloved."

It would not be difficult to show that the long list of our social injustices would vanish if a proper reverence for personality took possession of our hearts. The social evil in its commercial forms almost without exception involves the subjection of women who are regarded as social inferiors. The daughters of the poor or of the stranger are lured and thrust into this degradation. The abolition of red light districts, now in progress throughout the world, has for its dynamic the sense of human worthfulness. The man, participant in this evil, even more guilty than his victim, will cease from it when he respects womanhood everywhere in the light of the esteem he feels and demands for his own mother and sister. There are no forms of economic injustice in our modern world whose cure does not lie in respect for personality. When our knowledge is large enough, our imaginations sympathetic enough, to put ourselves in the place of the child in the factory or the man in the treadmill of a seven-day week, our social burdens will be more equitably distributed.

Reverence for human values is far more than a protest against injustice, it is the driving power in all forms of service to humanity. It can animate the daily task and make it divine. It inspires all social measures for a better world. The vast educational system in modern communities, whether supported by the state or by the devotion of individuals and churches, is motivated by a belief in the spiritual possibilities of the common people. Behind the missionary enterprise of the Christian churches, with its schools, hospitals and evangelistic agencies, lies the consciousness of universal human values. Religion heightens this consciousness, for it teaches us to view our fellow men, not as fleeting items in the order of nature, but as immortal children of God. The practice of prayer compels us to see our fellow men from God's point of view and thus it lifts us above our prejudices and antagonisms into the atmosphere of appreciation and sacrificial service. And on the part of all toilers for the common good, there is the tacit assumption that we live in a universe where love cannot labor in vain because it is a universe which has love at its heart. The first of all the commandments is love to God, for it underlies the estimate we place upon our neighbor and the willingness with which we devote ourselves to his welfare.

CHAPTER IX

THE SOUL AND SOCIETY

THE two indispensable and inseparable aspects of human life are the individual and society. The individual is each of us; society is all of us. Obviously, neither is possible without the other. There can be no society which is not composed of individuals; and there can be no individual who does not derive his life from society and realize his possibilities in it. If, however, we must affirm a primacy of value, it must be accorded to the individual as a personality. In personalities alone, spiritual qualities reside; apart from personalities, society is an empty abstraction. If the individual man is called upon to sacrifice his life for the social group, he does it for the sake of the persons who now and in days to come constitute the group, and not for a shadowy entity called society. It is society which is instrumental and personality which is ultimate. Society is our name for individuals acting socially.¹

The claim has been made for society that it is itself a personality. It is asserted that every human group, whether Alma Mater or the Church Universal, the Labor Union or the Boarding Club, may properly be denominated a person. Does not every group possess a collective mind, consciousness, will? Does not society give us birth, discipline us, forgive us, and immortalize us by conserving in itself the good we have done? Do we not sing praises to it, offer petitions to it, give

our loyalty to it with the spirit of religious devotion? "For me," wrote Josiah Royce, near the close of his life, "at present, a genuinely and loyally united community which lives a coherent life, is, in a perfect literal sense, a person."² And his thesis in this particular is almost justified by the beautiful name, "The Beloved Community," which he gave to the divine society.

Manifestly, here as elsewhere, everything depends on definition. Society is a form of integration of mind, which has many instructive parallels to the individual personality. But it is not, as Ralph B. Perry tells us, the specific mode of integration or unity which constitutes a person. In the case of a person, there is the direct integration of acts of a single agent operating through the continuities of one neural system, whereas societies must operate "indirectly through their objects."³ Our relation to the group lacks the intimacy and the individual response which characterize our fellowship with persons.

This fact is vital with reference to all efforts to substitute society, as a supposed personality, in the place of the personal God, as the object of religious devotion. We can offer remonstrances or petitions to the constituted authorities of the group, or make a general appeal to its members, but the corporate response is personal only as the voice of the personalities who form the group. The prayer of the secret place, the inner chamber where the soul communes with God alone, is not possible with the Socius of humanism. To offer prayer in such a place to the Spirit of the Group, would eventuate in the sense of futility which we feel after talking over a telephone when we learn that there is no one at the other end of the line. In

an accommodated sense, we speak of a corporation as legally a person, but the general extension of the term to all social groupings would abolish exactitude in language and reduce our thinking to confusion. The elevation of all manner of societies to the dignity of persons tends to the cultivation of false loyalties which make of such bodies as the state or the church ends in themselves rather than means, loved and cherished, for the good of real personalities.

A new sense of the supremacy of the individual person over the groupings through which he operates must come to us else social effort will lack adequate objectives. The solitariness of personality is quite as much a fact as its sociality. In our recognition of the gregarious instincts we have overlooked those instincts which make for independence. "The hell of the barracks" is the lack of solitude in which a man can possess his soul. It was the genial Sir Walter Scott who said, "If the question was eternal company, without the power of retiring within yourself, I should say, 'Turnkey, lock the cell!'" "We are islands in the midst of seas which both separate and unite us. We have power to react against society, to criticize and to reform it. Social progress depends on strong personalities who refuse to be dominated by contemporary society but who shape it nearer their hearts' desire. The paradox is, therefore, true, that an other-worldly religion, which knows how to abandon the world and even to despise it, is our major social force through the personalities which it produces.

Having said these things, in order to free ourselves from the current overemphasis upon the social to the neglect of the individual aspects of life, we recognize at the full the formative power of society. A parental

society gave us our beings. Our earliest activities were due to instinctive drives in our own natures but social imitation soon played a large part. Various forms of social control curbed and directed our energies. It is difficult to conceive the fate of a human being separated from all society in infancy and forced to live in solitude. Helen Keller, at nineteen months, lost her sight and hearing, but she had already acquired much. Virtually separated from her kind, when Anne Sullivan came to teach her the manual alphabet at the age of eight, and to put her in touch with the riches of human culture, Helen Keller, according to her teacher, was "the little savage."⁵ The group shares with us its garnered experience and thus calls out and builds up our selfhood. It conforms us to its will through the approbation which we love, the censure which we dread. Woe to the non-conformist in days when the social group depended for survival upon its own coherence! The stability and complexity of modern society affords larger room for individualism, yet our lives are very largely shaped by the social institutions in which we are reared.

The task before social Christianity is an appraisal of our various organizational agencies in relation to the personalities they produce, and a reshaping of these agencies so that they may be more truly ministrant to ideal personal values. The test once applied to the institution of the sabbath is applicable to all of them—they are made for man. If they perform satisfactory instrumental service, let them stand as they are; otherwise, let them undergo necessary modifications. Our human institutions are many in number and they represent in large part permanent human interests. Of special importance to us are the family,

the state, the economic order, the school, and the church.

1. *The family.* The basic social group is the family. At the first, it was society in its entirety—state, church, and all else. It is still true, that if our other social institutions were to vanish, we could replace them out of the social vitalities of the family, but if the family breaks down, there is no basis of social reconstruction. The rise of sex in the course of evolution meant a new social background to life. And nature's device of leaving certain brain centers undeveloped in the new-born human offspring, and the prolongation of the period of helpless infancy and of plastic adolescence, placed upon parents inescapable obligations and opportunities. There within the home are the most intimate human relationships and the supreme formative moral forces. The most important fact for society is the family life in which personalities receive their earliest training. The family gives us the vocabulary of our social idealisms—we toil and hope for the day of human "brotherhood." We seek to family-ize our general human relations. There are, however, higher and lower forms of family life. The standard of appraisal here, as in all other fields of interest, is personality. We can find our way among the conflicting ideas in our time concerning this fundamental institution only in the light of the type of persons which it produces.

It is instructive to consider the biological basis of the family in the lower orders of life. At the bottom of the scale, we find the rotifer leaving pieces of itself to grow up as its successors. The fish spawn by the million and leave their offspring to care for themselves. In general, the introduction of sex into the evolution-

ary process brings care of the young by the parents and some form of family life. Among certain ants and bees, propagation is delegated to one female and one male, all other members of the community are destroyed or made neuters. The community as a whole rears the offspring, a procedure advocated by extreme socialists for human imitation. The herd of cattle with a male at the head is a polygamous group. Monogamy obtains for life among the eagles; it is found among the lions also, during the period of reproduction, according to some authorities. The conditions of life, as they increasingly define themselves on the higher levels of organic evolution, point toward monogamy. "The monogamous family," says H. S. Jennings, "with lifelong union of the mates appears as the final term in a long evolutionary process." *

History tells that human beings have always lived together as families. There is no adequate evidence of original promiscuity. All savage peoples possess marriage in one form or another, and the deeper the social consciousness becomes, the larger the significance attached to marriage. The logic of human conditions makes lifelong monogamous union the normal relationship. The long period of immaturity of a human child, when it needs both maternal and paternal care, the conservation of social peace through avoidance of continual strife for mates, the growth of sentimental ties too sacred to be arbitrarily broken, all point in the direction of permanent union.

The earliest human family seems to have been matriarchal, that is, the wife remained with her people and her husband clave to her and to the children. It is the patriarchal type of family, however, which holds the front of the stage through the historical period

down to modern times. Here we have the rule of the father, tempered by custom and by law, but absolute within its limits over wife and children. One of the incidents of the patriarchal family is polygamy, a practice usually limited to a few possessors of power and wealth. The Roman matron, however, had no rival and it was the boast of the Republic that for five hundred years there was no divorce.

Christianity, in its task of fashioning the family in accordance with its own personalistic genius, found itself in the course of its history in possession of elements derived from Jews, Greeks, Romans and Germans. The Jewish home had a large measure of democracy and this fact helps to explain the vitality and greatness of the Jewish people. The constructive idea with which Christianity has molded the home is the worth of personality, not in the father alone, but in mother and children. Jesus consistently treated woman as a person, whether in his protest against a divorce law which gave her no protection, or in his insistence, when they brought the adulteress into his presence, upon a single standard of purity for both men and women. Paul laid down the principle of the absolute equality of the sexes, although some of his precepts are in apparent conflict with it. To-day we have the Christian ideal in its Catholic and in its Protestant forms. To the Catholic, marriage is a sacrament and is indissoluble, yet celibacy possesses a higher sanctity than does the married state.⁷ The latter opinion is an echo of the dualistic view of the world which regards the material order and sex as unfriendly to spirituality. Protestantism, on the other hand, believes in the permissibility of divorce on adequate grounds and in the equal or superior sanctity

of the married life, as compared with celibacy. The Christian home, as we know it at its best to-day, is a distinctive social fact and the finest flower of the Christian faith. Its cohesive principle is respect for personality, which expresses itself in obedience to the common good, in the spirit of comradeship, and in the development of all possible cultural resources.

In the realization of personal values in the home, Christianity has pledged itself to the ideal of monogamy. This ideal has been attacked from many quarters. Marxian socialism, resentful of woman's economic dependence, called for the destruction of the family as we have it to-day. The self-expressionists hold to monogamy, especially where children are involved; episodes, however, are not only excusable but desirable. On every hand is recognition of the vast importance of sex in human life, a recognition often carried to obsessionist extremes. Sex represents the principle of creativity in life, its sublimation gives us the loftiest achievements of the human spirit. In the case of man, it is never mere physical fact, but is invested with psychical and spiritual meanings. There is no reason to believe that the lower animals, incapable as they are of thinking in concepts, understand how sex is related to offspring. Man, however, is more than animal; there are personal and social values which he must conserve or he falls below the level of the human.

No truer words with reference to sex were ever spoken than these words in the book of Genesis, concerning man and wife, "They shall be one flesh." There is, through sex, a certain merging of lives and it logically follows that casual relations result in disruption and dissipation of personality. Promiscuity

in every form, whether polygamy, concubinage, or episodal free love, tends away from the sublimation of sex and toward a low grade human society, whereas monogamy represents the wholesome *via media*. William McDougall properly answers the ultra-feminists that when our sex energy is no longer sublimated to work on planes higher than the animal plane of sportiveness, "we shall lack one of the great forces of personality, the force which more than any other produces great art, great literature and great lives."

The personality of woman has been the neglected factor in many societies. In ancient Rome, to say nothing of modern states until recent days, woman was not in the full legal sense a "person," a disability she shared with children, idiots and criminals. In England, even in Blackstone's day, the law merged her, property and all, into her husband; and he was, moreover, permitted to give her "moderate correction." The status of woman is a fair measure of civilization, and in truly modern states she possesses equal personality with her husband. Her distinctive kingdom is still the home, but the water supply no longer comes from a well in the yard but from distant reservoirs and conduits controlled by political officeholders, and to protect her distinctive interest, woman has the ballot. Nor is she acquired by her husband, as in former days, by purchase or capture; as a personal being, she now consents—or chooses. In America, we are committed to freedom of choice in matrimony on the part of young people, whereas in many lands parents have selected mates for their children. A satisfactory solution of the problem, from the point of view of personality, will give to young people the control of their destinies

in this particular, but will assist and guide their immature judgments with parental counsel.

The child is the central figure in the Christian home. Manifestly, he begins with undeveloped powers and only gradually achieves full personality. He is, therefore, properly under tutelage, guidance and authority. As a personality actual and potential, he has rights of opportunity, protection and comradeship. The normal marriage eventuates in children, but the true idea of marriage is sacramental and not merely procreative. It is type of the union of the soul and God. Husband and wife exist for each other, as well as for the children, and this truth has important bearing upon problems of population in relation to natural resources and cultural opportunities. The presence of children in adequate numbers constitutes a home in the fullest sense and, in the case of married persons properly fitted, is the fulfillment of sacred social obligations. Children call forth parental tenderness, patience, toil, and do quite as much for parents as parents do for them. The common task of rearing children until maturity, as demanded by general and vocational education, requires the monogamous home. The reply to the contention of the feminist, that every woman, married or unmarried, has "the right to be a mother," is that every child has a right to have a father, as well as a mother. A child reared under full paternal, as well as maternal guidance, develops the most complete and effective personality.

Society has a profound stake in types of family life. Through the state, therefore, it exercises a measure of control over the family in order to protect the rights of all concerned. The monogamous family tends toward social peace. The Old Testament nar-

ratives are sufficient revelation of the strife engendered when competitive wives are at work. The historical argument is on the side of the Christian ideal of the family, for the groups which cherish it evidently possess superior survival power and are now dominating the world. We must recognize that the ideal is not always attainable in an unideal world. Conditions arise which negate the meaning of marriage and then separation or divorce may be inevitable. In determining the rules governing such cases, we must be guided by the principle of human welfare, alike for the persons most intimately concerned and for society in general. Certainly, we can never build permanent marriages on a temporary companionate psychology of impermanence. However difficult the realization, the ideal which we must seek to attain is one man, one woman, till death parts them.

2. *The state.* The inclusive social organization is the state. At the first, the family itself was the state, for it performed all the needful political functions. It protected its members in their intra-family rights and, also, from external foes; it was the instrument for carrying forward the activities involved in the satisfaction of temporal and cultural needs; and it exacted loyal obedience to customs and service to the common life. As population increased, the father of the original family found himself at the head of a clan. The next political unit was the tribe, organized as a rule along patriarchal lines. Under pressure of external peril, through various forms of conquest or voluntary coöperation, tribes merged into nations. And to-day we see nations struggling to express themselves as a universal human community.

The task of the modern state is the regulation of

the common life, particularly on its temporal side. Religion was once the function of the state; in the Levitical code there is no distinction between civil and ecclesiastical duties. Among primitive peoples, the god was head of the tribe and apostasy was treason, a fact which throws light upon the penalty of death visited in centuries past upon heretics. The modern state has learned to relegate distinctively religious matters to the group within the state interested in them, and to concern itself only with religious beliefs in their relation to public morality. We still hear echoes of the supremacy of the church over the state but they are growing ever more faint. The state assures to its citizens the right and opportunity to carry on their legitimate activities. The "policeman" theory of the state, however, is very inadequate, for the state performs invaluable positive functions as the instrument for common tasks, such as providing for water supply and public schools. One criterion alone defines and measures its responsibilities—the welfare of its citizens, the culture of personalities.

In the discharge of its functions, the state has assumed forms monarchical, oligarchical, and democratic. The one, the few and the many, however, have so intertwined their activities, that the state, whatever the formal seat of authority, has many patterns.

For forms of government, let fools contest,
Whate'er is best administer'd is best.

Alexander Pope's political dictum, in his *Essay on Man*, does not carry us far into the philosophy of the state. Public order and the efficient discharge of public business are invaluable considerations, but

they may be secured through a despotism which does little to lift a people out of political infantilism into self-reliant manhood. There can be but one adequate test with respect to competitive forms of government: that government is best which produces the best men. And by best men, we mean not simply well-behaved manikins, but men whose intellects, wills and emotions have received the highest development. Measured by this test, democracy presents the loftiest possibilities. It may not be an ideal immediately attainable, but self-government is an educative process in the discernment and application of political principles, in self-restraint, coöperation, initiative, mutual respect, and thus it tends to produce strong and fully developed men.

To-day, there is widespread reaction against democracy. The roseate hopes of eighteenth-century proponents of popular rule have fallen far short of realization and their political theories are in the crucible. In Italy, Mussolini abolishes democratic institutions with words of scorn as he establishes a virtual dictatorship sustained by a Fascist Grand Council patterned after the papal College of Cardinals. The millions of Russia are under the control of a dictatorship of the Communists who are pledged to work toward genuine democracy on Soviet lines. In our country, popular writers do not hesitate to say that democracy a century hence will have been relegated to the museum of political antiquities. The anti-democratic sentiments of our day are in part due to the troubled conditions which accompanied and followed the World War, and in part to the undoubted weakness of much of the democracy which we see in operation to-day.

History is eloquent, however, with the failure of despotisms, as in the cases of Bourbon France and Roman-off Russia. On the whole, the democratic states in the modern world are better justified by their fruitage of social well-being than are the despotic states. And by their very nature, they are politically and morally educative.

The unassailable truth in monarchical and oligarchical theories of the state is the need of leadership. Wherever there is group action, a leader is necessary. The fact is apparent even among the lower animals. At the apex of the wedge of wild geese in migration, there is a leader. Even more imperative is leadership where action is not simply instinctive, but involves the enlistment and coördination of free intelligences. Democracy cannot dispense with leaders, it is in fact a device for discovering them. Talent, as native ability, as the researches of Galton with respect to genius showed, is distributed among all social classes, although the eugenic law, by which like marries like, tends toward strains of super-ability along various lines. What is needed is equality of educational and political opportunity, whereby executive ability, wherever existent, can make its way to the places of power.

Nothing is more fallacious than the idea that any citizen is as good as any other citizen and is, therefore, competent to discharge the duties of any political office whatsoever. Unless there is intelligence and moral character in office, democracy is doomed to disaster. The chief foes of democracy are the demagogues whom Tennyson aptly described:

Unfurnished brows, tempestuous tongues,
Expecting all things in an hour,
Brass mouths and iron lungs.^o

And the chief problem of democracy is an electorate intelligent enough to repudiate incompetent men and to select trustworthy leaders.

There was epochal importance in the discovery of the representative principle in democracy. The ancient democracies were mass meetings and were possible only with limited populations. We avail ourselves of the merits of oligarchy when we rule through well-chosen representatives, and we are democrats when we empower them and exact full responsibility from them. The salvation of democracy lies in the selection of relatively few leaders, for the people are confused by long ballots, and in the retention of ultimate authority by the people by means of recall, initiative and referendum. These measures should be used, however, only under conditions which make them the instruments of a virtual revolution. The city managership plan shows the direction in which democracy is working out its destiny; through competent administrators it will achieve its eventual triumphs. Its success depends upon intelligent and coöperative personalities, and where these are lacking, even lower types of government may play a necessary educational rôle in preparation for a better day. In general, however, peoples, like individuals, have a right to make their own mistakes and to learn from them and thus to attain political maturity.

The instrumental character of the state is a truth which guards against ultra-nationalism and assures the coöperation of a nation with other nations in common world tasks. Patriotism is a noble virtue and every citizen is doubtless duty bound to love his country whole-heartedly, but he must love it in the light of its ideal possibilities and not merely in the light of

its imperfect actualities. The idolatry which makes the state an end in itself has been the source of untold harm. Among other evils, it has sanctified war as a necessary instrument of national aggrandizement.

Akin to narrow nationalism is egotistic racialism. There is no reason to believe that the white races have superior innate ability over the various colored races. Their present advanced position is a very recent historical achievement and may not continue for many generations. The skins of men differ in color but all blood is red. Man as man, everywhere, deserves respect, fair treatment and equal opportunity. Already, modern means of communication have created a unitary world life. Each nation will realize its true destiny as it fulfills its duties in the universal human community. And if life is correspondence to environment, and has therein its measure, then the man who is cosmopolitan in his sympathies and activities has a richness of personality to which the narrow nationalist and the tribal zealot are strangers. The pledges made in the Pact of Paris, wherein the nations outlaw war, and the activities of the League of Nations are indications that a new day in human relations has already begun.

3. *The economic order.* A worthy civilization must rest on adequate material foundations. A Chinese statesman in pre-Confucian days declared, "When food and clothing are sufficiently provided for, honor and disgrace can be distinguished; and when granaries are full, the people will know good manners."¹⁰ One is not committed to the thoroughgoing economic interpretation of history, when he recognizes the truth of the apostolic statement that the natural precedes the spiritual. There are constant and insistent bodily

needs which must be met in order for men to live at all. In numberless ways, material things are the instruments of all human culture. One of the chief causes of the collapse of the Roman empire was the exhaustion of the soil. To-day, modern methods of agriculture not only assure the continued productivity of the soil, but enable an ever smaller percentage of the people to supply sufficient food for our tables and raw materials for our industries, thus freeing a vast store of human energy for other tasks in our rich and complex civilization.

The economic order is far more than machinery to produce things, it is a school of character. In making a living, a man makes a life. The measure and mold of spirituality is the way we make and spend money. In the primitive group, there is always the coöperative activity of members of a family household and the consequent socializing of its members. Slavery left its impress on both master and servant. In feudalism also, where men were virtually bound to the soil, we see a resultant type of character. And now we live in the era of capitalism with all the excellencies and defects wherewith it stamps us. At its worst, it gives us stunted lives; at its best, it gives us strong, highly developed persons.¹¹ And it is in the realm of personality where our final assessments are made. We must appraise our present economic order in the light of personal values and shape our way accordingly. Our problem has a twofold aspect—production and distribution.

The resources of nature, given by the Creator for the use of all his children, are the first factor in the production of wealth. In discovering and utilizing these resources by labor, man ministers to his own

needs and the needs of his fellow men. These resources are so vast, as increasingly disclosed by modern science, that they have set at naught thus far the Malthusian nightmare of a population outrunning the means of sustenance. In the early clan, the sources of wealth in flocks and land were held in common. With the growth of individualism, there came a larger degree of private property. The right of eminent domain and much else, however, are proof that society regards private ownership of the resources of nature as subject to the public good. Wealth is a social product and as such is under social control. This fact is especially apparent when a people are under the exigencies of war.

The wisdom of social approval of private ownership of wealth is obvious. When a man cuts a hickory branch into a bow, he has so put himself into the bow—his time, strength, intelligence, purpose—that the bow is an extension of his personality. His right of ownership is his right to himself. Modern life has become so complex, there are so many social factors in the production of a yard of cloth, for instance, that it is difficult to estimate the rights of particular persons in it, but the principle still holds, the right to property is the right to a larger selfhood, to freedom and power. There is in this fact, however, no justification for anyone to appropriate through strength or cunning the output of the toil of other lives. What we call "capital" is accumulated social wealth. It is generally transmitted from generation to generation by inheritance, although the imposition of inheritance taxes by modern states is the assertion that rights of inheritance are not absolute but relative. A sacredness attaches to wealth as the extension of personality.

He who wastes money spills blood, for money is minted manhood, portable personality. The only filth upon lucre comes off our fingers, for money, as the measure of wealth and the instrument of exchange, is as holy as the sweat and tears, the heartbeats and the consciences, of human beings.

The goal toward which we toil is a more complete democratization of the processes of production. Capital, as an indispensable aid to production upon the higher levels of industry, is not an evil but a good. The basic fallacy of Karl Marx, which vitiates practically all his conclusions, is that capital is acquisitive and not productive. When a capitalist puts a dollar into a business and derives profit from his investment, it does not follow that he impoverishes others, so that the rich grow richer and the poor poorer; if the undertaking has been justly conducted, all connected with it are made richer. What is needed is a wider distribution of capital until one and the same man everywhere is both laborer and capitalist. And this is precisely what is taking place on a vast scale in America, where working men, in an unprecedented way, are buying shares in the business enterprises with which they are connected. When men gain a more direct and vital interest in productive activities, as well as a voice with regard to the conditions under which they labor, we may look for the larger joy which properly inheres in all creative toil.

The chief problem in the personalizing of modern industry relates to the distribution of the wealth created by capital and labor working upon the resources of nature. Capitalism has proved itself a marvelous producer of wealth, far exceeding earlier economic systems. Its appeal to initiative and effort has been very

strong. Public ownership of certain utilities seems wise, but as a whole the most effective economic system would seem to be private ownership with social control. There is, however, vast inequality in the distribution of wealth as a social output. Over ninety-five per cent of the income-producing property of the United States is in the possession of a tenth of the people. There is excessive expenditure on the part of the few and bitter want on the part of a submerged group. It is plainly immoral to live in idleness, at whatever end of the social scale, for such parasitism puts undue burdens upon all who toil, whether with hands or brains.

The foremost moral battlefield of our time is the economic order. Whether in state or church, democratic control rests upon wide distribution of economic power. Competition has its place in life, but it is subordinate to coöperation. The emphasis in business must shift from acquisition to service. We believe that it is doing so. Far-sighted men of affairs recognize that only the business enterprises built to serve the public have any assurance of permanence and even of gain. The practicability of the basic principles of the Sermon on the Mount, as a creed for business and for the social order as a whole, is accepted among truly modern-minded men. The new economic order, embodying more fully the spirit of Christ, will be machinery whose noblest product will be socialized personalities.

4. *The school.* We live in a time of unparalleled emphasis upon education. In practically every nation, whether in Occident or Orient, it has come to pass that the chief hope of the people is in education. The developments of science have put practical motives

behind the quest for knowledge and its technical applications. The World War awakened peoples everywhere to an appreciation of the relation between efficiency and education. Our colleges are overwhelmed with students. No doubt, education cultural and vocational is good for everybody, but it must be adjusted to personal capacities and needs. The leaders of society have learned that vast social changes do not require long periods of time. They can take place in a brief period, if we can control educational processes in the plastic years. "O, you blind leaders who seek to convert the world by laborious disputations!" cried Benjamin Kidd. "Step out of the way or the world must fling you aside. Give us the young. Give us the young and we will create a new mind and a new earth in a single generation." ¹² The discovery of the wide social significance of education is not new, for ecclesiastics and statesmen have appreciated the fact for long ages and have used it for purposes sinister as well as noble. But what is new is the measure of democratic idealism with which the present educational program is interfused.

In its largest sense, education is the symmetrical development of the whole personality. Human experience is a many-sided reality and is adapted to the evocation of our powers. Life itself is educative and its graduates acquire at least a few degrees of wisdom. The educational values of the human life-process are apparent when we consider that the ripest fruit of culture is ability to evaluate rightly a practical situation, to see the essential consideration when a problem confronts us. Education among primitive peoples is a process of daily experience, when the child learns, under the tutelage of its elders, to perform the tasks

of the household, of the chase, or of the soil, and listens to their wisdom about the world in general. When life becomes complex and the sum of knowledge vast, the artificial method of the schools becomes necessary. To-day we have educational systems as a specialized social interest. They abundantly justify themselves, despite their limitations, by the service which they render and they are destined to occupy a yet larger place in the life of the community.

The scope of education relates to the whole personality and not merely to a part of it. The personalization of education means the displacement of the three R's of colonial America, reading, 'riting, and 'rithmetic, with the three H's of twentieth century America, head, heart, and hand. The physical basis of life must receive attention, for a beautiful arrow profits little if there is no strength in the bow. Hitherto, the chief emphasis has been put on intellectual training. Such training tends toward rational conduct yet nothing is more certain than the fact that a rascal trained is all the more perilous to society. The training of the emotions in their evaluations and of the will in loyalty to clearly taught principles is an essential, and indeed the paramount, part of education. We must concede that training in character is much like the pursuit of happiness, it cannot be directly sought without self-defeat. Character is a by-product of the faithful performance of intellectual and moral duties. And in all our schoolrooms, the personalities of the teachers are quite as important as the textbooks.

The most generally neglected area in education is the religious side of personality. The essential religious attitude is reverence and reverence finds its highest expression in the recognition of the invisible and

eternal God. Apart from a sense of the sacred, no values in life are safe, whether childhood or womanhood, the home or the state. Even our intellectual powers cannot rise to their highest without the emancipations and insights which come through worship, as the response of the disengaged mind to God speaking through our total environment. A great scientific generalization is born out of moods which are not far removed from the religious.

In earlier centuries, education was in charge of the representatives of religion. The curriculum of the Boston public schools in 1781 included the Bible, the Creed, the shorter catechism and Watt's hymns. The logical development of the principle of the separation of church and state has resulted in the exclusion of formal religious teaching from the public schools. Roman Catholics seek through a system of parochial schools to impart education in an atmosphere of religion. Protestants endeavor to supplement the work of the public schools with their Sunday schools and week-day schools. Religion, as reverence, is something caught from its possessors and cannot be merely taught. Nevertheless, there is knowledge which conduces to intelligent reverence and knowledge is something taught. The Protestant way seems to accord best with the cohesiveness of the entire population in a democracy, but it has not yet given religion its rightful place in education as a whole.

The nature of personality, as seen in its normal unfoldings, has a right to determine methods used in education. It is increasingly recognized that all real education is self-education. It must arouse creativity in the human soul or it becomes a process of stultification. The impartation of information is not an ade-

quate conception of education. Strassburg geese are fattened, willy nilly, by having food poured into their stomachs through tubes pushed down the esophagus. Students cannot be intellectually fattened in a similar way. Memory is an invaluable function of mind and a large store of accurate knowledge is an inestimable blessing; but in life outside the schoolrooms our marks are chiefly based on creative and executive power. The case method in law schools and the project method in elementary education show the direction of the educational stream in our time. Modern theological education does not seek to impose upon the mind by authoritarian methods a divinely given and changeless creed, but to lead the mind through its study of the spiritual order into its own discovery of the eternal realities of religion. By this method, truth becomes a personal possession and can be spoken with spiritual authority.

Both in pupil and in teacher personality is the central fact in education. A famous teacher denied that he was teaching Latin, he was teaching boys. Subjects taught are instruments; characters enlightened and empowered are final objectives. It is charged against preachers, as public teachers of religion, that they are too frequently more concerned with the elucidation of themes rather than with the upbuilding of persons. The whole history of education proves that the personality of a teacher is the primary fact in his work. His vitality, accuracy, conscientiousness, idealism, awaken the dormant creative power of his students. The spirit which merely denies is a moral blight and dullness is an unpardonable sin. A Mark Hopkins on one end of the log and a James A. Garfield on the other are still a university, although it is wholly

desirable to replace the log with laboratories and libraries. And the final test of our educational systems is their ability to produce men and women who perform their tasks efficiently in the modern social structure and who live abundantly in all the wide range of their personal powers.

5. *The church.* The religious aspect of social life finds its expression in the church. The original church was the family and the father was priest and prophet. In the early Old Testament narratives, we see a large freedom with respect to a valid offering of sacrifice. Every religion, however, has learned that it can be an effective force in the life of a community only as its interests are entrusted to a special class of men, whether American Indian medicine men, Jewish Levitical priesthood, or Roman Catholic hierarchy. The god of the tribe was the focal point in its political unity, devotion to him was the test of loyalty. His favor and wrath were the supreme sanction behind the tribal customs. On the higher levels of religion, fellowship is still the central fact. The modern emphasis upon the social nature of personality has given us a new appreciation of the importance and permanence of the church. To the degree that the church serves personal values will it fulfill its function in the modern world.

The membership of the church ideally consists of the personalities who desire its ministry to their own lives and who are in sympathy with its plans of service to humanity. In primitive times, the whole human group was the church. Even to-day, a man is born into the Hindu religion as a national religion, just as an American child is born into American citizenship. With the growth of individualism and the deepening sense of the autonomy of personality, the church came

to consist of the people within the state who voluntarily chose its fellowship. This was the case with the Mystery religions in the Græco-Roman world and with the early Christian church. When Christianity became a state religion, however, the entire population was included in its membership through the instrumentality of infant baptism universally administered.

The era of modern individualism has given us ecclesiastical groups within the general community with whom church membership is self-chosen. In every type of state Christianity, it was, of course, true that a service of confirmation for adolescents represented the personal ratification of what had been done for them by the community. The effort to make the family the unit within the church expresses a noble ideal, but the personalistic genius of Christianity tends toward the primacy of the individual person, with utilization of the family as an indispensable aid. As an instrument for the establishment of the Kingdom of God, the church has no value if it merely reflects current standards. It must stand on higher ground if it would draw society up to new levels.

The task of the church is worship, fellowship, instruction and service. The first, basic, essential, eternal business of the church is the worship of God and, through worship, the cultivation of the spirit of reverence. It is frequently asserted that the church, which once had charge of education and charity and even dominated the state, is being progressively eliminated from modern life. What is actually taking place is specialization of function, and with the clear apprehension of its distinctive task, the church is but entering upon its real era of power. The great days of the church are ahead, for through the spirit of reverence

engendered in worship, it must permeate and mold the whole range of human activities.

The church, furthermore, is a center of fellowship. By an inevitable spiritual gravitation, persons with common needs, interests and hopes get together. There is a special consciousness of the holy, where even two or three are met in the divine name, for the aspiration of each is reënforced by the aspirations of all. The highest reward of church attendance lies not in music or in sermon but in sitting with kindred spirits in the presence of God. The church has a special duty to instruct the people in the truths of religion and morality, for formal religion, at least, is excluded from public schools. The diffusive influence of the messages of thousands of churches, week by week, constitutes a leaven throughout society of incalculable value in lifting the levels of public opinion, in disciplining the public conscience and in making the ideas of the Christian gospel regnant in human society. There are always forms of service, philanthropic, recreational, educational, social, which the church can render the community, in accordance with its special needs.

Like every social group, the church requires leadership and this leadership it finds in the ministry or clergy. In the Christian minister, there is fusion of priest and prophet. The priest represents man's approach to God and God's approach to man, particularly through sacramental acts, as well as through spiritual oversight. The prophet performs a similar function but distinctively through moral personality and religious message. The priest is the central figure in the Catholic faith; the prophet, in Protestantism. In both communions, no doubt, the clergy perform both priestly and prophetic offices, the difference lies

in emphasis. And all forms of Christianity demand goodness of their official representatives, and none of them have a monopoly of holiness and love. According to the sacramental theory, which teaches that there is an inward efficacy in the sacraments (*ex opere operato*, "by the act performed"), personal character in the officiant is necessary to a "worthy" but not to a "valid" performance of the rite.¹³ By a similar logic, of course, the truth in a Protestant sermon is not invalidated by moral faults in the preacher, although the influence it exerts is greatly compromised. It is easier, in every branch of Christianity, to rely upon ecclesiastical status and ritual performance, than to make moral personality the channel of divine blessing, and history shows that human nature is often prone to substitute the mechanical for the truly spiritual.

Historical continuities which, after all, exist in all kinds of Christianity in spiritual if not in tactual forms, and the sanction of a world-wide fellowship are impressive; but Christianity could never have made a beginning in the world, if these had primary importance. There is no magical power in the imposition of hands. To suppose that historical succession or apostolic ordination confers power to effect inward moral change in unconscious infants, through a formula and a rite, or to transform bread and wine into the veritable body and blood of the Savior, is to descend into the realm of the impersonal. In a spiritual Christianity, amply illustrated in both Catholic and Protestant piety, the one valid sacrament, giving value to all ritualistic media, is moral personality.

A similar personalistic test must be applied to the organizational forms of the church. They present themselves to us to-day in bewildering variety, but the

basic patterns are three—episcopal, presbyterian, congregational. In germinal or developed form, all are in the New Testament. There is no reason to suppose that Jesus, or the first Christians, with their expectation of the imminent end of the world, elaborated an authoritative form of church government. The Christian fellowship expressed itself in available contemporaneous organizational forms and met practical situations as they arose with necessary changes. In Palestine, the synagogue system with its elders was followed; in the Greek world, the democratic guilds and voluntary religious fellowships. And growing up out of it all, as the pastors of churches in metropolitan centers assumed leadership over the other churches in their territories, we have at length the episcopal system. To-day, there is but one test as to a valid church government—that government is best which makes the best men. If it accords with the principles of Christian brotherhood and respects the rights of personalities, the religious body which does effectively the work which needs to be done is divinely ordained; it is inseparably part of the one, holy, apostolic—catholic—Church.

CHAPTER X

THE PERMANENCE OF SPIRITUAL VALUES

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, in his old age, wrote to the bishop of St. Asaph that he had seen through a long life a great deal of this world and that he had come to feel "a growing curiosity to be acquainted with some other."¹ The satisfaction of curiosity, in this particular, presupposes the survival of personality beyond death and its ability to make death an item of knowledge in its on-going experience. The believer in immortality has one advantage, at least, over the disputant who denies immortality, as men have often sagely declared. If death ends all, there can be no recognition of the fact by the debaters; whereas, if immortality proves to be true, the believer in it can say to his opponent, to their mutual satisfaction, "I told you so!"

With respect to realities in the future, we have "hope," rather than absolute mathematical assurance. This is quite as true in the field of science as it is in the field of religion. We are reasonably sure that the sun will rise to-morrow, but there is a theoretical possibility that stellar collisions may reduce our solar system into chaos. In fact, our assurance that the material realm itself will persist in orderly relations is simply our confidence in the integrity and self-consistency of the power which gives it being and sus-

tains it. Faith in immortality asks for no more secure foundation than an appreciation of the meaning of personality in God and in man. The reasonableness of our "hope," we believe, will be apparent if we note the inconclusive character of the hindrances to faith, the positive grounds of our confidence, and the worthy nature, however dimly discerned, of the world to come.

1. *Hindrances to belief in immortality.* There can be no doubt that many hindrances to faith in immortality have been operative in our time, especially in circles influenced by modern science. The eighteenth century with all its rationalism, generally held to the reality of life beyond the grave. In our day, the questionnaire of Leuba seems to show that a third of the scientists listed disbelieve in immortality, while another third merely concede its possibility.² Even within religious circles, the "humanists" discard the idea of survival of death. The causes of this decline of faith are all of them involved in our estimate of the place and value of personality. In the light of history, it can be said that belief in the continuance of existence of some kind beyond death seems normal to the mind of man. Perhaps a sufficient aid to faith is the removal of difficulties. When tropical forests are cut down, beautiful flowers often spring from the soil from seed dormant but suppressed.

The humble origin of belief in a life after death has troubled many minds. Herbert Spencer, as the first reason for the "strange and repugnant conclusion" to which he came that consciousness ends at death, spoke of the dreams of the savage and the idea of a wandering double which separates from the body and survives it, as source of belief in an after life.³ But must we not remind ourselves that science, also, which

many hail as the new Messiah who is to displace religion, had its beginnings in crude explanations? The idea that tears of immolated children, as imitative action, could produce rain, was quite as much science as it was religion, and the primitive practice no more discredits prayer than it does meteorology. Mere external origins cannot be confused with values in any sphere of human interest. Dreams were but one of the occasions through which man's inextinguishable sense of continuance found expression, a prelude to the ultimate faith in immortality which rests upon the consciousness of imperishable spiritual values.

Belief in human immortality has been shaken by modern discoveries of the magnitude of the universe. In the old compact astronomy, which placed the earth at the center of things, man seemed to have an importance which justified immortality. But now the earth has become a midge on the outskirts of the Milky Way, the satellite of a sun which is but one of a billion suns visible through the telescope. In the presence of this vast procession of worlds which have existed countless eons of time, man seems to shrivel into insignificance and his dreams of immortality to become a ludicrous arrogance.

Here we are compelled to place personal values in opposition to mere physical vastness. The spectroscope shows that the heavenly bodies are made out of the same materials as our planet. The pebble which I trample under foot could achieve no intrinsic greatness by being enlarged a trillionfold. Antares may be four hundred million miles in diameter but it remains a mere thing utterly inferior to personal being. In fact, the magnitude of the universe is something which man discovers and makes a mental possession. The

more vast the universe the higher the tribute to the mind that comprehends it. The illimitableness of space, the endlessness of time, are revelations of the infinite capacity of mind to relate things to one another. Like the writer of the eighth Psalm, therefore, we refuse to be astronomically intimidated and we continue to believe in the superiority of man over the material order. It is wholly appropriate that man should be immortal.

The dependence of consciousness upon the brain is another fact which makes it difficult for many in our time to believe in life after death. It appears that men have always assigned psychic significance to bodily organs, and have variously located the seat of the mind and the emotions. Readers of the Bible will recall the man whose kidneys instructed him and the exhortation to put on bowels of compassion.⁴ Even the most primitive man must have known that a blow on the head interrupted consciousness or ended it. Aristotle thought the brain was a gland to cool the blood, but Plato had discerned its real function. It remained for Galen in the second century after Christ to establish for all time the central importance of the brain in our intellectual processes. These facts show that the dependence of consciousness on the brain is no new truth in our day. What is new is the discovery of the intimacy of this dependence. Broca in 1861 located the seat of articulate speech in the third convolution of the left frontal lobe of the brain; injury there destroyed the power of speech. And when a man grows senile, is it not apparent that his mental powers decay with his bodily powers? The conclusion seems inevitable that the dissolution of the brain involves the extinction of personality.

This dismal conclusion, however, is in no wise necessitated by the facts. There is, no doubt, correlation of brain changes and mental processes, but the function of the brain may be transmissive rather than productive, as William James argued.⁵ If Broca's convolution is a center for articulate speech, it has been specially fitted for the task by the laborious linguistic efforts of its owner. It is even possible, if injury befalls the left lobe in youth, to shift to the right lobe. In short, a man must fashion his own brain and thus adapt it to the higher tasks of life. Brain is manifestly an instrument placed at the disposal of personality. The decisive consideration in the body-mind problem, to which all human experience attests, is the efficiency of consciousness; it gets things done. Evolutionists are fond of saying that mind enters the evolutionary process as a potent factor, but it cannot be mere product of the activity of matter and at the same time possess originative and controlling power over the material order.

As a matter of experience, here and now, mind is somehow coördinated to the nervous system, but that mind cannot exist apart from it is an assumption which science can neither prove nor disprove. The failure of mental power in old age may signify only the failure of its instrumentalities, but the violinist in himself is no less a fact when certain strings of the violin are broken. An unconscious man, whose brain is temporarily paralyzed by a blow, seems no longer to exist, yet personality in all its powers returns from somewhere to full activity. The somewhere is God in whose keeping personality is secure in accident, in sleep, and in death. It is wholly conceivable that personality can win its freedom from dependence on our

present nervous structure. The onward thrust of life may be able to cross the borderland of death and to fashion for itself a new instrument of expression in a higher realm of experience.

Belief in immortality has been obscured in our time, also, by a strong emphasis upon social salvation. Christianity has always been a social force yet for many centuries it has been largely an other-worldly religion. In its first days, the emphasis shifted from social "Kingdom of God" to individualistic "eternal life." Through long centuries, the present social order was not definitely within the Christian program. The ultimate objective of that program was the deliverance of souls from the perils of hell and their safe arrival in heaven. At last, the social awakening came and with it the discovery that social relationships, as well as individuals were included in the divine redemptive purpose. Thereupon interest in a heaven beyond death faded for many through their absorption in the task of social betterment. Belief in immortality was even characterized as a selfish personal concern. The only desirable immortality was social, the persistence of our influence in human society through all coming generations.

We have here another instance of a pendulum swinging from one extreme to another. Social salvation is wholly desirable, but it finds its dynamic in the worth of people as personalities. To deliver them over to death as mere incidents in a changing material order is such a denial of their ultimate value as to remove much of the incentive to sacrificial social effort. And the society which is supposed to conserve our contributions to it and thus to give us social immortality seems itself doomed to disappear from our planet.

Occasionally a philosopher bids us to be cheerful despite a catastrophe so distant in time, but optimism by fiat cannot gainsay astronomic facts. The consensus of scientific opinion is that the earth will become uninhabitable through the cooling of the sun, however many millions of years in the future.

The idea of social immortality clearly makes personality solely a means to social advance. Men in no generation exist in their own right but only for a posterity which itself ultimately vanishes. Thus in the name of a higher morality, the basic principle of all morality is violated—personality must always be an end in itself. If the desire for my own personal survival seems selfish, at all events I am wholly altruistic when I ask, Does God, with the bludgeon of death, destroy all my fellow men, even the noblest of them? It is not selfish to wish to live in order to do good, whether a year or a millennium. Social immortality can be realized only through the immortality of personalities.

The idea of "values," also, is frequently presented in a way which minimizes the survival of personality. Values lift us out of interest in calendars into an eternal world freed from the pettiness of our egotisms. The presentation of "eternal" life as a qualitative reality is supposed to free us from quantitative considerations of time and space. And yet we know that the philosophy which extinguishes personality within the time order is quite as truly in bondage to that order as the philosophy which makes life to consist of endless continuance in time. It does not appear how finite creatures can ever transcend a time order in experience, but within the framework of time we can achieve the values of goodness, beauty and truth. These values, however, are nowhere dissociable from

personalities as their bearers. The immortality of values is the immortality of the people in whom the values inhere.

2. *Grounds of hope in immortality.* Our glance over the obstacles to belief in life after death reveals none which are insurmountable. They are mountains of mist which disappear as we approach. There is, at least, an open road to faith. The issue must be decided in the light of the positive considerations favorable to immortality which can be adduced. We shall not discuss psychic phenomena which report messages from discarnate people now in the realm beyond death, for it seems to us that the most favorable verdict relative to them is the Scotch one—Not proven. Apparently, it is part of our personal education to be compelled to base our hope in immortality upon spiritual grounds. Our hope, indeed, rises out of the deeps of life, but if we are to keep it, we must see its coherence with the other accepted realities of our experience. The striking fact is that all arguments center about the idea of personality. Three considerations, in particular, merit attention: the character of God, the worth of man, and the fact of Jesus.

The base line in all religious thought is the idea of God. This is true because our whole conception of the structure and meaning of the world is involved. God is not merely one person among others, he is the source, support and goal of all things. If we conceive of the universe in terms of an impersonal naturalism, man as a spiritual being will find himself in an environment indifferent or hostile to him, rather than friendly. He is only an accident in it, an *ignis fatuus* whose momentary scintillation of intelligence only deepens the blackness of a world without mind and without

love. Such a world view is not soil out of which the hope of immortality can spring and flourish.

Our belief in the survival of death never stands apart from our general ideas, it is always an element in a larger philosophy of life. We accept it as true because it harmonizes with our deepest convictions concerning reality. The view of God as spiritual, purposive, loving, provides a climate in which belief in immortality is natural and even inevitable. History shows that God and immortality are correlates of each other. If the Hebrew prophets discover God in his moral grandeur as holy love, an appropriate conception of the future life springs up in due time. The essential fact in religion is trust in God. No doubt there are men truly religious who do not believe in life after death, but that is because they have permitted needless difficulties to obscure the implications of their faith in God. Emerson's interpolative phrase, in "Threnody," states the ground of all our hope for the continuance of personality with its values:

What is excellent,
As God lives, is permanent.

The character of God is the guarantee of human immortality. There are many aspects of God by which we seek to apprehend his illimitable greatness, and all of them are pledges of our victory over death—his wisdom, his righteousness, his love, and his power.

Wisdom means the choice of right objectives and of proper means for their attainment. To ascribe wisdom to God is to believe that he is possessor of purposive intelligence. If we deny purposiveness to God, we belittle him below the levels of our own life. The evidences of adaptation in the physical universe indicate

that the God who runs it knows how to select means to attain desired ends. The course of evolution, thus far at least, reveals purposive activity, an activity which culminates in man. God pursues a worthy spiritual objective—the creation of personalities in his own likeness. And having produced them with eonian and cosmic cost, are we to suppose that he utterly destroys them with the brutal stroke of death? An artist does not produce his masterpiece and then rip the canvas into shreds. Nor will God in his wisdom cast man, his supreme achievement, into the void.

The righteousness of God, also, is a ground of hope. We are sure that the power who speaks in the absolutes of conscience is himself righteous. God has implanted in our hearts the hope of endless life. It is no vagrant wish but an expectation valid in its universality and in its salutary effect upon life. To awaken in us such a hope and yet to make no provision for its fulfillment, would be an act of bad faith inconceivable in a just God. The belief in a moral order which will eventually deal exact justice to all has been a chief support of the idea of a future life. The idea of retribution has been tempered, however, by the idea of moral opportunity. That we may have a chance to become better, this, it seems to us, a God of righteousness will accord. The eternal years are necessary in order that vicarious love may overcome the evil we have done and make us what we ought to be.

In the love of God, lies our foremost confidence in immortality. The certainty of his love arises in part from the conviction that all the love we see in human life—a mother in a home or Christ on his cross—is revelation of the inmost heart of the world. The assurance of divine love has a still more intimate source

in our experience of fellowship with God. We can never set at naught the accent of love in the divine voice which speaks to us. The historic pathway to faith in a blessed life beyond the reach of death was experience of the goodness of God. The writer of the seventy-third Psalm, deeply perplexed by injustice in the world, reaches the high point in the Old Testament glimpses of immortality, as he wins the assurance in his friendship with God that death cannot part them. It is not the way of love to destroy its objects but to cherish them. If God declares himself the God of any man, then that man, capable of friendship with God, possesses in himself such values that he is inherently deathless. God will not take him up into fellowship with himself and afterward drop him into nothingness. This is the truth implied in the words of Jesus, "God is not God of the dead but of the living." ^a

And behind the wisdom, righteousness, and love of God, with their promises of immortality, stands the power of God. We are not making an appeal to irrational omnipotence, for it does not exist. Divine power is not at the service of absurdities or of contradictions. The preservation of spiritual values is something inherently reasonable and desirable and we are justified in pledging the power of God to its realization. One of the chief difficulties in the way of the idea of survival of death is the sheer inconceivableness of it. External appearances, attendant upon death, are all against the idea of victorious life. But every new thing is inconceivable until it happens. Prior to man's appearance upon our planet who, in the days of the dinosaurs, could have predicted or conceived it? After the event, all seems natural, possible, and inevitable. The

same power which gave us in this present life these wonderful bodies as the instruments of personality, is able to give us beyond death the means of personal expression in a higher order of experience. To think otherwise is to err, not knowing the power of God.

The assurance of immortality has its basis also in the worth of man. Here is something which lies within our immediate experience. If all arguments for immortality were reduced to one, it would doubtless be man's sense of his own innate value in contrast with the whole material order. The assumption that spiritual realities, such as reason and love, exceed visible things in value is nothing which can be proved to the man who insists upon denial. But they carry their own appraisals to normal minds everywhere. The self-estimate of value belongs distinctively to personality, for it alone is capable of self-appraisal because it alone, in the full sense, possesses self-consciousness. It is, therefore, no offensive conceit on man's part in the presence of his animal friends, when he declares that his worth as personal being is a pledge of his immortality.

Our lofty estimate of personality is justified, we have already argued, by man's place in the creative process, as well as by his innate worth. The final act of God in creation, according to the sublime poem in the first chapter of the Bible, was to make man in his own likeness. And modern theories of evolution give to man the same distinction. He is the last and highest product of the long cosmic process. Occasional voices bid us to expect a more-than-man in due time, but the logic of evolution is against them, for the endless task to which the creative energy has manifestly set itself is the development of man's mental and eth-

ical capacities. We shall have conceivably a higher man but not a higher than man. The arrest of physical evolution in man, enables nature to give her full attention to man's personal possibilities. Through countless ages, the Creative Will has toiled to produce man and even yet has only begun to perfect the potentialities in personality.

In the light of these facts, are we to believe that death frustrates the majestic plan, death which itself entered the evolutionary process as an aid to higher forms of life? If man ceases at death and the human race itself vanishes from our planet, then evolution has ended in a fiasco. In order to give rationality and continuity to evolution, we must declare that the reasonable next step in evolution is immortality. On the lower ranges of evolution, we see the emergence of creatures able to utilize ever wider ranges of environment. When we reach human levels, it is plain that social progress is simply a process in which mind becomes increasingly master of the material order. Our Western Christian civilization, with its machinery, is frequently indicted as materialistic. No doubt, it is necessary for us to be vigilant lest the servant of industrialism usurp authority over us, but it is far more "spiritual" to travel by railway train than to travel by oxcart, for the modern conveyance expresses in higher degree the subjugation of matter by human intelligence. Evolution, organic and social, is spirit winning dominion over matter. And the logical issue of the cosmic process is not the victory of the grave over personality but the utilization of death as gateway to immortality.

When we turn to the innate worth of personality, we find ground for the assurance of immortality. All

the noble powers of the human spirit justify the confidence that they belong to a sphere into which death cannot enter. The fact that man conceives the idea of life beyond death is a fact of vast significance. The power to think immortality is indication of a capacity for it. The ability to picture to one's self death as an experience which terminates life here, is an achievement of conceptual reason. There is no ground for believing that animals possess such ability, although some of the higher animals verge toward conceptual thought. Animals, therefore, do not live in fear of death; the idea of the end of individuality does not occur to them. The ability to conceive of death and of life beyond it is token of man's elevation from the animal to the distinctively human level of existence.

One of the strange paradoxes of man's power to think of death is the inconceivableness to his mind of death as affecting his real self. One may indulge himself in the abstract idea of annihilation, but when he tries to apply it to himself, there is an innate assertion of consciousness which transcends it. The best we can do is to imagine ourselves present at our own funerals, viewing, it may be, our silent form and observing the grief of the mourners who at last evince a proper appreciation of us. Even the idea of social immortality seems to involve ourselves as spectators of a society transformed in some measure by our service. We feel, like Gamaliel Bradford, with reference to the merging of our beings in God, that the picture is not complete unless we are present to enjoy the delicious sense of being "merged," which is not to be merged at all.⁷ This irrepressible sense of continuance, we may hope, is prophetic of the inability of death to destroy us.

The desire for immortality is another fact with which

we must reckon. Possibly, we should say the desire for continued life here, rather than a desire for what lies beyond this bourne of time. Historically, the great majority of men have so pictured the realm beyond death, that they have shrunk from it with utmost dread. Primitive peoples everywhere have thought of Sheol, Hades, as the dim abode of men who are mere shades of their earthly selves. Did not Achilles say that he preferred to be the slave of a penniless man than to possess the whole lower world? To the millions of India, death means reincarnation, possibly as an insect, and the extinction of being is the goal of religious striving because it brings to an end the round of deaths and rebirths. Evidently, the expectation of life after death is no mere product of wishful thinking. And yet if men may prescribe the conditions of existence, the desire for continued life is part of the very texture of the soul. No instinct in us is deeper than the instinct of self-preservation.

The love of life is normal to man, life can be lived successfully on no other basis. The prophets of the new naturalism tell us frankly that the finality of death is something to which we must learn to reconcile ourselves. The taste for annihilation, like that for olives, is an acquired one. Naturalism in its denial of continued life is something to which we must be "educated up"—or down. The progress of society and the increasing enrichment of the individual cannot be expected to make us acquiesce any more cheerfully in our obliteration; for the nobler the content of life, the more reluctant we shall be to part with it. Not a few disciples of naturalistic philosophy have acknowledged the dismay with which they look forward to personal extinction. Even the defiant attitude of the writer of

"A Free Man's Worship," is tempered these later years by wistful longing. "I believe that when I die I shall rot," says Bertrand Russell, "and nothing of my ego will survive. I am not young and I love life. But I should scorn to shiver with terror at the thought of annihilation." ^s Here is a wish for life, as well as the fallacious intimation that the hope of immortality has its basis simply in fear.

In the presence of the desire for life—endless life—we must ask if the universe which enkindled this desire has made no provision for its satisfaction. The basic assumption of science is the coherence, orderliness, rationality of the order of things in which we live. In such an order, there is provision for the satisfaction of legitimate desires. There is light for the eye, for light evoked the eye. Must we not believe that in an honest world, there is immortality with which to match the desire for life?

The incompleteness of personality at death, likewise, points to some sphere of self-realization beyond death. Every personality begins as a mere bundle of potentialities. Under the stimulus of our environment, we promptly start to unfold. With the dawn of self-consciousness, we begin to take possession of ourselves. Infancy, childhood, youth, manhood, old age all bring their opportunities but at the end of it all we feel that there are worlds of unrealized possibilities in us. This is emphatically true of those who die in youth and they constitute, alas, half the race. Even men who reach old age, and are aware of failing powers, believe that they have not lived out a fraction of their capabilities. Not only have we abilities unevoked but how numberless the tasks which need to be done.

Duty as "inherently endless," Miss Calkins truly as-

serts, requires the eternal years.* The moral helpfulness of belief in immortality, as we seek to fulfill the requirements of duty, is pragmatic sanction upon our faith. Though we are too prone to dogmatize concerning the animal consciousness, it seems to us that the lower creatures fulfill their careers here, and, therefore, do not require eternity for self-realization and self-expression. But man, as possessor of illimitable aspirations, needs immortality. And here, also, the postulate of a reasonable and self-consistent universe is pledge of a sphere in which the life of man can go onward to its completions.

The distinctive values in each personality constitute a special call for its continuance. There seems to be but one respect in which we are alike and that is, we are different. The God who has made no two leaves of the forest alike, delights in variety. The whole of things is rich and complex in proportion to the distinctiveness of its several parts. There is not one of us whom God can spare. Each individual is a unique value necessary to the completeness of the divine society. The process of life works toward distinctive personal qualities. We become not less ourselves, but more. The proper function of death, in the kind of world in which we live, is not the destruction of individuality but the accentuation of it. The truth in individuality signifies that immortality cannot consist in the merging of our personalities even into God. The genius of Christianity does not say, "I shall lose myself in God"; but it says, "I shall see God." In God, there as here, we live and move and have our being. When we speak, therefore of immortality in God, we think of it as an immortality in which God respects the priceless values of personality.

In appealing to the worth of personality as basis of our hope of immortality, it is necessary to make a distinction between worth potential and worth actual. One reason why we cannot espouse the idea of conditional immortality is because we believe in the potential value of the most hardened and desperate wrong-doer. If the inner sense of worth is a ground of personal assurance, it follows that there is a certain parallel between actual worth and personal hope. Cicero observed that the conviction of immortality is strongest in the most exalted souls. Many men testify that the insights of their best moments are on the side of immortality. Our appreciation of the worth of other lives, especially great and significant lives, makes immortality seem a reasonable hope. The soil out of which assurance normally springs is a personality enriched and ennobled by acquaintance with God. The best way to be sure of immortality is to live here and now the immortal life.

The third consideration which confirms our hope of life after death is the fact of Jesus. It is confirmatory in character rather than originative. Faith in survival of death was not something new which Jesus gave to the world. Men in all ages and lands have had some conception of a future life. It is said of Jesus that he brought life and immortality "to light" through the gospel. He made plain what had always been true, the passing of men through the portals of death into the blessedness and opportunity of God's kingdom beyond death. Jesus gave to the hope of immortality a deeper certainty and a nobler content. He rendered an immeasurable service from both the historical and the spiritual points of view.

The historical contribution of Jesus has reference to

his resurrection from the dead, as related in the New Testament. In the time of Jesus, belief in life after death was part of Pharisaic orthodoxy, such had been the vast and significant development of thought since the days of the great prophets of Israel. The belief that Jesus survived death, therefore, was no revolutionary thought to his disciples. We can understand their enthusiasm over the Easter tidings only as we enter into their expectations of a Kingdom of God. The resurrection and ascension signified to them that Jesus had broken the evil cosmic power of death, had emerged from Sheol, and had passed into the presence of God in the heavens, whence he would speedily come and bring the divine kingdom with all its blessings.

We can be very sure that something happened which explains the transformation of the disciples from disillusioned mourners to jubilant apostles. Jewish writers to-day give similar explanations to those offered by their fathers in the first days of the gospel. The body of Jesus was removed by Joseph of Arimathea or by other disciples and buried elsewhere. Radical liberalism sees in the resurrection narratives a poetic mythology by which alone great truths can enter lowly minds. But there are still able Christian scholars who find secure historical basis for the faith which the first Christians have transmitted to us, although wide differences of opinion exist with reference to the character of our Lord's triumph over death and with reference to the objective and subjective elements in the experience of the disciples.¹⁰

It is often overlooked that our oldest literary witness to the truth of the resurrection of Jesus is the letters of Paul. He was probably converted to Christianity within a year after the crucifixion of Christ.

A famous chapter in a letter to the church at Corinth makes it plain that the resurrection was no mere return to the material conditions of this life. "Flesh and blood," he wrote, "cannot inherit the kingdom of God." In another letter he declared that it pleased God to reveal his son "in me."¹¹ Paul was, evidently, more deeply influenced by his Hellenistic environment than we have hitherto supposed. Professor Dodd of Mansfield College, Oxford, declares that organism or "body" signified to Paul the principle of individuality, the pure organic form which persists through all changes of material particles. Thus Paul's insistence on the resurrection of the "body" is meant to assert the continuity of individual identity, as distinguished from the persistence of some impalpable shade or "soul" which was not in any real sense the identical man.¹²

The historical foundations of our faith in the resurrection of Christ, as presented in the narratives of the empty tomb and the appearances of the risen Savior, have their supplement in the spiritual aspects of the resurrection. This has been a neglected field in the discussion of Jesus' service to our confidence in a future life. If we are to have a living hope from the resurrection of Jesus, it must rest not simply on considerations which are at the mercy of historical criticism, but upon experiences engendered by the gospel of Christ, out of which the hope of immortality normally arises.

In our survey of the philosophical foundations of the hope of immortality, we found two great ideas which have supported the assurance of men, however little the ideas may have been consciously defined by them; they were the character of God and the worth of man.

In every age these are the two piers which sustain our confidence. From them, like the trusses of a cantilever bridge, our hopes reach out to each other until they meet and span the river of death. But while these are the basic ideas, Jesus greatly strengthens them, for in him we see supremely the character of God and the worth of man.

Our belief in immortality is directly conditioned upon the kind of character we assign to the Determiner of our future. If a blind force, indifferent to spiritual values, is at the heart of things, then faith in a future life is no longer possible. The half-moralized gods of primitive people can do no better for men than to leave them in a gloomy underworld. But when men once believe clearly and intensely in God as holy love, then they are sure that he will deliver them from death and elevate them into the joy of his presence. And it is precisely this service which Jesus has rendered to the world. In the loftiness and the kindness of the personality of Jesus Christian faith declares that we see the reality of God within the limits of human life. The name of Christ has become the focal point for the noblest ideals of the race. In the cross, there is revealed and symbolized a sacrificial love which cannot permit death to destroy us. When the conception of a Christlike God takes full possession of a human mind, immortality becomes an inevitable assurance.

Jesus renders service, also, to the immortal hope by his disclosure of the worth of man. In all ages, the soil out of which belief in survival springs is man's sense of the imperishableness of personal values. To this sense of values he may have given no conscious intellectual expression, he may have encumbered it with all manner of crude ideas and superstitious prac-

tices, but it is the seed plot of his hope in life after death.

The personality of Jesus, as a single, indivisible fact, is revelation both of God and man. The moral possibilities which lie in human personality found in him supreme realization. In the presence of his life, we need no labored intellectual processes to be sure of the conservation of his personal values. Our assurance rises out of our sense of the supremacy and permanence of the spiritual. There is in the New Testament no nobler argument for Jesus' victory over death than the words of Peter on the day of Pentecost, "It was not possible that he should be holden of it."¹³ If the emphasis falls upon the pronoun "he," then, there is here an appeal, not simply to the historical and the material, but to the spiritual. Our faith in the resurrection of Jesus thus stands upon the age-long conviction that human worth transcends the experience of death. If it is said that the greatest argument of Plato for immortality is Socrates himself, it can similarly be said that the supreme argument of Christianity is the simple and overwhelming fact of the personality of Jesus.

3. *The undiscovered country.* The assurance of immortality, we have seen, rests upon our total world view. We hold to it because it harmonizes with the personal conception of God and of man. When we seek to define the conditions of the life to come, we have for our guidance only our sense of the fitness of things. The realm beyond death is the undiscovered country, as far as our direct personal experience is concerned. We have, however, our experience in this life and are entitled to make inferences from it. In the one universe of the one God, we can find in our pres-

ent experience clews to the coming to-morrow. But clear and certain knowledge of that far country, we do not have. Efforts to describe it are ordinarily so puerile that they discourage further desire to go there. The more the life to come means, the less we can know it, for we do not now have the experience of that life as a basis for knowledge.

We are to think of death, not as mere change in locality, but as an ascent into a new type of experience. The transformation of a caterpillar into a butterfly presents a dim analogy. On the lower plane, what lies before us is enigmatic and inconceivable; on the higher plane, all seems natural, normal, and divine. In our forecast from this bank and shoal of time, two principles seem to us applicable to coming events—continuity and transition. The element of continuity will pertain to the unfoldings of eternal life in our personalities; the element of transition, to the external conditions under which personalities find expression. We cannot wish for another world as a mere duplicate of this world, for the endless perpetuation of just the kind of existence we now have. Our experience here will do for a beginning, but like pilgrims of long ago, we seek a better country.

The bodily aspect of life beyond death has occupied a large place in religious thought. Primitive people believed in the unity of human nature, the complete man was body and soul. When they parted at death, only an ineffective shade passed to the underworld. Fullness of life demanded a return of the soul from Sheol and its union with the resuscitated body. This belief was in large degree taken over by Christianity, as a part of its Jewish heritage. On the other hand, the Greek, influenced by Platonic other-worldliness,

thought of blessedness beyond death as release from the body. Paul finds a happy solution in the idea of a "spiritual body," which is not mere resuscitation of this body, but is, nevertheless, an instrument through which personal life finds expression in the eternal world, for how can we come into relation with the universe and with one another, unless clothed upon with our habitation which is from heaven? As for this present body, a literal resurrection of it is attended with insurmountable difficulties. In the course of the centuries, the same particles of matter probably enter into the composition of many human bodies. If resurrection signifies reassembling of bodily structures, a large degree of embarrassment can easily arise from the simultaneous appearance of numerous claimants for the same dust. The Christian doctrine of resurrection is something far more than reanimation.

When we remember that the universe of which we are aware is purely relative to our present powers, the idea of a spiritual body opens the door to alluring speculations. To a blind man, the gift of sight reveals a new world of reality. Perhaps, now we apprehend only a fraction of the universe and the conferment of new powers will reveal to us unimagined splendors. When we wonder whether other stellar bodies are inhabited, it is well to consider that personality can conceivably find other forms of expression than those with which we are familiar here. And would it not be wholly appropriate that each man should receive at the moment of death the body which is to serve him in the eternal sphere? The intermediate state thus becomes the immediate state.¹⁴

One of our most assured convictions concerning the future life is its inclusion within the moral order. The

moral law of love is not a provincialism of our planet but it holds sway everywhere. Within themselves our personalities carry the fruitage of their deeds. We cannot doubt the continuance of that retribution whereby each receives according to what he does, and reaps as he has sown. There cannot be a moral world, here or elsewhere, in which men are automata with no power of will. And while there is a law of increasing fixity of character, there is, also, a law of new causations and beginnings. The issues of human destiny must, therefore, lie beyond our ken, whatever the hopes which we may cherish. We dare not take the element of risk out of life lest we cease to gird ourselves and strive for the highest.

What death may signify as a moral experience, we cannot prophesy. Perhaps there is value in the suggestion that death is the divinely ordained method by which we are delivered from the registry of sin in our bodies and are made free for new careers. It is difficult for us to see how we can be "made perfect" at death. Nevertheless, the inner pledge of Christian experience entitles us to hope that in the world to come the evil and sorrow of life here shall be explained and transcended.

Our view of the universe, as dynamic and growing, puts its seal of approval upon the hope of personal progress in the age to come. We believe that we shall grow in knowledge and that the wisdom we have gathered here will be part of the capital with which we begin our careers. The brain will cease to assist—or impede—us, but just how the continuities of memory will dispense with the nervous system is another of our mysteries, although theories of ethereal and astral bodies are available for those who can use them. Pos-

sibly, weariness is an incident in our present plane of experience, and tireless strength is to be our portion.

And if there is a future life at all, who can doubt that it is a life of fellowship? Personality is essentially social in whatever worlds it sojourns. The fact spells fellowship with old friends and new. Who can forget Thomas Carlyle's words in his old age, as he thought of his wife? "If we are to meet! Oh Almighty Father, if we are; but silence! silence!"¹⁵ And there is the line in a letter of William James to his aged father in reference to a possible meeting with his departed mother, "If that *were* true, all would be solved and justified."¹⁶ Such expressions show that the hope of immortality must voice itself in the personal terms of fellowship.

The practical and social genius of our age insists upon service as an essential aspect of the world to come. Possibly, one reason for loss of interest in "heaven," is the insipid character of popular religious representations of it. No socially minded person cares for endless serenades in a universe where there is so much need. The opportunities of service there seem illimitable when we think of the immaturities of countless millions as they pass from this life. A new note sounds in present-day writings in the demand that the redeemed should give themselves to those who need them most.¹⁷ The vast interests which engage attention, in a truly Christian conception of a future life, forbid the idea that endless years will pall upon us. In a universe of personalities, the mutual interchanges of fellowship and service signify a life ever richer and ever more interesting.

CHAPTER XI

CERTAINTY IN RELIGION

THE world view which has personality for its constructive principle has undeniable elements of attraction. It gives to man's spiritual selfhood supreme importance for its intrinsic worth and for its interpretative values. It finds in personal being our noblest clew to the meaning of God. It sees in nature the garment of God and in history the sphere in which God is working out his beneficent purposes for mankind. It declares that the personality of Christ reveals within human life the reality of a Christlike God and that salvation is a moral experience through faith in God and fellowship with man. It affirms that respect for personality is the guiding principle in ethics and that all the institutions of society are to be appraised and molded with reference to the kind of personalities which they produce. And it believes that personalities, as the goal of the cosmic process and possessors of eternal spiritual values, are not transient incidents in the order of nature but are heirs of immortality.

But—is it true? Attractive as the philosophy of personalism may be, it is a delusion unless it fits the facts of life. The dreams of the opium smoker are full of charm but they do not correspond to realities. The illusions of a mirage are pleasant but it is best to

know the truth about the desert and to adjust ourselves to it. Science has given us a passion for reality and we fear to be deceived by wishful thinking. Not a few men distrust optimistic conclusions as too good to be true because inconsistent with the facts of human experience. Durant Drake concedes that the personalistic idea of God is "the most inspiring and precious belief that the mind of man has ever entertained," but he does not find the current arguments which support it wholly convincing.¹

The problem of knowledge deservedly receives large attention to-day, for it conditions all the results of human thinking. It profits us nothing to arrive at delightful conclusions if our whole process of reasoning is wrong. Happily, we see with our eyes before we formulate the theories of ophthalmology, likewise we know with our minds antecedent to the rise of epistemology, although both sciences are invaluable to the mature man as correctives and guides. It was wittily said by Creighton that we must have "epistemological grace before meat."² We may, however, make partial amends for dispensing with it before our theological dinner, by following a hallowed custom which required grace after meat, as well as before. It is not our purpose to restate arguments already advanced but, if possible, to establish their validity in the light of the general conditions of knowledge. There are certain preliminary considerations relative to the quest after religious certainty which demand attention, and there is a necessary evaluation of the factors which enter into the achievement of religious certainty.

1. *The quest after religious certainty.* At the outset, we remind ourselves that an intelligent quest involves definite objectives. Certainty is not a general

feeling of assurance having no reference to anything beyond ourselves. Our task is simplified when we recognize that the central fact in religion is God. As creator of the world, which he sustains by his immanent presence, God gives to the world its inmost meaning. If God himself is moral personality, he is the guarantee that spiritual values are the supreme goal of the cosmic process. Certainty in religion is not merely the assurance that man can participate in ideal social values, it is the assurance that God, as moral and friendly cosmic power, is objectively real. All the general interests of religion—the permanent worth of man, the experience of salvation, a divine social order, a life everlasting, are contingent upon the sublime fact of God. To be certain of the Christlike God is to be sure of all else.

It is obvious that many factors enter into the quest after certainty in religion. In this part of our discussion, it is sufficient to refer to the need for certainty, to the light which we may expect from science in our search for spiritual realities, and to the spirit of expectation which we may reasonably cherish as we begin our pilgrimage.

The need of certainty in religion underlies our quest after it. A militant agnosticism may proclaim itself satisfied with the findings of physical science and the tasks of social betterment, but our scientific and social interests have implications which reach beyond themselves. Auguste Comte bade us to restrict ourselves to nature and society but the insatiable demands of his heart led him to invent his Religion of Humanity, and even to provide a cosmic setting by affirming the friendliness of the universe. The philosophy of one world at a time cannot suffice for creatures who by

their very natures transcend the present. Unlike Shelley's skylark,

We look before and after,
And pine for what is not.

The attitude of indifference to the ultimate meaning of existence is not normal to man. The present unbelief on the part of certain intellectual groups is a passing mood which must give way to a renewed pilgrimage in the eternal quest after God. We cannot operate a solar system and dispense with the sun. Every type of life needs its native element, its appropriate environment; the fish needs the sea, the bird needs the air, and man needs God. The words of Arthur Hallam still echo in our souls:

Lord! Lord! I have tried how this thing or that thing will fit my spirit. I can find nothing to rest on, for nothing here hath any rest of itself. Oh! center and source of light and strength, oh! fulness of all things, I come back and join myself to thee.³

The type of certainty which we need must take account of our adventurous nature. It must not be gained too easily, nor answer all our problems with finality. The assumption that man is a purely comfort-seeking animal is as fallacious as the famous dictum which made him an economic animal. When aroused, as by the passion of war, or by the infinitely higher passion of religious faith, money, comfort, death itself, are as nothing. Man is a pioneer, a discoverer, a darer, and any theological or ecclesiastical arrangement which denies him the experience of adventure, is foe and not friend. Whether the gulfs wash him down or he reaches the Happy Isles, he must leave his pent-up Utica and voyage forth.

Our spiritual education is involved in the method by which we attain religious certainty. We need guidance, it is true, but all real education is self-education. We must face the issues for ourselves; cultivate discrimination and insight; verify our conclusions in experience; thus we build personalities which possess initiative and power. Infallible tribunals, of whatever kind, would be a disservice to us for they would deprive us of the blessings involved in the quest of certainty. We need the spur of our insecurities, in order to call forth our highest effort. It is an exaggeration of this truth, however, to say that the quest is itself a sufficient reward. No miner will dig endlessly for gold without the occasional encouragement of real discovery. A wholesome philosophy of life combines challenge and certainty.

Doubt is one of the necessary factors in the achievement of the higher certainties. The unquestioning acceptance of all we are told, especially in the swirl of modern opinions, would soon fill the mind with indigestible contradictions. The choice of the external authority to which we bow involves appraisals of its competency and the inherent reasonableness of its teachings, a process which usually gives rise to wholesome doubts. If doubt were sinful, primitive man could never have risen out of his superstitions, nor could a child put away childish thoughts and attain intellectual maturity. There is a normal unfolding of the mind by which we can enter into ever worthier conceptions of God and his world. Even a period of skepticism may have its justification, as a transition from lower to higher forms of faith. Doubt, however, is not good in itself, it is good only as a necessary incident

to the attainment of nobler forms of belief. It exists to be overcome by divine positives.

We need certainty for the sake of mental satisfaction. The mind cannot rest unless it has a reasonable assurance with respect to basic realities. A soul, with the principle of order in its very structure, can find no peace in chaos, there is nothing of which it can be sure. The whole effort of science is devoted to the reduction of the diverse phenomena of nature into orderly relations upon which we can depend. The joy of a great scientific discovery, whether it is Archimedes and the law of specific gravity, or Kepler and the law of planetary motion, is a joy conferred by a new certainty with respect to the intelligibleness and dependableness of the natural order. No doubt, the solution of all our intellectual problems would take away the zest of life but we have little to fear in this particular. The larger our island of knowledge becomes, the more its shores touch the illimitable and mysterious oceans by which we are surrounded.

The emotional life of man, also, requires confidence with regard to its basic interests. In the sphere of personal relations, loyalty is the foundation of friendship. The home is impossible if there is no mutual confidence. The traitor is held in scorn because he makes it difficult for persons to trust one another. The Hebrews had reached one of the notable milestones of the history of religion when they saw in Yahweh no longer a deity of caprice but a God of absolute faithfulness whose goodness could be trusted in the most desperate circumstances. The doctrine of "assurance" does not receive to-day the emphasis given to it by earlier Protestantism, but it remains true that an all-important

element in religion is the consciousness of security in God.

There can be no question that a reasonable certainty is needed for effective living. Doubt in itself, without hope at its heart, is a paralysis. Faith is everywhere the principle of achievement, alike in Columbus sailing westward over the sea of darkness, and in Christ believing in the reality of a coming Kingdom of God. Without expectation of a harvest, no farmer would scatter even a handful of seed. The religious leader, in particular, must deal in positives, if he is to awaken faith in his fellow men. The trumpet which gives an uncertain sound cannot call men into successful battle. The genuine prophet is so certain of the truth of his message that he puts it upon the lips of God and says, "Thus saith the Lord." The New Testament, as a literature of power, abounds in phrases of assurance. Nor does the highest certitude rise from knowledge of one opinion only and ignorance of all others. It has its basis in acquaintance with competitive ideas, in intelligent discrimination between truth and error, and in the conviction that only the best is good enough for men everywhere.

In our quest after certainty in religion, there is light in a study of the nature of the assurances which science has been able to win. Science and religion are the two great complementary fields of human interest; one has to do with facts, the other with values. They see one and the same universe from different points of view. Each according to its vision beholds areas of reality hidden from the other. Science deals with the actualities of which the five senses take cognizance, seeking the facts with respect to phenomena and the laws which govern their relations. Religion, on the

other hand, takes us into the world of the evaluational, the emotional, the moral, the personal. The primrose to the botanist is *primula flava*, and it is nothing more, whereas to Wordsworth, the meanest flower that blows moves to thoughts too deep for tears. The so-called conflict of science and religion is a joust in definitions. They move in separate planes and cannot intersect. A battle between them is no more feasible than a fight between an elephant and a whale, for they live in different worlds of interest.

Certainty is popularly supposed to belong preëminently, if not exclusively, to science. The physical universe assails our senses at every turn and we cannot possibly interpret our experience without recognition of the reality of material objects, however we define the nature of the reality. The fixity of our experience compels us to believe in an objective order of physical things and laws. No caprice of thought on our part can halt the stroke of the lightning, or suspend the law of gravitation when we fall on a slippery sidewalk. On the other hand, spiritual realities seem at times subjective and unreal. Immanuel Kant, innocently enough, encouraged science to think of itself as distinctively the field of certainties, by giving to acquaintance with its facts the honorific title of "knowledge"; whereas, noumenal or spiritual realities belonged to the sphere of "faith." Tennyson gave wide currency to the same dualism when he wrote:

We have but faith: we cannot know;
For knowledge is of the things we see.*

It has thus come to pass that the secular temper of our time regards religion as the realm of beautiful poetic mythologies and illusions, oblivious to the fact that

our most immediate and assured certainties are the certainties of personality.

What we have in both science and religion is "knowledge," but knowledge in each case appropriate to two worlds of interest and the methods of knowledge-discovery which is proper to them. The general method of science, as experiment, hypothesis, verification, is the method of knowledge which obtains everywhere. In experiment, we have observation under specially favorable conditions. Having gathered the facts, we seek some general law by which we can set them in orderly sequence and classify them. The hypothesis thus made, we verify by a new reference to all the facts, noting exceptions as keenly as we do especially favorable phenomena. There is, first of all, perception of the fact, then the conception or general idea, and last of all, interpretation in the light of knowledge already gained. Our physical senses carry to the brain various reports, or sensations, out of which we elaborate knowledge. The mind, by principles immanent in itself, organizes knowledge out of fragmentary, discontinuous data brought by the senses. If this were the whole of knowledge, we would be poor indeed. There is a realm of duty, love, hope, God, which lies beyond the findings of the sciences, with certainties of its own.

This brief glance at the methods of science shows that even the certainties of scientific knowledge rest upon assumptions of faith. At every stage of the processes of science, we assume the trustworthiness of our faculties, the reality and honesty of a world objective to ourselves, the universality of law with its assurance of a dependable and intelligible universe. Who

can give us absolute certainty that the star we discover is an objective, stellar reality and not a mere subjective disturbance in the brain? How do we know that persons, other than ourselves, really exist? There is no theoretical escape from the monstrous egotism of the solipsist who thinks himself the entire universe, except through those postulates of faith which are necessary to give coherence to our experience. The moment we proceed to understand a fact, we assume that it has its place in an orderly world which the mind can understand. No one has compassed all phenomenal facts and found them existent in intelligible relations. The universality of law, as the basic postulate of science, is a magnificent venture of faith. All scientific knowledge, it is obvious, rests upon faith, which in its assumption that the order of things in which we live is trustworthy and, therefore, kindly, is implicitly faith in God.

The conclusion is inescapable that "probability" is our guide in science, as truly as in practical life. We can have rigid mathematical demonstration only in the figures of geometry or in the formulæ of logic. In real life, the three angles of a triangular piece of land do not equal two right angles, for our lines are not infallibly straight. The Greek thinkers elaborated a doctrine of probabilism, but the skeptics in all ages have failed to do justice to the practical implication that we must act on the conclusion which we reach as though it were the undisputed absolute. We have no alternative but to jump into the abyss with both feet. What we are pleased to call knowledge, even in science, as Simpson pithily says, is "high-grade probability." ⁶ Emphatically, this is true in such fields as history with

all its conflicting testimony. Our courts of law deal with our most cherished personal interests, and do it upon the basis of probability.

We have thus far used the accepted term "probability," but we must confess that it is an inadequate term. It seems to suggest a delicate balancing of the scales and a precarious conclusion. In the sphere of religion, to say nothing of science, we need a stronger term, and we, therefore, prefer to speak of "moral certainty." When we trust in God, as well as in his world, we do not build upon dubious surmise but upon certainty which is moral because it involves the whole integrity of our experience.

As we set forth on our quest after certainty in religion, we are inspired and sustained by a spirit of expectation which is rightly called "moral optimism." The full implication of the attitude of moral optimism has been cogently elucidated by Professor Macintosh.⁶ He has shown the necessity of this attitude for all successful living and has deduced from it all the basic truths of the Christian faith, notably belief in God and immortality. We shall concern ourselves here simply with the insistence that "the good, the true and the beautiful" are inseparably united. This famous triad has expressed for ages the supreme values of human life. And certainly from the days of Plato, it is largely agreed that they are not three utterly separated interests, but are phases of one ultimate reality, for the universe is one. The limitations of our minds are such that we must break up reality into concepts, in order to apprehend it at all. But we know that the jewel is one, however many the facets through which our eyes see its splendors.

The good and the true cannot be dissociated and

placed in antagonism to each other. Science takes the true as its special field of interest. It is wholly right in its determination to know the truth, without compromise with inherited ideas and personal prejudices. The theologian owes to the ideal of truth a similar whole-hearted devotion. And all of us are confident that truth is somehow best for us. It profits no one to build his life upon a lie. However deeply we are hurt by the discovery that a cherished conviction is a fantasy, we, nevertheless, believe that knowledge of the truth is part of the highest good. Do not the secularists tell us that abandonment of faith in God and immortality will spur us to seek social justice for men here and now? Men generally are ready to declare that the true is also the good, but are they willing to concede that the good is also the true? Religion and art, no less than science, have their pathways to the one temple of reality.

Life, by its very nature, seems to have a charter of optimism written within itself. At the heart of every form of life there is an inward urge toward self-preservation, self-realization and self-propagation. Evidently, life thinks well of itself. And as it reaches out into its environment to lay hold of elements to sustain and enlarge itself, it seems disposed to believe in the responsiveness and kindness of the universe. Faith in the goodness of existence may be an illusion, but it is necessary to victorious living. Any other attitude leads to the obliteration of life. Pessimism is a disease because it is the negation of life, its logical issue is the void. No one can demonstrate that life is good, it is a postulate we must make in order to live at all.

These facts have a profound bearing upon our disposition to believe. We cannot, without being false

to the scientific ideal to which we are pledged, believe a thing just because it is pleasant so to believe, but we certainly will not reject it through mere fear that it is a product of wishful thinking. The fact that an idea appeals to our sense of the good and the beautiful is presumptive proof that it is true. The charge is sometimes made against personalistic philosophy that it is built to defend preëstablished moral and religious convictions. The existence of evil in the world, particularly, is regarded as confuting the roseate conclusions of personalism. But in point of fact, Christian faith, in its doctrine of redemptive love, deals profoundly with the mystery of sin and sorrow. It has no tolerance for the superficial optimism which is blind to the tragic aspects of human experience, but its vision is so wide that it sees things with due perspectives in the light of God. And in that radiant light, it is disposed to believe that the veritably good must be the credibly true.

Instead of saying that a noble belief is "too good to be true," it is more reasonable to say that it is too good not to be true. The latter attitude fits in better with the demands of life and the character of the Christly God.

Friend, surely so
For this I know
That our faiths are foolish by falling below
Not coming above what God will show.⁷

The beliefs which are favorable to richness and fullness of life cannot be brushed aside by calling them "rationalizations." There is no truth, even in science to which our minds have not given form, but it is not thereby discredited. A man may believe in immortality without any stultification of the scientific spirit,

arriving at his conclusion, not through test tubes, scales and telescopes, but through his sense of values and the demands of a comprehensive and coherent view of life. There is only one possible reason which can justify dis-faith in immortality, and that is that something far better is true, which cannot be.

The extent of a man's beliefs must be determined by the number of beliefs which can pass the tests imposed by the good, the true and the beautiful. There is a certain validity, of course, to an ascetic attitude of the intellect. This is the temper which believes as little as it must, especially in religion. We do not, however, follow a similar rule in our personal relationships. The normal man believes all the good which he can concerning his friends. Far better is the over-belief which takes the hazard of faith, knowing that in the personal world faith is a creative power which makes its hopes come true. The path of wisdom is to believe all that our logical faculties will permit, where the vital interests of life are at stake. It is well to be a great believer.

2. *The achievement of religious certainty.* The quest after certainty in religion has its rewards. It is true that Omar, the tent maker, depicts the seeker after truth as evermore coming out of the door which he has entered, but we believe that his pessimism has its refutation in the facts of Christian experience. Pilgrimage has romantic elements but it becomes a tragedy when it never arrives anywhere. Its ideal terminus, in any event, is the City of God, which has foundations and whose gates on every side are always open. Two methods offer themselves to us with pledges of religious certainty; one is the method of authority, the other is the method of personality.

The idea of authority has played a large part in human life generally, not least of all in religion. It signifies, in substance, the right of some power external to us to tell us what to believe as true and what to do as right. Authority is thus the whole religious question. It underlies the entire structure of faith and conduct. If men could agree on their views of authority, much of the contention within religious circles would cease. The word itself is innocent enough, as it begins its career in the ancient Latin. "Auctoritas" was an expression of responsible and competent opinion which, therefore, carried deserved weight. We speak to-day of "authorities" in the various spheres of human thought and activity. No one presumes to dispense with "experts." We accept their judgments, although with reserved right to pronounce upon their competency, and even upon their conclusions.

The need of external authority, although not necessarily "merely external," is obvious to anyone acquainted with human dependence and immaturity. The child needs the directive authority of its parents, even though it is an authority successful only as it increasingly abolishes itself. In the political world, we find that ordered liberty is contingent upon the right of the state to rule us, tempered by our collective right to reconstitute the state. There may be a certain relativity in the authority exercised by human society, but no one can doubt the absolute, external authority of the world order over us. The laws of nature in no wise depend on our consent; if we break them, they inexorably react against us. We must believe that there is an equal absoluteness in the laws of the spiritual world, for laws everywhere are the transcript of God's character, as he has expressed himself in the

order of things. Infallible, absolute authority is in God but in God alone, and all the authorities which mediate his authority to us are relative and partake of our human limitations. Historically, the two outstanding claimants to authority, within the Christian religion, are the Church and the Bible.

Catholicism, in its various branches, regards the Church as the seat of authority. It was widely held in earlier centuries, as it is held to-day in Anglican and Greek Catholic circles, that the Church, as represented in its general councils, has authority in matters of faith. But the monarchical principle has been carried to its logical issue in Roman Catholicism, and the Pope, as bishop of Rome and heir of Peter, is regarded as the custodian of orthodoxy and morality. In 1870, the doctrine of papal infallibility was formally promulgated by Pius IX, the Vatican Council consenting but in no wise giving validity to the decree.

The papal claim of infallible authority was carefully defined. It ascribes to the Pope no sinlessness and no freedom from error when he speaks unofficially. It declares that when he speaks *ex cathedra*, from the chair, that is, when as pastor and teacher of all Christians, he defines a doctrine regarding faith and morals to be held by the universal church, he is possessed of that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed that his church should be endowed. In the light of these definitions, it is difficult to know just what utterances of the Pope are infallible, for we cannot always clearly say what doctrines pertain to faith and morals rather than to philosophy and politics, nor can we be sure when the Pope is formally seated on Peter's chair or on some more secular piece of furniture. The general claim of authority is clear, how-

ever difficult its applications, and it is acknowledged by the faithful everywhere. Ignatius Loyola, in his *Spiritual Exercises*, lays it down as a fixed principle for members of the Jesuit order, "What I see white, I believe to be black, if the Hierarchical Church so define it to be." And Father Ronald Knox, in our day, tells us that the Church rightfully asks us to believe solely on her authority, as the duly accredited representative of a Divine Teacher, although of course, with all Catholics, he holds that reason has its function in proving the claims of God and Christ and the Church.⁸ We assure ourselves of the credentials of the Church and then submissively accept its dogmas.

It scarcely seems necessary to refute claims so extreme, they fall by their own weight. They have no secure basis either in the New Testament or in reason. We know of no magic by which the brain of one man, with all the moral and intellectual limitations common to humanity, can deliver infallible judgments on anything. We must, however, acknowledge the vast truth in the idea that the common judgment of the Church universal, the spiritual Church if not the visible Church, illumined by the gospel, instructed by prophetic leaders, guided by the divine Spirit, is our nearest human approach to a knowledge of the mind and will of God.

In Protestant Christianity, much emphasis has been placed on the Bible as the rule of faith and practice. The controversy with Rome required an authority definite, objective, open to all, and the Scriptures were elevated to the throne previously held by the Church. It must be said, however, that the Catholic Church, on its part, regards the gospel of Christ "as the fountain of all," both saving truth and moral discipline,

but it gives to "tradition" coördinate rank with the written books.⁹ In the nature of things, tradition in the passing centuries became a jumble of heterogeneous elements. Protestants denied the authority of tradition and held solely to the canonical Scriptures. The attitude of the Reformers was one of freedom in the use of the Scriptures. Luther regarded Christ alone as normative and did not hesitate to cast aside books, like the Epistle of James, which he regarded as inconsistent with the spirit and teaching of Jesus. The formal principle of Protestantism was the authority of the Scriptures, but the inner principle was justification by faith, a principle which carried with it the autonomy of the individual conscience. Post-reformation scholasticism carried the doctrine of Scriptural authority to its extreme, the Swiss formula of Consensus in 1675 even insisted upon the infallibility of the vowel points in the Hebrew text of the Old Testament.

No one can doubt the supreme value of the Bible as a religious guide. It is the literary record of the greatest creative movement in the history of religion, the movement which gave clear historical expression to the essential truths of ethical monotheism. It presents to us practically all we know concerning the extraordinary personality of Jesus. Such a record naturally embodies normative truths valuable for all time. As the divine revelation recorded in the Bible was a progressive one, covering many centuries, it inevitably reflected contemporary ideas of science and history and religion. Its authority, therefore, is not of the letter but of the spirit. Faulkner finds the infallibility of the Bible "in its general drift and spiritual implications and essence."¹⁰ Such a conception of authority

delivers us from bondage to texts and enables us to live in the Religion of the Spirit.

A complete view of authority in religion must take account of its twofold aspects—the outer and the inner. Thus far, we have dwelt chiefly on the external side of authority, as it has been historically expressed in the Church and in the Bible. No one can deny the necessity of these objective realities. We can no more dispense with the truth of God which has been mediated to us through history and society, and realize our higher lives as spiritual beings, than as physical beings we can do without a physical environment. A clear distinction, however, must be made between the divine order with its absolute laws and our human interpretations of them. Gravitation has authority, but not Ptolemy's account of it; the purpose of God has authority but not Augustine's view of it. Our external authorities in the sphere of interpretation, whether in science or in religion, must find their completions in the response which they awaken in us.

The human mind has power to know the truth, as the eye is able to respond to the sunlight. This power is conceded even by the Roman Church, when it bids us to validate by reason the authority of the Church, and having done so, dutifully to accept its deliverances. The same reason which recognizes the credentials of the Church must pronounce upon its message. Truth carries its own credentials and every teaching which overlooks the fact is a form of unbelief in spiritual forces. The free response of every man to the truth does not result in social chaos, for men everywhere are essentially alike, and everyone is deeply influenced by the collective judgments of his fellow men.

The ultimate court of appeal in religion, therefore, is the conscience of the individual man. And the ampler name for conscience is personality. The historic doctrine of "the witness of the Spirit," as the ground of our persuasion of the truth of the Scriptures, enunciated by the Westminster Confession, is a recognition of the inward aspect of authority. The "Spirit" is God immanent and active in human personality. The witness of the Spirit, then, is the response of our minds and hearts to the objective revelation which God has given. And apart from that witness and that response, there is no spiritual authority. Certainly, every man with a right spirit will seek to inform his mind and correct his conclusions in the light of the widest possible acquaintance with the thoughts of good men everywhere, as recorded in Scripture or expressed by the Church; but the final tribunal is God speaking in the throne-room of his own personality. "The seat of authority is here," says the aged Adolf Harnack, as he strikes his breast over the heart, "it is here where the Jesus of history meets the Christ of experience. When steel strikes stone, then come the stars."¹¹

In the achievement of religious certainty, the final fact is personality. No doubt there are personal factors in the method of authority, but large areas of personality are virtually suppressed when we blindly accept the pronouncements of external tribunals. The reason, in this case, after its preliminary investigation of credentials, goes into retirement. Even the sentiments, at times outraged by cruel doctrines and commands, are not permitted to have any part in our decision with respect to what is true and right. Only the will comes into play and that in terms of passive

acceptance and obedience. By way of eminence, therefore, we may denominate the attainment of religious certainty, through the activity of the whole range of our spiritual powers, as the method of personality.

The surest knowledge which we have pertains not to objects and tribunals external to us but pertains to personality. The base line of all knowledge is our immediate sense of the existence of the self. However I interpret the self, its reality is certified to me by a direct act of consciousness. And the certainties which pertain to the external world of science or society are the perceptions and the interpretations of personal experience. We do not think of ourselves as dwelling in a solipsistic wilderness, where neither God nor neighbor are, because our experience cannot achieve coherence without assuming their objective reality, and it is by experience that our instinctive assumption is verified.

The discovery of the method by which the mind operates ought not to invalidate the reality of an objective world and reduce all experience to subjectivism. Yet this is the error into which a naïve psychologism has fallen in matters of religion. It attempts to explain the spiritual order, which the religious man thinks to be objective, purely in terms of inner adjustments. According to E. D. Martin, God is an escape mechanism, the mere rationalization of a father-complex. "Hence psychologically speaking," says he, "reconciliation with the father means reconciliation of our infantile jealousy with the fact of our own maturity."¹² No doubt, there are desires which we objectify, but we adjudge them to be mere rationalizations in contrast with desires which correspond to objective realities. All will agree that our experience

as experience is fact—quite as much fact as are cannon balls. The peace and inward freedom which a man finds through trust in God are a fact. That such trust brings peace is not a law which man established, it is ordained by the Nature-of-Things in which man lives, and the Nature-of-Things is only an awkward name for God. No reasonable man insists, because our awareness of the sun is mediated to us by the opening of our eyes, that the sun in the heavens is, therefore, only a function of the eyelids. A knowledge of method is no more a negation of objective reality in religion than it is anywhere else. If we learn how God does a thing, we need not conclude that he has nothing to do with it and does not even exist.

If religion moves primarily in a personal world, the method of religious knowledge will be the method suitable to that kind of a world. All knowledge is won by observation, interpretation, verification, whether in science or elsewhere, but the special application of this triadic rule depends on the particular facts with which it deals. One does not know a meteorite from the sky and a painting by Raphael in just the same way. In the case of the meteorite, we measure and weigh, we analyze into component elements. We pick at its burned surface and find that it is composed of the same materials as we find upon our planet. But the painting—we do not pick at the pigment and learn its composition, we stand before it and recognize its beauty.

The method of science, distinctively, is analysis. We learn what are the constituent factors in an object and how they are related to each other and to the immediate environment. The method of art and religion, on the other hand, is synthesis, we allow the

object to make its impression upon us. The way to know a man, as a personal being, is not to reduce him to his physical and psychical elements and to put them in jars and diagrams, neatly labeled. We become acquainted with the real man through the sympathy and the friendship by which we receive the impact of his total personality. Whatever analysis we make of his character is strictly subordinate to the entirety of his manhood. It is one of the superstitions of our time that reality must be found in constituent elements, such as electrons and neutral mental entities; whereas reality, in the highest sense, is found in that organization of material and spiritual forces which we call personality, secondarily in man, and supremely in God. The interpretation of personal experience which yields religious certainty must concern itself with both the apprehension and the confirmation of spiritual reality.

In the light of the unity of personality, so stressed by modern psychology, it is an axiom that we can lay hold of reality only with our total powers. The nature of man does not operate in installments, one part of him active while the rest is quiescent. When a man does anything, the whole of him does it. And when he learns anything, every power of his being coöperates, although some one aspect has a relative prominence. Man is like a pile of lint, we cannot twist a single thread without drawing all other threads into its train. The three approaches to a knowledge of spiritual reality are cognitive insight, moral sympathy, and volitional activity.

The mind is equipped with powers by which it apprehends both physical and spiritual reality. By means of these powers, it gives coherence to sense

perceptions and makes knowledge out of them. But over and above what is evolved from these perceptions are such rational ideas as completeness, necessity, which are part of the structure of the mind, no matter how the mind gained possession of them. By means of these categories, like space and time, the mind can conceive of yesterdays and to-morrows, and place things in intelligible relations. To the direct apprehension of the meaning of the objective order, we give the name "intuition," or instinct, or insight. Rudolf Otto regards the idea of the "holy" as a complex of rational and non-rational elements, won by us through powers which are "purely *a priori*," or part of the original furnishings of the mind. And to the faculty by which we recognize the holy he gives the name of "divination."¹³ The sense of the divine rises in us through the direct response of the receptive human spirit to the presence of God, antecedent to our expression of the divine in rational concepts. The sense of the divine, indeed, is too great to be stated in any of our concepts. This is the paradox of religion—we know the love which passeth knowledge.¹⁴

The function of reason, in the narrower sense of the term, is the examination and classification and evaluation of the beliefs which intuition has already engendered in us. Reason is not creative but critical. It is very evident that the logical faculties, therefore, cannot in themselves alone bring us to a knowledge of reality. The word "rationalism" has fallen into disfavor because it is the effort to understand religion solely in terms of reason. "Rationalism," as thus conceived, is itself irrational for it employs only rational processes, and, therefore, has no reality upon which to work. Life produced religion long before philo-

sophical speculation was born. I know my neighbor by acquaintance and not by logic. Personality answering to personality—this is knowledge in the personal world with all its innate certainties.

Moral sympathy, also, is one of the conditions of spiritual discovery in the realm of personalities. In the sciences, the natural sciences particularly, the emotions play a relatively small part. The attitude of the scientific investigator is supposed to be impartial and impersonal. He seeks to know the facts, irrespective of all likes and dislikes, of all preconceptions and predilections. And yet, it is true that all theorizing is sustained by deep currents of feeling. The love which the scientist feels toward the objects of his study is a factor in his success. There is a subtle sympathy between him and them. Man would not be able to know the world at all if he were not organic to it, a part of its inmost life. The bridge which spans the gulf between mind and matter, enabling mind to know the material universe, is the fact that both are expressions of the World Soul, and, therefore, in a true sense are kindred realities.

In the mutual knowledge of personalities, sympathy is all-essential. Intuition is living in the stream of things, it is a getting inside by vital affinities. Love is interpenetration of personalities, the mutual sharing of life. As the great poets know, love is reason at its deepest, for love alone can understand. Self-disclosure is inhibited in an atmosphere of hostility and contempt. We appreciate noble purposes in a human life when those purposes are our own. It is a truism of the Christian gospel, that community of life is a condition of acquaintance. Like alone knows like. The knowledge of God demands of us a vital sympathy

with the divine aims in our own lives and in history.

Of profound importance, also, in the apprehension of religious truth is volitional activity. In the normal development of personality, probably purposive action has primary place, then come reason and affection. For the most part, however, our powers are spokes in one wheel; all move at the same time. Nature lays the foundation for our mental and emotional life in our instinctive reactions to particular situations. In pure science, we need not do anything about our facts, knowing is an end in itself. As scientists we have done our duty about the stone when we have described and classified it; others may make of it a millstone or a gravestone, as they please. But in the sphere of moral values, we must act in order to know. We may be told that there is satisfaction in doing our duty, but all the argumentation in the world cannot reveal to us this moral truth. But when we perform even the humblest duty in the spirit of self-forgetful love, lo! the secret of the divine peace is disclosed to us.

The knowledge of God is attained through coöperation with the divine purposes, as well as through logical reasoning and loving trust. "Probability" is the knowledge attainable by us, in view of the assumptions of faith which underlie both science and religion. But probability does not yield the highest certainty until we act upon it. We must fling ourselves upon the side of the scale which probability favors. Belief in God is a supreme adventure, with a supreme reward. Obedience is still the organ of religious knowledge. Like Lady Henry Somerset, we gain the triumphant certainty of God, when we obey the mystic voice;

"Live as though I were, and you shall know that I am." ¹⁵

The confirmation of our religious ideas, as well as the discovery of them, is given to us in our total personal experience. The tests which we apply to reality are not simple, they involve the activity of the whole man. Rationalism, mysticism, voluntarism unite to give us assurance. What illumines the mind, enkindles the noblest feelings, and strengthens the will for its conflicts and duties, that is true. The response of personality in its entirety gives us unshakeable confidence. The tests of truth are intellectual coherence, emotional satisfaction, and practical helpfulness.

The most available mental criterion which we apply to an idea is coherence with already accepted ideas. In giving primacy to intellectual coherence, it is not necessary to deny value to other criteria which are widely employed, such as universal belief, tradition, survival power. Truth is not infrequently defined as correspondence to reality. When the content of the mind is a faithful picture of the outward reality, then we have truth. The statement is, no doubt, correct, but what we really have in the mind at first is perceptions, out of which we ourselves build concepts. The mind itself contributes so much to knowledge, that it is difficult to lay the object and the idea side by side and to pronounce on their similarities. What we can do is to introduce the new idea to our mental household, and if he proves himself acceptable company, bid him make himself at home. When a student acquires a new world view, many old beliefs fall away, and new ones take their places, not through formal logical processes, but simply through an intuitive mental sense of the fitness of things. The capac-

ity of the average mind, however, to entertain contradictions is quite remarkable and it is not everyone who achieves even approximate inward harmony.

Delight in the concord of ideas is the native right of the soul. The scientist in his discoveries, the philosopher in his meditations, find compensations in the disinterested love of truth, wholly apart from the practicalities of daily life. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God . . . with all thy mind"¹⁰ is a command which carries its own reward. The philosophy of "instrumentalism," which sees nothing but functional value in ideas, is only fractionally true. In the lower stages of evolution, mind may be solely the instrument of the biological urge, but in due time it acquires rights of its own. During our immaturity, we think to eat, but as the years bring the philosophic mind, we eat to think. In our enjoyment of the harmonies of truth, we have one of the valid certifications of reality.

The idea of God enables us to win a coherent view of the world, therefore we know that it is true. It brings order into the contents of our mind, and this is a credential of reality. By its very structure, the mind operates with the category of cause and effect. It can no more attain mental peace by regarding the orderly cosmos as a fortuitous concourse of atoms than it can do so by ascribing the Brooklyn Bridge to chance. Even the problem of evil in our moral world loses something of its sharpness when we see it in the light of the vicarious love of God. Regarded in its entirety, the personalistic Christian world view, in its respect for scientific facts and spiritual values, is our most coherent interpretation of the universe, and for this reason it creates certainty in our minds.

We attain certainty, also, by our emotional satisfactions. The heart has been called the best of theologians and it certainly has its reasons which the head may not understand. No doubt, our emotions are peculiarly powerful and subtle and there is real danger in "emotional thinking." Nevertheless, our feelings are essential factors in personal life and legitimate avenues to spiritual assurance. We can do far worse than accept the conclusions of emotional thinking; when our emotions are high and pure, we shall probably arrive more nearly at the truth of things than by an unbreakable logic based on false premises. Love is the fulfillment of the law, for its instinctive findings can be trusted. The intuition, which admits us into the heart of things, is quite as truly emotional as it is intellectual. Does not art, no less than science, have its certainties? Music oftentimes is the truest divination of reality. The first sure consciousness of God is more frequently awakened in us through the impression made by parental reverence in the divine presence than by the disquisitions of philosophers, valuable as their theories may be.

There is emotional satisfaction in faith in God, because aspiration thus finds an adequate sphere. We can strive after holiness and love when we know that we live in a world which was built for them. And in God, there is peace, for in him is perfect goodness and illimitable power. We are safe in his hands. The craving for fellowship, also, finds in God a perfect fulfillment. In all these particulars, God carries his own credentials. Frederick W. H. Myers pointed out the emotional certainty inherent in religious experience, when he wrote the vibrant lines:

Whoso has felt the Spirit of the Highest
Cannot confound nor doubt him, nor deny:
Yea with one voice, O world, tho' thou deniest,
Stand thou on that side, for on this am I.¹⁷

The practical helpfulness of a belief, also, accredits it to us as true. Here we find an emphasis congenial to the modern temper. It has received formal expression in pragmatism, as a theory of knowledge. It declares that a belief is certified as true, if it works, on the whole and in the long run. Thus, there is apparently a relativity to truth, for what works seems dependent on particular situations. Perhaps we can "make truth." A falsehood may indeed seem serviceable for the moment, but the mills of the gods grind it to powder in due time.

The practical value of truth is a major consideration in the search for certainty. The universe would be fatally atwist, if a truth could be true and yet be hostile to our highest interests. The utilitarian approach seems to savor of cash values and to be inconsistent with a pure love of truth. Perhaps it is better to say that a thing works because it is true, than to say that it is true because it works. In applying the test of utility, we have difficulty, of course, in knowing how long a long run should be, just as we cannot be sure how much time constitutes permanence, when permanence is made the test of truth. But our inexpugnable conviction that the good, and the true, and the beautiful are one and inseparable makes us sure that beliefs genuinely helpful to a good and beautiful life are also true.

The Christian religion, with its innate personalism, is willing to meet the pragmatic test. Its Founder, in speaking of trees and of people, declared that by

their fruits we shall know them. The religion which bears his name has not always been true to its own ideals, but in its inherent possibilities and in its actual ministries, it is incontestably helpful. Its philosophy of life has practical value, for nothing so frees a man's powers and orients him in his world as a reasonably satisfied mind. And beyond all measure is the comfort and hope which the gospel of a Fatherly God and of personal immortality has brought to the burdened hearts of men. Christianity challenges our latent energies with tasks necessary to the achievement of a divine society and imparts to all receptive souls a steadfast strength. We find in it full moral certainty because it brings to us illumination, solace and power.

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